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The aim of this dissertation is to understand and analyze the museum location decision, defined 
as where museum founders choose to establish or relocate their institution. The empirical case is 
the museum population of New York City from 1910-2010. In three substantive chapters, I 
explore this complex decision process from the organizational-level, the population-level, and 
the audience-level. In the first chapter, I argue that the museum location decision has evolved 
over the past century, and has experienced three major paradigm shifts. Out of each era, a new 
model of the museum location decision has taken hold, resulting in the current organizational 
landscape. I demonstrate how these eras emerged through historical, comparative case studies of 
two New York museums, the Museum of Modern Art and the Whitney Museum of American Art. 
In second chapter, I show that the location decisions illustrated through the histories of the 
Whitney Museum of American Art and the Museum of Modern Art are representative of New 
York’s museum population overall. Using a dataset of all museums that have existed in New 
York City  (and all of those museums’ relocations), I chronicle the aggregated movements of the 
museum population between 1910 and 2010. I argue that the three eras of the museum location 
decision interacted with key demographic changes to create the unique distribution we observe 
today. The insights from these findings indicate that the spatial diffusion of museums in New 
York is systematically  patterned in relation to demographic changes. The final substantive 
chapter is devoted to exploring the possibility that institutional location impacts audience 
composition. I argue that proximity  to museums and other kinds of arts institutions is a 
significant, yet understudied determinant of attendance. The introduced concept of institutional 
exposure suggests that  local access to arts institutions has cognitive, behavioral, and interactional 
consequences. Although directly testing the effect of institutional exposure is beyond the 
parameters of this dissertation, I show that there is a strong correlation between exposure and 
attendance. I illustrate the increasingly unequal access to arts between white and African 
American New Yorkers, which correlates highly with still-unexplained low attendance rates of 
African Americans. The observed evolution of the museum location decision explains when and 
how New York institutions adopted and then abandoned each institutionalized practice of 
museum location. In the Conclusion, I highlight several implications of this work, both of 
sociological theory and on current cultural policy.  
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 In 2000, Queens-based artist  Jimbo Blachly  was open to inspiration. Deep in the halls of 
the New-York Historical Society, he found it in the form of a century-old topology report. James 
Reuel Smith wrote the report, Springs and Wells of Manhattan and the Bronx: New York City at 
the End of the Nineteenth Century, a near-obsessive survey of the remaining natural water 
sources in an increasingly  urbanized metropolis. The New-York Historical Society  published the 
work in 1938, and it sat in their library  for almost seventy years without incident. Blachly’s art 
often involves themes of nature and the passage of time, and he was taken by how Smith 
uncovered the natural world underneath New York’s buildings and sidewalks. Blachly set about 
to do the same thing. Retracing Smith’s footsteps, he photographed the now unrecognizable 
natural springs sites, and recreated an alternate future for them through installation sculpture. The 
final work presents a complete picture of New York at many different points in its trajectory 
towards urbanization - and conjures images of natural and manmade structures that have been 
long forgotten.   
 The historical, nostalgic piece was a fitting selection as the inaugural exhibit  in the 
SculptureCenter’s massive new building in Long Island City, Queens. The SculptureCenter is a 
New York mainstay; it  is the first nonprofit institution solely dedicated to sculpture. It has 
supported and promoted notable twentieth century sculptors, including Alexander Calder and 
Isamu Noguchi. The institution’s new Queens location is its fourth building spanning three 
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boroughs over seventy-four years. If Blachly  had used the past sites of the SculptureCenter as his 
inspiration, he still would have a long, meandering history to follow. 
 The story  of the SculptureCenter begins with another artist. In the mid-1920s, Dorothea 
Denslow was a young, energetic sculptor teaching adults and children in her local neighborhood 
of Crown Heights. She drew such a loyal clientele that her students would often follow her back 
home to her studio (Donahue 1946). As she welcomed more and more students to her home more 
frequently, she converted her private studio into the “Clay  Club”. Denslow’s fans quickly 
multiplied, and by 1930 they  needed more space - in a different location. Denslow moved the 
Clay  Club to a converted stable house, “an odd little brick structure” (Knox 1950, accessed 
online), on the corner of Fifth Avenue and Eighth Street in Greenwich Village, Manhattan. The 
area, once lined with the mansions of antebellum elites, was now being taken over and chopped 
up into studios and apartments by  the city’s bohemian community. Amidst artists of all kinds and 
next door to the Whitney Museum of American Art, Denslow felt that the Clay Club would be 
right at home in a small, converted stable house. 
 The Club continued to expand its mission and audience; the first floor was an open-to-
the-public exhibition space, and the upper floors housed amateur and professional classes. Here, 
the organization found its niche as a nonprofit educational center focused on supporting 
emerging sculptors. In 1948, the Clay Club moved uptown, to another converted carriage house, 
this time at 167 East  69th Street. It renamed itself the SculptureCenter and shed its bohemian, 
do-it-yourself mentality. The institution was now located in the heart  of the art world - encircled 
by the galleries of 57th Street and the burgeoning Museum Mile on upper Fifth Avenue. 
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 As time went on, however, the institution again became restless. The new art scene 
moved away from the steadfastly elite Upper East Side. Mary Ceruti, the museum’s Executive 
Director, recalls: “It was hard to draw a contemporary art audience up there” (Ogunnaike 2002, 
accessed online). Once again the SculptureCenter moved, this time to Long Island City, Queens. 
The move afforded them more space - and lots of it. The organization bought an abandoned 
trolley repair shop on a quiet, non-residential block of Purves Street. Maya Lin, one of their 
world-renowned architects, said that “it was a huge move psychologically and 
physically” (ibid.).
 The institution received major blowback for the move. Members were concerned that the 
trustees had lost their educational mission - would the SculptureCenter turn into a de facto avant-
garde, inaccessible gallery? In truth, the SculptureCenter was hardly  the first arts institution to 
identify Long Island City as the place to be. There was already another major sculpture museum, 
the Isamu Noguchi Sculpture Garden, nearby. The Museum of Modern Art was set to move into 
longtime Long Island City resident P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center temporarily that same year. 
And ten years later, the SculptureCenter is still going strong in the Queens neighborhood. This 
September, they are hosting the Purves Street Block Party for the first time. 
 If we were to follow Blachly’s lead, we would find that  - similar to the many of the 
natural springs he sought - former traces of the SculptureCenter’s history are long gone. Crown 
Heights, a middle-class Jewish commuter suburb when Dorothea Denslow opened her home 
studio, has undergone several successions of residential turnover. It  is now home to a large 
community  of Caribbean black immigrants and an increasingly gentrifying population. 4 West 
Eighth Street, the Clay Club’s stable house, was razed along with the mansion it once serviced. 
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The block, however, is now one of the most expensive in Manhattan and Greenwich Village is 
one of the toniest neighborhoods in the five boroughs. The SculptureCenter sold 167 East 69th 
Street as a private home for $3 million, subsidizing almost all the purchase and renovation costs 
for the Purves Street building. 
 The many lives of the SculptureCenter may come as a surprise. We do not often think that 
a museum could be so footloose. What  is even more surprising is that it is far from the only 
museum to move repeatedly. We will learn that the Whitney Museum of Art, for example, 
followed an almost identical institutional trajectory. Furthermore, the museums of New York 
City, despite being incredibly diverse, have a highly  patterned diffusion both spatially  and 
temporally. 
 The charts below show the number of museum foundings and relocations in New York 
City  between 1900 and 2010. Museum foundings and relocations have followed a boom and bust 
cycle over the past century  that are in line with national patterns (Blau 1991). The geographic 
diffusion of those foundings and relocations is patterned as well. Between 1900 and 2010, 
museums have grown to be tightly clustered in a few spots of the city, as is evident in the three 
maps below. In 2010, 38.5% of the entire city’s museums were located in only five 
neighborhoods (the Upper East Side, the Upper West Side, Midtown, the Wall Street area, and 
the East Village area). These five neighborhoods constitute 1.57% of the city’s total land area. 
92% of museums have at least one other museum within a mile radius, and over half of museums 
have over twenty museums within that distance. Perhaps the most dramatic indicator of spatial 
clustering is the fact that 212 of the city’s 295 neighborhoods1 do not contain a museum. 
4
1 Neighborhood boundaries and names sourced from the New York City Department of City Planning. 


































































































































Figure 3. Museum locations in 1900, 1950, and 2010
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 This patterning goes against our basic understanding of the American museum. Museums 
are unique, individual institutions, each with their own colorful, specific history. The chronology 
of the SculptureCenter, replete with charismatic leaders, carriage house and trolley shop 
conversions, and the influence of star architects, would lead us to believe that the locations of 
museums are extremely contingent. There is no way to make sense of when or where founders 
decide to place their institutions - there are too many happy accidents and strokes of luck. This 
commonsense response makes the following questions even more worthwhile: how can it be that 
so many museum founders decided to open shop at the same time? And even more puzzling, why 
did so many decide to open shop in just a few neighborhoods? 
 Even our basic knowledge of the purpose and characteristics of the museum itself 
contradict the observed spatial and temporal patterning. We think of museums as ‘pure’ 
organizations; they are “sacred” and “untouchable” (Anderson 2004, 1). They operate on a loftier 
plane than for-profit business; simply stated, these are not customer-oriented institutions. 
Museum leaders are required to elevate and properly  represent the arts and sciences. Their aims 
are noble and timeless. Museums, in essence, are the organizational manifestation of the mad 
scientist and crazed artist; any response to the outside world would be considered a ‘sell out’. 
And it’s true that museums are often led by artistically bent administrators, who are less likely to 
follow protocol and more likely  to make from-the-gut decisions (Cray and Inglis 2011; Cray, 
Inglis, and Freeman 2007). Yet, we also hold a contradictory assumption: museums are expected 
to serve the public good. This expectation is a relatively new phenomenon in the organization’s 
global history. However, American museums have always been attached to some explicit or 
implicit public service mandate; this mandate is tied to the growth of the nonprofit sector in the 
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twentieth century, and museums’ absorption into that organizational form. Almost all museums 
must include an educational mission to qualify for the much-sought-after 501(c)3 tax-exempt 
status. Finally, we assume that  museums are immobile. The spiral of the Guggenheim, the lions 
of the Art Institute, and glass pyramid of the Louvre are even more recognizable than the art 
inside these structures. Museum buildings - and the locations upon which these buildings stand - 
are often considered to be ‘for the long haul’. 
 Considering these commonly held, yet contradictory assumptions it is possible to imagine 
alternate spatial and temporal diffusion patterns for New York’s institutions. If museums were 
solely  ‘pure’, it  is possible that their diffusion would be less patterned. And if they were strictly 
educational, we might see more effort to locate institutions evenly  across the city’s 
neighborhoods. Finally, if museums were fixed in place, we might not observe as many 
relocations (sixty-eight) as have taken place in the last century. In other words, how museums 
have generated the observed spatial and temporal diffusion is not immediately  clear based on our 
commonsense notions of how they operate. 
 From everything we know, museums are slow-moving, independent, long-lasting 
institutions. How can it be that they open and move in concert? In this dissertation, I will set 
about to understanding how these assumptions have become lodged into our collective 
consciousness, how they are fundamentally  incorrect, and how museums actually end up where 
they do. This is the subject of the museum location decision.
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Three analytical levels of the museum location decision
 For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus of study is the museum location decision - 
that is, where museum founders choose to establish (or move) their institution. I will present 
analyses of the museum location decision from three perspectives: the organizational-level, the 
population-level, and the audience-level. The organization-level case studies will give a sense of 
the individual experiences of the three location eras, and will frame the following chapter 
analyses, which will address the meso-population processes, and the macro-level outcomes. The 
museum location decision is a unique object of analysis that successfully links these three levels 
through one focal point. 
 The linkage between individual organization behavior and aggregated outcomes has been 
demonstrated before in the social sciences. New institutionalism is an established field of 
research in sociology, economics, and political science that asks how norms, conventions, and 
environments affect the founding (Bigelow and Carroll 1997), structure (Minkoff 1999), efficacy 
(Vaughan 1996), and survival (Baum and Mezias 1992) of organizations (for a review, see Strang 
and Sine 2000). The field coalesced in the 1970s and 1980s with the publication of seminal 
works by  Meyer and Rowan (1977), Powell and DiMaggio (1978), and Scott (1983). These 
scholars addressed how individual organizations are affected by their environments in their 
structure, governance, and mission. Powell and DiMaggio’s groundbreaking thesis of 
institutional isomorphism explained why most organizations are so similar to one another: 
organizational forms emerge, face ambiguity and constraint, become legitimized, and then 
coalesce into a recognizable population of homogenized institutions. I utilize many of the key 
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insights offered in this body of research, particularly Powell and DiMaggio’s thesis of 
institutional isomorphism. 
 Let’s return to those three fundamental assumptions about museums, but this time 
through the lens of new institutionalism. First, new institutionalism helps explain how museums 
can be expected to both follow a pure vision and serve the public good. Museums are like any 
other organization - they  are full of competing influences and constraints. As new 
institutionalism theory argues, those influences and constraints have evolved along with the 
growth of the museum field. Museums were once founded as the personal playgrounds of heirs 
and heiresses; although they had some interest in ‘educating the masses’ it was not taken 
seriously. Powell and DiMaggio explain how the introduction of external funding sources 
regulates and ultimately  homogenizes a once-diverse population of organizations. In the case of 
museums, government funding necessitated a mandate to diversify  audiences while corporate 
funders wanted to see an increase in the overall audience size. The introduction of new actors 
and the rise of isomorphism explains how museums wrestle with competing missions of artistic 
license and democratic goodwill. 
 More generally, museums represent a meeting point between nonprofit institutions and 
for-profit firms. Nonprofit  organizations, in general, have proliferated since the mid-20th century 
(DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). 501(c)3’s are bound to serve some collective good, broadly 
construed (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). However, museums also receive much of their funding 
from corporate and individual sponsors, and their trustees represent private, diverse interests. The 
museum sits at the juncture of for-profit and charitable organizations, making this particular 
organizational form a complex, revealing object of analysis. 
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 Defining location as an institutionalized decision helps to explain why forty-four of the 
museum’s existing today are second or third or fourth locations of the original institution. Many 
museums have relocated more than once, with El Museo del Barrio topping out at six separate 
venues. Museum leaders do not take their location decisions lightly. Far from it  - the museum 
location and/or relocation decision is one of the most crucial in most administrators’ eyes (Cray 
and Inglis 2011). The location decision requires considerable capital; it involves active 
participation from the administration, board of trustees, and public interests. This means that  the 
location decision is a meaningful, deliberate event which reveals the priorities of an organization. 
I argue that the location decision both reveals and constitutes the American museums’ formation 
from individual, sporadic pet projects into professional, legitimized monoliths of culture.
 Although this study adds to existing empirical instantiations of institutionalism, the 
location decision is a novel object  of analysis. New institutionalists have seldom looked at how 
and where institutions decide to locate as a key  indicator of this process; location diffusion and 
other geographic phenomenon have often been left to the domain of economic geographers 
studying for-profit firms (Porter 2000, Martin and Sunley 2003). By  tracing the growth of 
museums and their clustering in space, this dissertation provides an understanding of how the 
maturity  of organizational populations condition individual organizations’ decision-making. I 
find that the location decision, similar to the better known organizational characteristics such as 
governance, mission, etc., is vulnerable to the same coercive, normative and mimetic forces that 
constrain and conform organizations. However, the analysis does not stop  when the museum 
population becomes homogenized. Instead, I offer an empirical and theoretical contribution to 
how and when a homogenized population experiences change. While there is a large literature 
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about how organizational growth and homogenization brings about static populations there is 
much less written about the kinds and bases of decision-making while fields are more or less 
matured.
 The third level of this analysis assesses the potential implications the museum location 
decision has on museum audiences. Throughout the dissertation, I make the argument that 
museums matter for individuals and for neighborhoods. This may run counter to the our common 
assumption that museums are ‘global’ institutions detached from the rhythms of everyday  life. 
This research demonstrates that the contrary is in fact the case. Museums alter neighborhoods 
and their inhabitants; the presence of local institutions in one’s life is strongly  associated with 
attendance of those institutions. As evident from prior research, knowledge of and ease within 
cultural centers corresponds with economic mobility  and opportunities (Veblen 1899, Willis 
1977, Bourdieu and Passeron 1984). 
 We will discover that museums have become active players in redefining the urban 
landscape. Although the museum location decision is made by  individual organizations, 
population-level trends in these decisions have resulted in a segregated museum environment. A 
few New York neighborhoods contain most of the entire city’s formalized cultural resources. The 
neighborhoods (and their residents) who receive the windfall of these social, economic, and 
cultural riches are as positively impacted as the remaining neighborhoods are negatively 
impacted. In this dissertation, we will unpack how certain neighborhoods became museum 
clusters over the past century and seek to better understand the consequences of this patterned 
diffusion.
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 In addition to these theoretical and analytical payoffs, the study of museums reap 
concrete, practical rewards as well. Museums, which are not often considered ‘movers and 
shakers’ of urban policy, have quickly  emerged as major players in urban renewal and economic 
growth. I will explore this point more fully in the Chapter Two, but suffice it to say  that museums 
at as both a barometer and increasingly  a bellwether of a neighborhood’s and city’s economic 
health. Museums are also important as sites of social interaction. Increasingly, public spaces in 
which individuals can acquire, practice, and hone their artistic appreciation -- and the ability  to 
express it -- are inaccessible to a wide range of potential audiences. Performing arts 
organizations are often cost-prohibitive, and public schools (and even libraries) have been forced 
to reduce artistic programming and education. Museums have the opportunity  to become 
instrumental in education, interaction, and outreach in regards to cultural programming. In 
Chapter Three, I will discuss how museums have grappled with this opportunity  over the 
twentieth century, and the implications their struggles have generated.  
 I will now provide a brief road map  to the substantive chapters of the dissertation. Before 
moving on to Chapter One, I survey the history of museums leading up to our case of twentieth 
century New York City. 
Chapter one: the museum location decision
 In the first chapter, I argue that the museum location decision has evolved over the past 
century, and has experienced three major paradigm shifts. Out of each era, a new model of the 
museum location decision has taken hold, resulting in the current organizational landscape. 
13
Before 1940, New York’s museums were still unregulated in structure and governance. 
Consequently, there was not a clear model of where a museum ‘should’ be; instead museum 
founders relied on personal networks they  were already embedded in to determine location. This 
era created an idiosyncratic, seemingly unpatterned distribution of institutions. Between 1940 
and 1980, the museum field became institutionalized and homogenized. A model of the ideal 
location - in an elite neighborhood surrounded by other museums - was cemented and many new 
institutions followed suit. This era marked a period of expansion in the number of museums, yet 
contraction in the places those museums located. Since 1980, museum founders and leaders have 
adopted a new location strategy  by aligning with public and private actors to re-brand 
neighborhoods through arts and culture. The current era marks a careful, deliberate geographic 
expansion of where museums are locating in the city. Taken together, these three models of 
museum location decision making have generated a highly  patterned geographic distribution of 
the city’s cultural resources.
 I demonstrate how these eras emerged through historical, comparative case studies of two 
New York museums, the Museum of Modern Art and the Whitney Museum of Art. These 
institutions were founded as modern art institutions one year apart. Both were spearheaded by 
elite heiresses. Their mission, locations, and governance have converged and diverged at various 
moments. How each of these institutions has responded to the changing museum environment is 
the empirical substance of the chapter. 
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Chapter two: New Yorkers and their museums
 In this chapter, I show that the location decisions illustrated through the histories of the 
Whitney Museum of American Art and the Museum of Modern Art are representative of New 
York’s museum population overall. Using a dataset of all museums that have existed in New 
York City  (and all of those museums’ relocations), I chronicle the aggregated movements of the 
museum population between 1910 and 2010. I argue that the three eras of the museum location 
decision interacted with key demographic changes to create the unique distribution we observe 
today. During the era of personal networks, neighborhoods were still in flux. New Yorkers, and 
particularly the New York elite, had not decided on a permanent home neighborhood. This 
ambiguity  complemented the idiosyncratic nature of the era’s museum location decision: clusters 
were established all over the growing city. The following era of homogenization saw the growth 
of one cluster - Museum Mile - and the stagnation of clusters in neighborhoods undergoing 
demographic upheaval. I will trace how the growth and settlement of the African American 
population corresponds with the lack of museum foundings in several neighborhoods. The 
current era of cultural branding marks a temporal and spatial diffusion of museums. Since the 
1980s, museums have moved into new territories to rebrand themselves and their surroundings; 
they  are no longer closely tied to elite mainstays. These efforts are tightly  coupled with local 
economic development and the gentrification of the city as a whole.  
 Throughout the three eras, I argue that the museum location decision was unintentionally 
but consistently aligned with neighborhoods that  did not contain a strong African American 
presence, even though the principles of neighborhood attraction to museum leaders changed 
dramatically over time. In other words, the ideal location decision has evolved, but has always 
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overlooked predominantly African American areas. This has resulted in a current spatial 
distribution of museums in which African Americans have drastically less local institutions than 
the rest of the New York City population. 
Chapter three: the consequences of the museum location decision
 The insights from the previous chapters indicate that the spatial diffusion of museums in 
New York is systematically patterned in relation to demography. This chapter is devoted to 
exploring the possibility that institutional location impacts audience composition. I argue that 
proximity to museums and other kinds of arts institutions is a significant, yet understudied 
determinant of attendance. The concept of institutional exposure suggests that local access to arts 
institutions has cognitive, behavioral, and interactional consequences. Although directly  testing 
the effect of institutional exposure is beyond the parameters of this dissertation, I will determine 
if inequalities in institutional exposure are correlated with inequalities in arts attendance. I find 
increasingly  unequal access to arts between white and African American New Yorkers, which 
correlates highly with still-unexplained low attendance rates of African Americans. We will see 
that this finding is upheld even when accounting for other kinds of arts institutions, and for the 
educational attainment and income of African American New Yorkers.  
 With this road map  in mind, I will now devote some attention to setting the stage for the 
study. Before trying to understand the museum population in twentieth century New York City, I 
will provide some history of this organizational population’s antecedents. 
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Precursors to the 20th century New York City museum
 The storied museums of New York were founded with notable examples that stretch back 
to the oldest  cities. Although there are instances of museum-like collections throughout antiquity, 
the Greeks invented the word mousieon, which was a place of contemplation and study of the 
Muses of the arts and sciences. This earliest form of the mousieon, which existed through the 
third century  B.C., was more akin to a modern graduate school than the exhibition halls we know 
today.  
 The word museum first appeared to describe the great, expansive collection of Lorenzo 
de’Medici in 15th century Florence. It was later appropriated by 17th century monarchs and 
aristocracy  to denote their private cabinets of curiosities. In 1683, Elias Ashmole bequeathed his 
cabinet to the University of Oxford. The University made the innovative decision to erect a 
private building to house and exhibit the collection to the public, to be known as the Ashmolean 
Museum. With this small act, the modern museum was born. 
 The organizational form exploded during the Age of Enlightenment; the era brought a 
newfound belief in accessibility and distribution of scientific and cultural progress. In 1759, the 
national government founded the British Museum. Its purpose was purely  democratic: to educate 
and entertain all classes of their citizens. The Louvre was opened in 1793, spurred on  by the 
Revolutionary  government. It’s aims were similar: to make French culture accessible to its 
citizens. While these institutions attached the notion of ‘public good’ to art, they were not truly 
public at the time of their founding. The British Museum had a very limited attendance policy, 
and attendees were required to apply in advance before entry. Regardless, the democratic, 
‘public’ museum model was taking hold and spreading across Europe. The Vatican created a 
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system of interconnected museums. The Prado was founded in Madrid, the Royal Museums in 
Brussels, the State Museum in Amsterdam, and more. The model was being exported to 
colonized nations as well: the Indian Museums in Calcutta, the Argentine Museum of Natural 
Sciences, and the Batavia Society of Arts and Science were all inspired by the original European 
institutions.  
 These grand museums were an experiment in ‘nationalization’, in which previously 
private or royal collections and buildings were taken over and made public. Consequently, many 
of these museums were located on imposing, expansive estates that were once off-limits to the 
general public. Most were housed in former palaces that were once seats of political power, often 
in city centers. Examples include the Louvre, former palace of Louis XV; Museum Island, a 
cultural complex in central Berlin was once a residential area and then decreed a district for arts 
and sciences by the King of Prussia; Museo del Prado was nationalized in 1868 but remained in 
the once-royal central building. The Rijksmuseum, modeled after the French cultural policy, is an 
extreme example of this state-sponsored cultural influence. Its original location was inside the 
Hague, before it was moved to Amsterdam. 
 The National Gallery  of London provides an interesting counterpoint to this trend. The 
institution was not built up  from a royal palace or collection. It was created from the ground up, 
and consequently  the founders had  some flexibility  in location. They bought a townhouse owned 
by one of their supporters, at 100 Pall Mall. This address looked onto a busy, central 
thoroughfare described as “the very  gangway of London, where it is alike accessible, and 
conveniently accessible to all ranks and degrees of men” (Taylor 1999, 36). When the museum 
grew out of the townhouse, the museum leaders rejected the option of moving Buckingham Place 
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(now the home of Buckingham Palace) because it would be too removed from most of London’s 
citizens. They moved to a new building in Trafalgar Square, which was a geographic meeting 
point between the wealthy west and working class east.
 After this initial burst, Europe’s tradition of state-sponsored museum projects intensified 
during the 20th century. The French national government initiated several topdown policies to 
create museums that attract  a diversity  of citizens (Zimmer and Toepler 1999). These have been 
centralized into France’s Ministry of Cultural Affairs, whose founding mission was to: “make 
available capital works from humanity, and initially from France, to the greatest possible number 
of French people”. French policy has increasingly decentralized, cultural policy  is filtered 
throughout the country’s regions, but  still carries a strong commitment to nationalism. The 
European Union has adopted this hands-on philosophy in which national government directly 
promotes the content and construction of arts and culture. Many  of the continent’s most famous 
museums (including those referenced above) are still owned and operated by national 
governments. Current policy still suggests that creating a national artistic viewpoint is crucial to 
patriotism and national identity. In a recent publication, the EU argues that cultural offerings 
“play an important role in conveying European identity and values…” (European Union 2010) 
and encourages social cohesion. It seems that Europe’s long history  of museum building has 
settled on an active policy of museum administration and direct cultural patronage.   
 Of course, the United States does not have a history of monarchs and imperial rulers. 
There was not a repository of private collections for public institutions to inherit. Furthermore, 
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while the European model was in the process of being imported stateside, the notion of an 
American museum was still a shaky concept, made shakier with nonexistent government support. 
However, entrepreneurial individuals nevertheless brought the museum to America, in myriad 
forms.  
 Charles Wilson Peale, an artist and scientist, founded one of the first museums in the 
United States. Peale’s Cabinet of Curiosities opened in his private home Philadelphia in 1796, 
later moving the growing collection into a separate building. Peale’s philosophy was decades 
ahead of America’s conventional thinking at  the time; his museum was a precursor to the cultural 
democracy  ideas that later emerged during the 1960s. He strove to attract a diverse audience: “an 
annual ticket to the museum cost a dollar, and early members included everyone from presidents 
to congressmen to merchants and skilled laborers” (Hansen 2008). Without state support, his 
exhibits had to be blockbusters (which featured motion pictures and items from “out West”) 
because all of his funding was generated through ticket sales.
 After Peale’s death, P.T. Barnum, the showman and future circus owner, bought much of 
the collection. In 1841, he bought an existing multistory building in lower Manhattan, on the 
busy  corner of Broadway and Printing House Row. From 1842 to 1865, he operated Barnum’s 
American Museum. The museum was a sensation; Barnum created exhibits that synthesized what 
we now consider to be high and low brow art. Sideshow acts were housed in the same institution 
as a “Moral Lecture Room” for upper middle class to learn about and agree upon proper 
decorum. This combination of high and low brow acts was common at the time (Levine 1988), in 
fact: “the bizarre was collected together with sober specimens with no real order or 
organization” (Mondello 2008, accessed online). Barnum was determined to draw in as large and 
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wide a crowd as possible. In addition to offering a wide array of attractions, he kept the museum 
open 365 days a year, fifteen hours a day. And it worked: “sooner or later, everyone went to 
Barnum’s – society matrons, children, lawyers on their lunch hours, black porters, Irish day 
laborers, single women, and tourists…” (Burns 1999, 86). Like others, DiMaggio (1982, 2012) 
argues that this period of American culture saw less distinction between the elite and mainstream 
cultural norms than exist today. Peale’s and Barnum’s museum, with an even emphasis on elite 
education and eye-popping entertainment, epitomize that tension.  
 America’s answer to the nationalized cultural complexes of Europe was ironically  spurred 
on by an Englishman. In the 1830s, James Smithson, an English scientist, willed his estate to the 
United States government to establish an institution of science and learning specifically  in 
Washington, DC. This museum was far unlike the Peale’s homespun cabinet  or Barnum’s showy 
spectacles: Smithson’s mission was to support “the increase and diffusion of knowledge among 
men”.  The Smithsonian, with the additional vocal suport of John Quincy Adams, was to be an 
educational center along the lines of the original museion: a place of learning.  
 Thus, the earliest incarnation of the Smithsonian was research-oriented. The first 
building’s design (now known as the “Castle”) was modeled after the medievel cloisters of 
England’s oldest universities. The Smithsonian’s second secretary, Spencer Fullerton Baird (in 
office 1878-1887), was the one to initiate a series of museums for public use. Similar to the 
European model, Baird’s mission of the national museums was to “foster a sense of national 
identity” (Smithsonian Institution Libraries 1996). Baird expanded the mission and role of the 
Smithsonian by founding the United States National Museum in 1881. Since then, additional 
museums of art, history, and the natural sciences have opened. The museum and research 
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complex is located on the National Mall, set off a wide promenade flanked by the Capitol and the 
White House. The location carries symbolic weight; similar to Europe’s museums in former 
political and royal buildings, these new constructions were deliberately  centered between the 
nation’s political powerhouses. Despite its enduring significance, the Smithsonian is notable in 
its exceptionalism. Direct government ownership or support of museums was not widespread 
during this period, and did not reach the nation’s other large cities. Instead, the real museum 
building of the country was left to private individuals. 
 The Gilded Age (1860s-1890s), which gave birth to the highest concentrations of wealth 
seen in the country, was a turning point for the American museum (Conn 2000). Not surprisingly, 
these industrial magnates filled the vacuum of royal wealth and active national policy that 
existed in Europe. In short  order, Gilded Age millionaires constructed an infrastructure of 
educational, cultural, and charitable institutions. The 1870s saw the founding of the Metropolitan 
in New York, the Pennsylvania Academy of the Arts, and the Boston Museum of Fine Art (Blau 
1991). Unlike Peale and Barnum, these founders did not have to rely on attendance for income; 
they  could dictate the content and mission of these institutions without regard to marketability  or 
popularity. During this period, the Barnum-style museum model disappeared as the high culture 
model rose to prominence. United States museums were open to the public from their inception 
(Weil 1997). However, these spaces, including museums in New York, were criticized for their 
implicit exclusion of the non-elite; the institutions were an instrument of constructing an elite 
class in the same vein as the European aristocracy. 
 At the close of the Gilded Age and the turn of the century, New York City contained a 
handful of museums, including the Metropolitan, the American Museum of Natural History, the 
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Brooklyn Museum, and the New-York Historical Society. There was no clear guide to founding a 
museum (though it surely required a fortune), maintain it (again, this was an age before the 
appearance of grant giving organizations), or locate it. This is the setting upon which the 
museum population will unfold over twentieth century New York. Gotham is a particularly 
exciting case study  because it contains the highest number of museums of any American city. It 
has also experienced rapid, profound waves of industrialization, demographic turnover, and 
urbanization. It could be said that  the entire history of America’ s culture and people could be 
seen through the prism of New York’s streets. I will make the case throughout this dissertation 
that New York City is an extreme example of how museum location decisions play out over an 
urban environment. However, that ‘extreme-ness’ reveals a complex set of dynamics that have 
taken place, to a lesser extent or in part, in other American cities and with other forms of the 
institutions2. With this history in mind, we are prepared to analyze the museum location decision 
through the institutional histories of the Whitney Museum of American Art and the Museum of 
Modern Art. 
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2 This case study strategy is advocated by Stinchcombe (1987). 
Chapter one: the museum location decision
 
 We have seen that museums have not been distributed randomly across time and space in 
New York City. One can quickly identify pockets of museums in certain areas and not others. 
This distribution is not incidental. It was created by a series of small-scale decisions made by 
museum leaders and founders. The goal of this chapter is to uncover how museum founders and 
leaders decide to locate and relocate their institutions. 
Three eras in the history of New York’s museums
Institutions are for the long run.
Flora Miller Biddle3 
 The diffusion and evolution of New York’s museum population can be divided into three 
eras. Each era has its own typical museum location decision. As evident from the table on page 
27, variation in the museum location decision hinges on two correlated dimensions: museums’ 
degree of institutionalization, and the maturity of New York City’s museum population. 
 The process and consequences of organizational institutionalization have enjoyed 
considerable attention in the field of sociology. The arrival of new institutionalism in the 1970s 
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3 Granddaughter of Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney and former President of the Whitney Museum of 
American Art (Biddle 1999, 143).
and 1980s has cemented a renewed interest in the topic (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 1983, 
Zucker 1977, Powell and DiMaggio 1983). This approach, broadly  speaking, posits that 
organizations are not structured strictly  regarding efficiency or rationality. Organizations also are 
governed by norms, myths, and pressures for legitimacy, as well as internal and external 
dynamics. This results in populations of organizations that are not necessarily  efficient, even 
though relevant actors may believe them to be. 
 This theory is temporal: a population of organizations may start  out loose and diverse, but 
will eventually become rigid and homogenized. I will discuss just how this convergence towards 
institutionalization occurs later. Suffice it to say, the process of institutionalization is key to 
understanding and explaining the museum location because New York’s (and the rest of the 
country’s) museum population has emerged from a few, scattershot projects to literally  hundreds 
of formalized institutions over the past century. As this growth began and sustained, museum 
founders and leaders were faced with the varying constraints laid out by new institutionalist 
scholars. 
 Institutionalization helps us understand why organizations become similar; however, we 
also need to understand how and when organizations become different. The maturity  of the city’s 
museum population explains how and when organizational saturation influenced a shift  in the 
museum location decision. Only these two processes together will account for the diffusion 
trajectory we observe over the past century.  
 While we learned in the Introduction that museum institutionalization was a national 
project, New York’s museums were also operating in a more bounded space: their own city. 
Community ecologists urge scholars to consider the environment in which a group of 
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organizations exists and interacts (Freeman and Audia 2006 for a review). One can define an 
organizational community as a bounded geographic space, or limited set of resources. A subset of 
community  ecological scholars look at how organizational density and saturation - otherwise 
referred to as colocation and/or agglomeration - have an impact on organizational structure and 
change. Colocation can intensify  inter-organizational interaction, competition, and spillover 
effects. There is a wide variety of research demonstrating that organizational forms that exhibit 
agglomerative tendencies (Carroll and Wade 1991, Sorenson and Audia 1990), albeit the subject 
of these studies are mainly for-profit firms.
 New York’s museum population is one of the oldest, and undoubtedly the largest, in the 
country. It has acquired 218 museums (some of which have since closed) in the past one hundred 
years. Due to this rapid expansion, inter-organizational dynamics have evolved. Unlike the 
process of institutionalization, this is city-specific. The organizational community has shifted 
from a young, sparse environment to an old, dense environment. Individual museums must adapt 
to this changing environment. We will see just how they adapt later on in the chapter.  
Table 1.1. Three eras of the museum population in New York City
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 With these two dimensions taken together, we can chart the movement of the museum 
location decision from one era to the next. The location decision is of course vulnerable to 
accidents of history; and thus these eras are not strict  boundaries, but signposts to indicate major 
paradigm shifts. In no era do all museums follow the typical location decision. I will discuss in 
Chapter Two the points when past eras blurred and bled into the next; each contains holdouts 
from the previous location decision. This is in part because museums, as a whole, are often 
victims of structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1977); relocating is a particularly contentious 
and cumbersome endeavor. With that said, the three eras of the museum location decision 
nonetheless encapsulate the conventional thinking and cultural zeitgeist of the time. I will 
demonstrate in the next chapter that these eras are indeed reflected in the locations of the New 
York City museum population in aggregate. A brief description of each era follows. 
 The first, the era of personal ties, spans the Gilded Age through 1940. During this period, 
New York City’s museum environment was still new and unsaturated, and its organizations were 
far from institutionalized. Initial organizational diversity resulted in a series of seemingly 
unsystematic location decisions. But a pattern in the location decision emerges when one 
accounts for a key variable: founder networks. Since opening a museum in this era was still a 
personal, entrepreneurial enterprise, founders located their networks around the people with 
whom they  associated. Since these networks varied, subsequent  location decisions varied as well. 
These early years result in a virtual toss-up of museum locations around the five boroughs. 
However, towards the end of the period, a concentration in Manhattan was forming, moving us 
into the next type of museum location decision.  
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 By mid-century, the museum was coalescing into a distinct organizational form. This 
period, which I call the era of homogenization, ranges from 1940 through 1980. The New York 
museum environment gained higher density. As the new institutionalism scholars predicted, 
museums became homogenized and professionalized during this time. The location decision 
became similarly  convergent; a dizzying number of museums opted to locate in and near elite 
Manhattan. Quickly, Museum Mile ascended as the prime museum destination.
 By 1980, the museum was institutionalized and the growth of the past forty years had 
created a dense, saturated museum environment. While other empirical research has found that 
organizational density can lead to museum failure and/or founding stagnation (Baum and Mezias 
1992), New York’s museum population swelled during the last decades of the twentieth century. 
However, with hundreds of museums in existence, there was a newfound need for differentiation. 
I argue that instead of stagnation, New York’s museum leaders used the location decision as a 
lever of differentiation and re-branding. This transition was accelerated by a new connection 
between arts organizations and urban redevelopment. During the era of cultural branding, 
museums leaders, economic developers, and city officials aligned to brand museums and 
neighborhoods through deliberate location decisions. This has resulted in an outward diffusion of 
the museum population, but only in conjunction with development efforts.  
 There has been little research on the geographic diffusion of nonprofit institutions 
(exceptions include DeVerteuil 2000, Wolch and Geiger 1983), in spite of increased attention on 
the organizational form (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). As we learned in the introduction, 
museums are unique organizational forms with a distinct set of pressures. This research 
contributes to existing work in organizational sociology by offering a longitudinal account of 
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nonprofit emergence, homogenization, and differentiation. These processes are exemplified by 
the three eras of museum location decisions.  
 The next step is to get a closer look at these eras in action. We can witness a century of 
location decision-making through the institutional lives of the Whitney Museum of American Art 
and the Museum of Modern Art. These museums are exceptionally  revealing cases both for their 
similarities as well as their differences. Although these museums were founded in the same era 
and focus on roughly the same content, they have converged and diverged in their location and 
structure at key points. Both institutions have actively responded to the changing environment, 
although in varied ways. The Whitney Museum of American Art seems to have broken free from 
the common shackles of structural inertia, and underwent a major relocation during each era. 
The Museum of Modern Art, on the other hand, has remained in the same neighborhood for its 
entire institutional life; we will see, however, that it still managed to address the changing 
demands of the museum population. 
 The location decisions of these museums act as an entry  to a broader discussion of the 
museum population as a whole (this will be the focus of Chapter Two). The Whitney and the 
MoMA were selected, similar to the selection of New York City  as a case study, based on the 
logic proposed by Stinchcombe (1987). These institutions are exceptional case studies because 
they  have been active across the three eras and have evolved dramatically in size, administration, 
and mission. Most museums have not experienced the same number of location decisions and 
degree of institutional change; however, through tracing the history  of these two institutions, I 
illuminate many of the phenomena other museums faced on a smaller or less frequent basis. 
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The era of personal ties (1870-1940)
 The Gilded Age was a seminal period in the cultural development of America. Museums 
were being founded in relatively  large numbers for the first  time in the country. While there was 
some consensus over the high culture model (DiMaggio 1992), there was still enormous 
divergence in the internal structure of these new organizations. Zolberg (1981) found that this 
“pre-professional” (105) era was highly individualistic. Founding and running a museum was an 
“intimate” (ibid.) task, in which personality and connections were more valued than credentials 
or experience. Consequently, founders enjoyed latitude in their leadership  styles and decision 
making, less burdened by the bureaucratic pressures placed on their successors. 
 Entrepreneurs in a new field must rely on these networks even more, because there is no 
existing blueprint to follow (Romanelli 1991, Aldrich 1979). Granovetter (1985) argues that 
individuals navigate through even their economic decisions using their personal relationships. 
Personal ties were often place-based in Gilded Age New York City, as they are today (Lui, King, 
and Bearman 2010; Saxenian 1994; Gieryn 2000). New York’s museum founders were 
embedded in networks that were highly associated with certain neighborhoods. The museum 
location decision was a byproduct of these landed ties. In Chapter Two, I will discuss how the 
shifting neighborhoods of the city’s elite during this era influenced the population’s location 
decisions as a whole. In this section, I will demonstrate how the place-based personal networks 
of the founders of the Whitney Museum of American Art and the Museum of Modern Art led to 
their divergent location decisions (one in Greenwich Village, one in Midtown), despite both 
being founded as modern art museums within one year of each other. 
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Whitney’s home away from home
...a Village landmark serving a Village audience with Village zest.
B. H. Friedman4 
 The Whitney Museum of American Art is the byproduct of an heiress’ desire to escape 
the social claustrophobia of the Upper East Side. Gertrude Vanderbilt5 was born on January 9, 
1875. At the time, her father was the richest  man in the country. She was the granddaughter of 
railroad tycoon Cornelius Vanderbilt, who had transformed a small ferry business to a national 
shipping and freight industry. Her childhood home at 1 57th Street sprawled across an entire city 
block and contained 137 rooms. The mansion was flanked by the Waldorf-Astoria and the 
southeast gates of Central Park. In 1897, Gertrude rose to an even loftier social ranking when she 
married Harry Payne Whitney, son of an old money society  family. The newlyweds moved just 
one door down, to 2 West 57th Street, to a similarly  lavish townhouse. Despite her wealth, 
Gertrude’s social and physical world was stifling her; she wrote in her diary: “just as I had 
physically moved some fifty feet from my father’s house into my husband’s, so I had moved 
some fifty  feet in feeling, environment, and period…” (Friedman 1978, 160).  She felt confined 
by the Upper East Side and its tight social circles. Restless, Gertrude began to look outside of her 
neighborhood - towards downtown. 
 Gertrude became enthralled with the fine arts, particularly  sculpture, and she quickly 
immersed herself in the social world of artists. One of her first tutors, a sculptor named Fraser 
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4 Friedman 1978, 441.
5 In this chapter, I will refer to Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney as Gertrude to avoid any confusion between 
the woman and the Whitney Museum of American Art (the Whitney). 
introduced her to artist-populated, bohemian Greenwich Village. His studio was located on 
MacDougal Alley; this street in particular had become a popular location for artists to convert 
stable houses into studios or residences.  
 In a measured attempt to leave one social network and enter another - through a location 
decision - Gertrude moved her sculpture equipment to a studio at 19 MacDougal Alley. She made 
friends, hired teachers, met secret lovers, and bought art in tight-knit neighborhood. Gertrude 
embraced the change, as “there was a strong belief that a change in address would bring about a 
change in identity” (Berman 1990, 81). In just a few years, she became well-known as an artist 
and art patron in the downtown scene.  
 But merely embedding herself in the New York art world was not enough. During the 
1910’s, Whitney  organized that social world. She transformed her private studio into a 
semipublic salon and exhibition space, the Whitney  Studio and its social arm, the Friends of 
Young Artists. The mission of these initial organizations was to support living, American artists 
who were being more or less shut out of New York galleries and museums (most notably the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art). Bringing struggling artists together was achieved easily in the 
Village, where the principle actors were densely connected, both physically and socially.
 By this time, Juliana Force, who was once Whitney’s personal assistant, had become a 
creative and professional partner. Force was equally  involved in the Greenwich Village art world; 
she was known for scraping together an artist’s rent, connecting potential friends, and throwing 
amazing parties. As the informal institution began to grow, the need for a public face increased. 
They  opened the Studio Club just  a few blocks away, at 147 West Fourth Street, in a four-story 
brownstone. 
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 This location decision revealed exactly  who the ‘public’ was for Gertrude and Force. 
Their ‘public’ was their artist network: all of whom lived and/or worked in Greenwich Village. 
The small neighborhood of Greenwich Village was so identified with the New York art scene it 
inspired this poem by John Reed: 
 Yet we are free who live in Washington Square, 
 We dare to think as Uptown wouldn’t dare, 
 Blazing our nights with arguments uproarious;
 What care we for a dull, old world censorious...6 
The locations on Fourth and Eighth Streets were not a convenient address for many New Yorkers 
that would likely visit  the Whitney  (remember that Greenwich Village at the time was not a 
premier or oft-visited location). Tourists, elites, and city officials did not have Greenwich Village 
on their agendas. But the women’s first priority was always to the artists, and second to the small 
population of New Yorkers who purchased and publicized contemporary American art. These 
latter group would be expected to travel to the neighborhood. 
 Over the next few years, Gertrude and Force continued to expand the organization. By 
1929, they  decided to transform the organization into the Whitney Museum of American Art. The 
museum population during the 1920s was growing across the nation (Blau 1991). The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, their institutional opposite, sat on a plot  of land in Central Park 
near East 82nd Street. A Museum of French Art and the Museum of the City of New York were 
recently  founded on the Upper East Side. Other notable museums were also located above 14th 
Street, including the brand new MoMA on Fifty-third Street  and Fifth Avenue and the Morgan 
Library on the corner of Madison Avenue and 36th Street. By converting into a permanent 
museum, this was the organizational landscape they could enter. 
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6 Quoted in Chapin 1920, 177.
 Instead, their preferred counterparts were the organizational manifestations of the artist 
networks. These included a few small, up-and-coming galleries that were located in Greenwich 
Village. These were all showing and trying to sell living American art, and included the 
Downtown, Stieglitz, Macbeth, and 291 Galleries. The Gallatin Museum of Living Art was 
founded on the New York University  campus in 1927, but did not share a devotion to New York 
based artists. In terms of mission, Gertrude and Force were more aligned with these small, 
commercial institutions than the large, established museums, at  least during the early days of the 
Whitney Museum. 
 Force was to be the first director of the new museum. Peterson (1987) notes that the 
museum director was less modern-day bureaucrat and more ‘impresario’ before museums were 
professionalized. Force fit the ‘impresario’ role to a T: she had no formal museum training or art 
history education; her currency was in networking and persuasion; her goal was to make friends 
of artists (as opposed to funders). Whitney did not hire any  trained museum employees or art 
historians; instead, working artists were brought on as curators. Force and Whitney’s personal 
preferences shone through in the deeply  personal institution. Even the building itself was a home 
away from home. The exterior was covered in pink stucco, and, unlike existing museums, the 
interior was designed similar to a private home. Force’s own apartment was a natural extension 
of the museum, on the top floor of the building.  
 With the building ready, the women opened their doors on November 18, 1931. The 
museum was now a combined structure, taking over the properties at 8, 10, 12, and 14 West 
Eighth Street. It  became a landmark in the Village art  scene. James Michener, a writer, 
remembers walking past the museum every  day on his way to lunch from his office. After a little 
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while, he decided to go in, and was immediately struck by the paintings, which formed his “basic 
taste for American art” (Berman 1990, 314).   
 Although the museum was still a small, relatively loose organization, the expectations of 
its new status as a museum quickly began to weigh on the founders. Force wrote in a letter: “the 
word ‘museum’ has an awesome sound...To the onlooker there is a vast difference between a 
picture in a museum (if it is not in the cellar) and a picture in a studio or gallery.” Force became 
more conservative with the Museum’s acquisitions, after years of emotionally driven 
acquisitions. Force’s initial public mission statement for the Museum, upon its founding, 
reflected a pre-museum mentality: “Ever since museums were invented, contemporary liberal 
artists have had difficulties in ‘crashing’ the gate...Exactly the contrary  practice will be carried on 
in the Whitney Museum of American Art” (Berman 1990, 278). Force herself had to dampen this 
initial sentiment; by March of 1930 she publicly retracted the statement and expressed that the 
new museum would not be as experimental towards young artists. The new institution received 
solicitations from “dealers, donors, artists, and others eager to push their own interests” (Berman 
1990, 282). During the first decade, it transitioned from a private organization to a nonprofit with 
tax-exempt status (albeit the new board of trustees were all family members).
 Their relevant counterparts slowly transformed. Just before the Whitney  Museum was 
founded, Gertrude had offered her entire collection and funds for a wing construction to the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art. Her offer was motivated by her concern for the future maintenance 
of the institution after her death. The Met rejected the offer; at the time, it did not hold 
contemporary  American art. Of course, Gertrude decided to open her own museum instead, and 
only a decade later, the Met attempted a dramatic three museum merger with the Whitney and the 
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MoMA. By 1941, the MoMA attempted to broker a partnership with the institution. Neither of 
these, clearly, were successful. Although they were still committed to supporting living artists, 
the conduit  to that goal was now through other museums instead of galleries. Gertrude and Force 
pushed for acquisitions and coordinated a series of traveling exhibitions at out-of-town 
museums.
 We will see that these changes only increased as time passed. However, despite these 
early signs of the tensions that museums would face in the next decades, the Whitney  remained a 
personal, quirky  institution for years. This was in large part because Gertrude and Force 
continued their commitment to the downtown network of struggling artists, “many of whom 
resided within blocks of its doors” (Berman 1990, 282). In fact, the museum remained ‘private’; 
they  did not accept any gifts to the museum until 1949 and had no external trustees during its 
initial years. This is uncommon for most museums and I argue is meaningfully tied to the 
museum’s ability to stay in its original location as long as it did. For a while at  least, the Whitney 
Museum remained a “family affair” (Biddle 1999).  
Making midtown modern
Although a private museum in legal terms, the Museum had always been a public institution in 
terms of its goals and concerns.
Sam Hunter 7
 The Museum of Modern Art came together differently than the Whitney and yet one can 
see that the initial location decision of the two museums was driven by a similar factor: personal 
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ties. While we learned from the last  section that the Whitney was a starving artists’ safe haven; 
the Museum of Modern Art  was founded with a more explicitly public mission. Nevertheless, 
while this institution was founded with democratic goals, its location decision and ultimate 
success were based on proximity to and resources provided by friends and family. The art of the 
Whitney and the MoMA are similar, yet the relevant  networks (and subsequent location 
decisions) were miles apart.
 In one way, the founding of the MoMA was similar to the Whitney: it was an act of 
rebellion. In the early 20th century, modern art was largely unknown to the American public and 
dismissed by  the established art world. The Armory Show, put on in 1913, was the first major 
effort to alter that attitude. The Show sent a shock wave through New York. Even though it only 
ran for a little less than a month, it made a lasting impression by introducing Americans to 
expressionism, cubism, and abstraction.   
 Three women were profoundly yet independently influenced by  the Armory  Show: Lillie 
Bliss, Abby Aldrich Rockefeller, and Mary Sullivan. Lillie Bliss was already an active collector 
of contemporary art, and had lent a portion of her collection to the Show. She was the daughter 
of a prosperous textile merchant, and devoted much of her inheritance to supporting the arts. She 
lived on Thirty-Seventh Street in Manhattan, and traveled to Europe regularly to learn about the 
latest movements in painting. In 1921, Bliss, along with others, convinced the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art to show an exhibit  of modern European works. The show was panned by the 
critics and rejected by the public. For Bliss, it was clear that the Armory Show had not done 
enough to change public opinion. Bliss and her friend, Abby, began to discuss the possibility of 
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founding an institution solely  dedicated to the genre during an opportunistic meeting while both 
were traveling in Egypt.
 Abigail “Abby” Greene Aldrich was the daughter of Nelson W. Aldrich, Senator of Rhode 
Island. She was surrounded by art as a child both at home and during tours abroad. Her father 
collected old masters and sponsored the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, which removed the 
prohibitive taxing of fine art imports. This legislation dramatically increased American’s 
collecting capabilities (and indirectly  provided many of today’s museums with their permanent 
collections). Abby married John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in 1901. The wedding was front page news 
because the Rockefellers, similar to Gertrude’s family, were American royalty. ‘Jr.’ was born into 
one of the richest families in the world; his father was the industrial tycoon and founder of 
Standard Oil.  Abby’s family was a political powerhouse, and she married into a financial one.  
 By the 1920s, Abby Aldrich Rockefeller (who I will now refer to as Rockefeller) 
commenced an informal education in contemporary  art, through a series of tutors, and quickly 
accumulated a private collection. In 1929, she converted the top floor of her seven-story 
townhouse on West 54th Street into a private exhibition space named Topside Gallery. In spite of 
her family’s distaste for modern art, she populated the gallery with works by Van Gogh, Picasso, 
and Cezanne, as well as a growing collection of American folk art. Like Bliss, she was 
disconcerted by the lack of support  for modern art. When she and Bliss returned from Egypt, 
Rockefeller quickly brought Mary Quinn Sullivan into their conversation.  
 Mary Quinn, a former art  teacher in the Midwest  and a graduate of the art program at the 
Pratt Institute, held several leadership positions in creating New York City’s public school art 
programs. Like Bliss, she traveled abroad to observe Europe’s art  education, and was exposed to 
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early Impressionist and Expressionist art. In 1917, Quinn wed John Sullivan, a prosperous and 
well-connected New York City  lawyer who sat on the Board of Education. During their marriage, 
she amassed a large and expansive modern art collection. 
 Similar to Gertrude, all three women supported living artists by purchasing art and 
providing financial security to those in need. However, they also desired to develop modern art 
as a field, and create a permanent collection representing it. Consequently, their involvement in 
living artists was more deliberate, and their purchases more measured than Gertrude and Force’s. 
 The women had what they  needed to found a museum: connections, cultural capital and 
money  (Hunter 1997, 10). Rockefeller’s son, Nelson, who would later become President of the 
Museum, remembers that his mother, Bliss, and Sullivan were “the perfect combination. The 
three women among them had all the resources, the tact, and the knowledge of contemporary art 
that the situation required.” (Hunter 1997, 10). They would become known as the ‘adamantine 
ladies’.  Yet, instead of simply relying upon themselves for know-how (as Gertrude and Force 
did), Abby, the tacit leader of the endeavor, consulted with art critics and museum directors 
before founding the museum. She hired and brought in experts from a variety of sectors. 
 In May 1929, Rockefeller, Bliss, and Sullivan nominated Conger A. Goodyear as chair of 
the museum founding campaign. Goodyear had a long history in the professional art world, and 
was recently president of the Albright Gallery  in Buffalo, NY. Unlike the Whitney Museum, the 
new quartet established a board of trustees from the start. They enlisted Josephine Porter 
Boardman Crane, founder of the prestigious and progressive Dalton School; Frank 
Crowninshield, editor of Vanity Fair; and Paul J. Sachs, Harvard museum scholar and co-director 
of the Fogg Art Museum. The circle that these women established was obviously very different 
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in character than Whitney and Force’s. The adamantine ladies forged a formalized, elite-based 
network that spanned a variety of professional (but only one social) milieux. 
 Their newly appointed director was also a far cry from Juliana Force. Alfred Barr, Jr., was 
a twenty-seven year old prodigy - the youngest tenured professor ever at Wellesley College. The 
field of modern art and the profession of museum director/curator was still unformed; Barr was 
at the forefront of shaping the discipline and the profession. A former student of Sach’s 
innovative ‘museums course’ at  Harvard (one of the first of its kind), Barr designed and taught 
the only course on modern art in American higher education. The multimedia focus of this course 
would set the foundation for the expansive departments - painting, drawing, film, etc. - at  the 
MoMA.  
 With these diverse, but connected individuals each offering their opinions, the founders 
then got  to work on their mission for the institution. The charter with the Boards of Regents of 
the University  of the State of New York states that the institution was designed for “establishing 
and maintaining in the City of New York, a museum of modern art, encouraging and developing 
the study of modern arts and the application of the such arts to manufacture and practical life, 
and furnishing popular instruction” (Hunter 1997, 11). It is evident that the seeds of education 
and scholarly conservation were planted from the outset.  
 The museum location decision was one of the last pieces of the founding puzzle. There 
were endless viable location options for the new Museum. As we know from the last section, the 
geography  of modern art at  the time was concentrated south of 14th Street, with their closest 
counterpart - the Gallatin Museum of Living Art - in Washington Square. Other major museums 
were scattered around the city; the Metropolitan on the Upper East Side and the Brooklyn 
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Museum on the eastern side of Prospect Park. Eschewing opening in any of these locales, the 
founders decided to focus on vacant commercial and office space for the new museum in 
midtown Manhattan. The location decision was not as pre-meditated as their other plans. Just a 
few months before opening, Barr was still considering over ten locations (Lynes 1973, 49). The 
matter was eventually placed into the hands of Mary  Quinn Sullivan, who turned to Peter 
Grimm, a friend and former student. Grimm was already  tied to the Rockefeller family: he was 
employed at the real estate firm in charge of all the family’s properties, which at this point 
spanned the five boroughs. Grimm suggested a suite of offices just  a few blocks from the 
Rockefeller’s residence, at the prestigious Heckscher Building.8  The location was one of the 
most desirable in the city. Heckscher, the building’s creator, stated: “whoever will not shop on 
Fifth Avenue and 57th Street will not shop  anywhere” (Horsley, accessed online). When he said 
this, Heckscher was referring to people like the Rockefellers and the rest of the board - those are 
the ‘sort’ who would shop on Fifth Avenue and 57th Street. Although the twelfth floor rental 
suffered from “cramped gallery spaces” of 4,430 square feet (Hunter 1997, 12), Alfred Barr, Jr., 
the founding director, saw it as ideal: “it is perfectly located…in a well-known landmark” (Bee 
and Elliott 2004, 26).  
 The Museum of Modern Art opened on November 7, 1929, just after Black Friday. 
Though modern art was controversial at the time, the opening show was a blockbuster.  It drew 
in almost 50,000 visitors during its month-long exhibition.  It was the largest audience of modern 
art since the Armory Show (Hunter 1997), and a “mixed bag” (Lynes 1973, 70) of elite and 
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8 The Hecksher building was constructed in 1921, and was a close to Whitney’s home at the time.  The 
site of the Heckscher Building was originally owned by the Whitney family, where one of their 
townhouses once stood.
relatively less elite attendees. Rockefeller and Barr were “delighted” (Lynes 1973, 70) that the 
first show brought a diverse (from their perspective, at least) audience.  
 The great success of the first year or two of the Museum compelled the founders to seek 
larger quarters, and very quickly another museum location decision was underway. A formal 
building committee was organized. In the wake of the 1929 Crash and the ensuing Depression, 
the committee focused on potentially  adaptable private residences that newly impoverished New 
Yorkers were looking to unload. Serious consideration was given to a property on Sixty-sixth 
Street between Park and Madison. However, once again, the ultimate selection came very  close 
to home. In 1932, the museum moved to a property at 11 West 53rd Street owned by Abby’s 
husband, John, Jr. At the time, West 53rd was a quiet residential block tucked away  from the 
commercial boulevards. As stated earlier, the Rockefeller family had holdings stretching across 
the city; West 53rd Street was not then the only possibility  for a property within the Rockefeller 
holdings. John Jr. himself had already or would go on to develop the Interchurch Center and 
International House of New York in Morningside Heights, The Cloisters in Inwood, and major 
housing developments in every borough. Despite an array of choice, the Museum of Modern Art 
stayed put in midtown, embedded in the networks that ensured their success.  
 Their success relied on their elite network to a far greater extent than may be expected. 
Although the Rockefellers were, at that point, contributing large sums to charitable causes, John 
Jr. limited his wife’s donations to the Museum. In fact, Goodyear had initially  suggested that the 
Museum purchase the 53rd Street townhouse from the outset, but  John resisted, solely agreeing to 
give the institution a break on the rent (and this concession only because he had been unable to 
generate income on the property from other potential tenants). Without Jr.‘s deep  pockets, the 
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museum had to fundraise in earnest. The board of trustees, of course, were in the line of fire. 
During this period, the initial founders strove to add a who’s who of New York’s elite to their 
extended circle, both informally and formally. Frank Crowninshield wrote: “I think it  is very 
important to have individuals like these [elites] in our background...perhaps even on our 
stationary” (Lynes 1973, 74). Their proximity  to these individuals proved to be useful as they 
acquired a larger board and donor list. We will see in later sections that the MoMA was at the 
forefront of an emerging trend towards professionalization. While they  could still dictate their 
location decision without much outside influence in the 1930s, this was about the change 
dramatically for the institutions that followed.     
 In the era of personal ties, individuals groped their way through the embryonic process of 
founding a museum. This era’s founders had an adventurous, entrepreneurial spirit (which we 
saw in Gertrude and Rockefeller), rather than a by-the-book approach. This is simply  because 
there was no book yet. The museum population that these women entered into represented the 
tail end of the era of personal networks. At this point, the museum population was not 
dramatically clustered into one location. There were art museums existing across Manhattan and 
many sections of Brooklyn. They  could have located near major museums in Crown Heights (the 
location of the Brooklyn Museum), the Central Park area (where the Met and the Museum of 
Natural History were located), or a planned museum complex in Washington Heights (location of 
the Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Hispanic Society  of America, and more). Instead, they 
represent the era by  following personal ties, which reflect the isolated, seemingly idiosyncratic 
location of the Nicholas Roerich Museum in Morningside Heights and the American Museum of 
Safety  on West 24th Street. I will discuss the era’s museum population as a whole at length in the 
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next chapter. Suffice it  to say, founders were deeply  involved in and intimately  attached to the 
organizations they built - the museum location decision was a natural extension of that 
orientation. 
 The decision was determined by the networks in which founders wanted to embed their 
institutions. Two very different  women, Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney  and Abby Aldrich 
Rockefeller, had the flexibility to generate divergent museum models in this era. Whitney kept 
the institution almost entirely self-run and self-funded. She built an “unbreachable wall” (Kert 
1993, 274) between her art world network in Greenwich Village and her high society world in 
Midtown. She threw herself into the downtown bohemian community and created a “sort  of 
social service agency” (Larson 1990, accessed online) - in the words of former Whitney Museum 
director Thomas Armstrong - for New York’s bohemian community. This then transformed into a 
full-fledged museum, slowly and ad hoc. The result was an institution of and in Greenwich 
Village. The Whitney would come to be identified by their art as much as by their location. 
 Rockefeller, on the other hand, envisioned an educational and collecting institution from 
the start. She brought modern art to her existing connections in midtown. During this era, the 
nation’s elite had set up a dense social network in Midtown and the Upper East Side. The 
geographical heart of that  network - the Plaza Hotel at 57th Street and Fifth Avenue - was across 
the street from MoMA’s first location and four blocks from their second. Rockefeller and her 
fellow founders used their place-based elite network as a jumping off point for their new 
institution. As her biographer Bernice Kert argues, Abby Rockefeller “had acquired the 
Rockefeller penchant for building a broad base, bringing other people into her venture” (1993, 
274). Their commitment to elite networks explains how a museum that is in name aligned with 
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contemporary  artists and the greater public could open in the wealthiest neighborhood in the 
country. These contrasting approaches typify the networks-based museum location decisions 
made in the preprofessional era.  The next era brings the Whitney and the MoMA out of an 
elastic environment and into a much denser and more constraining one.  
The era of homogenization (1940-1980)
 The era of homogenization represents a maturation of New York’s museum population. 
No longer resembling rebellious, strong-willed children, the museums that survived and the ones 
that opened were operating in a new reality. On the organization level, the museum form was 
slowly but surely developing; there was a growing consensus around what a museum should be 
and how it should be run. At the population level, New York was attracting a number of new 
institutions; the museum population was entering the insecure, conforming age of adolescence.  
 This new reality was also marked with the introduction of game-changing characters. 
Public and corporate grant giving bodies codified their expectations of museum structure, 
mission, and operation. All of New York’s institutions were confronted with these unfamiliar 
constraints. I will discuss how these new field entrants and the growth of the museum population 
contributed to institutional isomorphism of both museum structure and the location decision. A 
single model of success rose to the top  of the population hierarchy. The successful model was a 
formal, educational museum run by  a professionalized director with a large, wealthy board. The 
location decision was similarly  homogenized; during this era, museums located in elite areas 
(similar to the MoMA), often near their board members. Additionally, new museum founders 
piggybacked off the successes of existing museums by locating their museums nearby, creating 
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an endogenous feedback of cluster growth in elite neighborhoods. This was encouraged by birth 
of a professional community of museum administrators and employees, who increased 
association and communications during this period. This period, between 1940 and 1980, saw the 
unfettered growth of Museum Mile and its environs, to the detriment of other parts of the city  (I 
will discuss the aggregate consequences of this era in Chapter Two). 
Museums and the rise of the American nonprofit organization
 Before explaining how the introduction of state and corporate funding sources redefined 
New York’s museum population, I will first  trace an equally  important redefinition: the museum 
as a government-sanctioned nonprofit  institution. Nonprofits emerged in the United States during 
the Gilded Age (Hall 1982). These charities resembled early  instances of high culture 
institutions; they were constructed to ‘do good’ not  just for the public but for the founder’s social 
status (Arnove 1980, Cookson and Persell 1985). The federal government began to identify 
nonprofit institutions in the early  20th century. Between 1913 and 1918, Congress passed the first 
laws to exempt these organizations from federal taxes.  
 In 1954, a new revenue act encoded the strict, bureaucratic guidelines for nonprofit status 
that museum founders must adhere to, even today. All nonprofit organizations are categorized 
under the 501(c) tax code. Within this designation is a mandate to serve the public good, broadly 
construed. Museums are specifically designated as 501(c)(3); they are categorized to be both 
educational bodies and promoters of the arts under this code. The 501(c)(3) status is now 
considered essential for any major museum. It provides major tax breaks to potential corporate 
and individual donors, and determines eligibility for a number of public funding opportunities. 
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But the requirements to receive this designation are stringent; they permeate nearly every  aspect 
of an organization and demand a high level of organization and accountability. To put it plainly, 
it is safe to say  that the early days of the Whitney would not be granted 501(c)3 status. Existing 
institutions, and those that were founded during this period, conformed to the 501(c)3 
requirements. 
 Powell and DiMaggio (1983) argue that the intervention of the state into an 
organizational field coerces the population to homogenize and bureaucratize. While this was 
indeed the case, the proliferation of the nonprofit status was not the only  homogenizing force 
during this era.  
More people to please
 The unparalleled fortunes amassed during the Gilded Age were evaporating. The days of 
pumping obscene amounts of Gilded Age money into cultural institutions were on the decline. 
Museum leaders were increasingly at  the mercy of external funders. Many museums took on a 
board, but the corporation and the state were set to emerge as financial lifelines during this era. 
The museum was now an organization with several sources of external pressure. Each of these 
sources exacerbated the already-ongoing process of isomorphism.  
 As demonstrated in the Introduction, the United States government has not been 
especially friendly to the plight of its cultural institutions. Federal and local agencies had 
practiced a decidedly hands-off approach9  in regards to directly supporting the creation and 
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9 As I mentioned in the Introduction, friendly tax policies were in effect by this period, but this was the 
only form of sustained cultural policy. There was a brief hiccup during the New Deal when the federal 
government directly supported starving artists through WPA commissions, but this program was 
dismantled unceremoniously during WWII.
administration of arts and culture. Passive tax policies, as described above, were the sole 
intervention into the sector. It was not  until the 1960s that America developed its own explicit 
cultural policy. This came through the founding of the National Foundation for the Arts and 
Humanities, which in turn established the grant-giving National Endowment for the Arts and 
National Endowment for the Humanities. These agencies represented a new model of state 
patronage: provide grants to existing arts organizations based on peer review and expert opinion. 
The same period also saw the rapid proliferation of state arts councils, which operated similarly 
to their federal counterpart. 
 It is no coincidence that federal and state arts agencies were created in the backdrop of 
the 1960s; the democratization of culture was a national project well underway. Instead of 
condoning elites’ monopolization over culture, public opinion was leaning towards equal access 
to and enjoyment of it. Consequently, government support urged arts organizations to appeal to 
new, diverse audiences, as well as to increase their education and outreach programs (Alexander 
1996). Needless to say, the new sources of cash profoundly  reshaped the museum population. 
Strom argues that the state has become the “most important patron of high culture” (2002, 12). 
Powell and DiMaggio (1978) predict that the intervention of the state coerces organizational 
fields to homogenize. Peterson (1987) has supported this claim, suggesting that American arts 
organizations have moved into a bureaucratic, administrative structure due to new funding 
pressures. The museum location decision has been particularly vulnerable to these pressures 
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because public dollars often support capital investment - the purchase of land and the 
construction or renovation of buildings (Netzer 1978).10
 Corporate funders became a force to be reckoned with as well (Porter 1981), yet with 
similar strings attached.11 For-profit companies want to get a bang for their buck. Corporations 
are keen to underwrite ‘blockbuster’ shows that, again, are geared towards larger, broader 
audiences (Alexander 1996). Instead of creating the most esoteric, cutting-edge exhibit or 
pleasing the tastes of a single benefactor, museums now had to produce content that would 
appeal to the masses. Museums were expected to be packed to the brim with anyone they  could 
get in the door rather than sparsely populated with just the right kind of people. Following the 
model of government programming, corporate funders have begun to standardize and 
bureaucratize their giving. The consequence of these concurrent interventions is an 
organizational population that cannot survive financially without professionalizing, formalizing, 
and consequently homogenizing. 
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10 Historical data on museum finances is somewhat piecemeal (Manjarrez et. al. 2008, 90), but there is a 
consensus that government funding emerged during the 1960s and quickly became an influential force 
(Zimmer and Toepler 1999, Cummings 1995). Between the founding of the NEA in 1965 and 1980, its 
budget grew from $2.5 to $150 million; corresponding state-based and city-based funding increased from 
proportionately during that time as well (DiMaggio 1983, 61). High status conferrals and matching grants 
initiatives from government programs have spurred on corporate and private foundation giving during the 
same period. However, since the 1980s, museums have been increasingly relying on earned income as 
public funding has decreased beginning with the Reagan administration. A recent sample of New York 
City nonprofit arts institutions found that large institutions particularly have increased their earned 
income as public and private funding has declined (Alliance for the Arts 2010). Between 1995 and 2009, 
total earned income in the sample has more than doubled (from $357 to $841 million) while private and 
government grants have flattened. In 2009, earned income constituted 53.9% of income, with government  
funding at 14.1% and private funding at 32.0% (Alliance for the Arts 2010). When disaggregated by 
borough, Manhattan had the largest share of private contributions and the smallest average share of 
government funding. Another sample survey, by the Cultural Data Project, found that New York’s 
nonprofit arts institutions funding sources are divided as follows: 39% earned income, 35% private 
giving, 17% government funding, and 9% other (Alliance for the Arts 2011). A study conducted by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services found that, on a national level, museums generated funding 
from the following sources in 2006: 43.7% earned, 24.4% private, 12.2% investment, and 19.7% 
government (Manjarrez et. al. 2008). 
11 Private foundations, in particular the Ford Foundation, also became active agenda-setting grantors. 
Clustering
 The environment’s increase in the number of institutions has its own ecological effects. 
During the period of homogenization, the museum field was becoming dense and competition 
was growing. Seventy-two founders located or relocated their institution during this forty year 
period, versus thirty-eight during the previous forty. An increase in the rate of organizational 
founding often coincides with geographic clustering. The phenomenon of organizational 
clustering has been well-documented in other fields, mainly  for-profit ones (Bennett, Graham, 
and Bratton 1999; Gordon and McCann 2000; Porter 1998).  
 As more experts were hired 12  and more paperwork was generated, the ‘fundable’ 
museum model came into sharp focus. Museums had to adapt to this model or lose out on 
significant opportunities (Useem and Kutner 1986). During this era, museums and their locations 
are more similar than unique. This process was only accelerated by the ecological phenomenon 
of organizational clustering. This homogenization will be reflected through founding and 
relocation patterns of the entire population in Chapter Two. But first, we will see how the 
Whitney Museum of American Art was affected by this era.  
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12 Another significant force of homogenization is the professionalization of museum employees 
(DiMaggio 1991). As has been found in other industries, employees of new organizational forms strive to 
define and bound their work. This is the process of professionalization. During the era of homogenization, 
museum curators and directors created the museum professional. Museum employees became more likely 
to make the same decisions, since they were trained by the same education programs.  The 
professionalized population also became its own network and association. 
The Whitney comes of age
 By the 1940s, the Whitney was alive, but bleeding. After Whitney’s death in 1942, the 
Museum was left to her children. The institution was guarded from outsiders for as long as 
possible; the “tiny, family  board” (Biddle 1999) lasted for longer than it  probably should have 
(Larson 1990); the Whitney was in a financial crisis. Although Gertrude’s generation left  money 
to the next, it was not enough to solely support  what was becoming a complex, long-lived 
institution.  
 The Whitney was also responding to the changing environment by shifting its mission 
and orientation. Even in the first decade of the Museum’s founding (and in large part due to the 
museum’s efforts), American modern art was becoming accepted; once-starving artists were 
getting gallery shows, and traditional museums were incorporating key pieces into their 
collections. In a way, the Whitney created the seeds of its own destruction. It would have to 
become more like a museum, and less like an artist-promoting studio club, to rationalize its 
continued existence. 
 The 1950s saw the next  generation of Whitney leaders (led by  Gertrude’s daughter, Flora 
Whitney Miller) wrestle with unforeseen financial pressures. As the Museum continued its 
“inevitable” growth (Biddle 1999, 97), the board of trustees finally  allowed non-family 
members. This dramatically changed the seat of institutional power. The additional members 
brought in much needed cash, but also demanded a say in how the institution grew, who it hired, 
and what it exhibited. Miller, then president, knew that the introduction of external board 
members would remove the original personal orientation of the institution, she “agreed that the 
Museum could become a truly public institution...only  by expanding the board. But what did 
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truly  public mean? Supported by the public certainly, in proportion to its accessibility  and 
accountability to that public” (Biddle 1999, 108). The board itself began to institutionalize: Flora 
Miller Biddle, who at the time was a board member, remembered: “trustees’ meeting were 
different now. We had agendas, we set dates, we tried to be more formal” (Biddle 1999, 109). 
 One of the main topics of board meeting conversations was a possible relocation. Despite 
barely being in the black, the trustees were adamant about expanding. Another museum location 
decision was underway. This relocation would change the scope and mission of the institution 
from an ad hoc artists’ haven to an esteemed, collecting behemoth. The Whitney’s original plan 
was to find temporary  quarters in order to expand and renovate the Eighth Street building. The 
search for a short-term space was a nonstarter, mainly due to lack of finances. After much hand-
wringing, the leaders decided to accept a favor that appeared from a familiar face. In 1949, the 
Museum of Modern Art offered the Whitney a property adjacent to it, facing West 54th Street.13 
This generous offer was initiated through an intimate network tie. The chair of MoMA’s board 
was John Hay Whitney, cousin and friend to Gertrude. The Whitney accepted the offer in 1949, 
but sat on the actual relocation, camping out in Greenwich Village for another eight years. 
 Finally, after enough time had passed to persuade leaders to feel that “uptown seemed to 
be the place to be” (Biddle 1999, 78), they relocated to West 54th Street. This was a dramatic 
move away from the Greenwich Village artists’ network they  held so dear. The Whitney’s new 
neighbors would be wealthy  Fifth Avenue residents and a new slate of profitable, commercial art 
galleries. This move, in effect, traded in one landed network (informal, socializing artists) for 
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13 This offer came after a fumbled attempt to absorb the Whitney into the MoMA. The effort, spearheaded 
by Juliana Force, was abandoned because the MoMA would not accept the Whitney’s collection as is.  
another (formal art  galleries and their wealthy clients); this was not only  a new location, but a 
new internal identity for the institution. 
 The move had a significant  effect on the Museum’s external identity  as well. In their first 
year, their attendance quadrupled (Biddle 1999, 97). They became associated with the MoMA, 
losing some independence and gaining some of their policies. Trustees and directors became 
even more cautious and selective in their acquisitions for the collection. They agreed to accept 
gifts and donations from external individual donors, the state, and corporate sponsors. The 
Whitney became aware of their competition with other museums for these funds, the MoMA in 
particular. Biddle said that with these changes came “a dissemination of authority” (1999, 97). 
The days of Gertrude and Force calling the shots were over, replaced by a large, diverse set of 
interlocutors. Their new geography was in lockstep with their new governance structure. 
 These bedfellows lasted for nine years. During that period, other museums were 
gathering on the Upper East  Side. The entire population was institutionalizing and mimicking, 
similar to the process the Whitney was undergoing. By the mid-1960’s, the MoMA was ready to 
have their space back, and the Whitney was eager to get out from under their shadow. Again, the 
museum leaders were faced with a location decision. They quickly decided not to move back to 
their original space on Eighth Street. They also vetoed the notion of a permanent location in 
midtown. Instead, their eyes were looking northward. The board agreed upon a location on the 
Upper East Side. 57th Street was becoming a gallery  scene, but the site (on the corner of 
Madison Avenue and 75th Street) was more conveniently  adjacent to the heart of the most elite 
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status community  in New York and it was only one avenue away from the burgeoning Museum 
Mile.14 
 As a result of the increased cost of the land purchase and original construction, the 
Whitney further institutionalized, adopting museum policies that are now standard. They began 
charging for admission for the first time. More board members were added. Citywide marketing 
campaigns were approved. As Powell and DiMaggio (1978) predicted, these moves reflect a 
mixture of coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive pressures were brought on 
by the endless crossings of T’s and dottings of I’s that came with government and corporate grant 
giving. In order for the Whitney to even be eligible for these forms of support, they were 
‘forced’ to operate in an accountable, professional way. Mimetic pressures are part and parcel 
with their geographic proximity to and relationship with the MoMA. The Whitney  trustees knew 
that the MoMA was their competition - and that the Whitney was losing that competition 
(Berman 1990). In light of their economic precariousness, the Whitney chose to emulate their 
more legitimized peer, both in location and administration. Finally, the role of normative 
pressures were strong, not only for the Whitney, but for the entire museum population. Museum 
directors and curators were well into the professionalization process. The American Association 
of Museums was growing, directors were increasingly mobile since WWII (Meyer 1979), and the 
top museum directors were so connected that by  this point one expert likened the profession to “a 
kind of freemasonry” (Meyer 1979, 231). The days of Juliana Force and her kind were over (she, 
incidentally, was ousted from power during this period). From all fronts, the onslaught of 
institutional isomporhism was coming to the Whitney.  
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14 Coincidentally, Abby and John Rockefeller had followed the elite clustering on the Upper East Side and 
were now located at 740 Park Avenue, just a few blocks from the Whitney’s new location. 
 The Whitney’s new location and new governance did have its advantages. As a result 
(many would argue), attendance at the new location increased exponentially, and the Whitney 
joined the ranks of the major public museums in New York and the dozen or so museums already 
operating on the Upper East Side. These included: the Frick Collection, the Goethe-Institut, the 
Cooper-Hewitt Museum, and more which I discuss in the next chapter. 
 Flora Miller Biddle, Whitney’s granddaughter and new president of the board, fully 
embraced a scholarly mission in line with her new neighbors: “the sheer number of artists and 
new galleries in New York made our former mission hopeless to fulfill. We couldn’t possibly 
show all emerging artists…All in all, the Whitney’s top  priority was now to show the very finest 
of American art…” (Biddle 1999, 191). During this era, the Whitney Museum of American Art 
transformed from an informal, artist-driven advocacy organization to an institutionalized, donor-
friendly institution. The museum’s location decision was a key driver and reflection of this 
change.  
 While the MoMA stayed in its original location, it also underwent an institutionalization 
process (albeit, not to the extent of the Whitney Museum). Goodyear, the museum’s first 
president, argues that as the institution’s public expanded; the number of “special constituencies” 
it needed to please increased. So too did the complexity  and size of the institution (Hunter 1999, 
33). They began to accept a significant amount of public and corporate grants. Goodyear recalls: 
“receiving it [grants], however, implied greater public accountability for the Museum’s 
programs...” (Lynes 1973, 33). Despite this additional pressure, public and corporate giving 
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continued at the MoMA, and as the 1970s and 1980s wore on, the museum became increasingly 
oriented towards attracting more and more attendees.  
 We can see that by the mid-twentieth century, there was a clear push towards similarity 
over difference for the museum population. As a result of the homogenization of internal 
organizational decision making, museums founded in this era were more likely  to join the 
growing museum population in elite Manhattan. The Whitney took the more dramatic step of 
relocating into it. 
 The intra-organizational homogenization was exacerbated by population-level dynamics. 
Museums were growing in numbers, becoming a field of their own. And the benefits of grouping 
geographically were only increasing. Prior research has shown that geographic clustering drives 
and is driven by institutional homogenization. The advantages of clustering for museums, 
specifically, include: the possibility of sharing or sponging attendees, staff, reputation, and 
donors (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004). The result is a map (which I will show in Chapter Two) 
of the newly concentrated distribution of museums, which occurred in elite Manhattan for the 
reasons previously laid out. 
 The irony is that the era of homogenization took place alongside the advent of 
government patronage and ‘cultural democracy’ politics. Unlike programming and marketing 
decisions, the museum location decision was not vulnerable to democratization pressures. If the 
era of homogenization were to continue, we would observe an unsustainable level of saturation 
in the elite sections of Manhattan. Instead, as will be discussed in the next section, the role of 
museums in urban life transformed significantly over the following decades.  
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The era of cultural branding (1980s-present)
The question of what the economy can do for the arts has been reversed to  what the arts can do 
for the economy.15 
 By 1980, New York’s museum population was more saturated than any other city in the 
country. There were eighty-nine museums within the five boroughs. 53% of these were in 
Manhattan, and 56% of those were located in the single neighborhood of Upper East Side. As we 
saw in the last era, the museum population had matured and homogenized. It is possible that  the 
process of homogenization could have continued, but a new trend of location decisions was 
about to take hold. During this era, we will witness the deliberate, state-sponsored transformation 
of the museum field from a constellation of nonprofit institutions into a major force of urban 
economic development -- and museums’ emergence as a key  player in the ‘creative economy’. I 
will argue that the political, economic, and organizational changes of this era have also 
reconstructed the museum location decision. In Chapter Two, we will see that this resulted in a 
controlled diffusion of museums to new areas of New York City, including the outer boroughs. In 
addition to an upsurge of support for capital projects, museums are using their location decisions 
to brand and re-brand their institutional identity. With such a large museum population, a single 
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15 Hendon, Shanahan, and Macdonald 1984, 297.
institution must look for new ways to differentiate itself from the rest of the pack, and 
demonstrate its own ‘anchoring’ abilities. Thus, cultural branding is a symbiotic process between 
the institution and community: both leech a desired reputation from the other, meeting 
somewhere in the middle.  
 This sea change has occurred in concert  with political and economic urban actors who 
have named arts organizations as a new lever of renewal and revitalization.16 In 1983, the New 
Jersey and New York Port Authority published a landmark study estimating the ‘economic 
impact’ of the cultural sector on the region (Stern and Seifert 2008). The ripple effect of the study 
quickly moved through arts institutions, economic development organizations, and government 
agencies. Through the findings of economic impact reports17, arts organizations could now 
justify  receiving larger public earmarks (as well as funding from agencies not specifically 
designated to support culture), and municipal bodies could align with local economic developers 
in mutually beneficial goals. These efforts were spurred on by the bullish 1990s. A surge of 
major building projects has followed; between 1985 and 2002, seventy-one large-scale museums 
or art centers have been founded across the country  (Strom 2002, 3). In New York City, one 
hundred museums of all sizes were founded.  
 This attention has only intensified as city leaders have begun to brand their cities to 
appeal to two key demographics: tourists and the creative class (Hannigan 1998, Eisinger 2000). 
Prevailing wisdom argues that both of these groups ‘need’ museums and other arts institutions in 
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16 There are important precursors to this form of economic development, including culture-based renewal 
projects by Robert Moses and the revitalization of SoHo as an artists district (Zukin 1987). I will discuss 
these instances in detail in Chapter Two. However, I argue that it was not until the 1980s that these efforts 
became widespread and systematic.  
17 The validity of arts-based economic impact reports are debated. EIR’s use a ‘multiplier effect’, which 
assumes that every attendee of an institution will spend a far greater sum on the city in general.  
their cities. Tourism has always been a major source of revenue for urban America, New York 
especially. Recently, urban tourism has enchanted policymakers: cities are creating amenities not 
for their residents, but for their visitors (Judd 1999).These policies are tied intimately to cultural 
projects. The reinvestment, for example, in Times Square and the midtown theater district, has 
dramatically changed the face of the once-seedy, adult oriented neighborhood, which is now a 
family friendly destination. In the NYC Department of Cultural Affair’s 2008 Annual Report, it 
is clear that municipal policy has negotiated and encouraged these transformations, and triumphs 
the city’s arts as “a central element” of the city which “strengthen[s] our communities” and 
“contribute[s] to the spiritual and economic health” of New York. Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
(who took office in 2002) has been especially supportive of arts-based revitalization.
 Along with tourists, cities, which suffered from an exodus of the middle class mid-
century, are aiming to attract  high skill and high income professionals. Similar to building an 
infrastructure of tourist-friendly pockets within an urban center, urban elites are attempting to 
install institutional amenities that are favored by young, urban professionals. This demographic - 
with a special emphasis on those engaged in creative and hi-tech professions - has been termed 
the ‘creative class’ (Florida 2002, 2005). Florida became the voice of this movement, 
encouraging the fostering of ‘creative cities’ through the development of cultural and lifestyle 
amenities. This has resulted in cities allocating huge sums of money to develop live-work 
neighborhoods rife with arts and cultural organizations. According to Florida’s theory, the end-
goal of attracting and sustaining the creative class is a more prosperous, modern, and happy  city 
for all of its residents.  
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 Taken together, there is a new conception of the transformative power a major arts 
institution can exert on its surrounding community. Thomas Krens’ work as President of the 
Guggenheim Foundation could be the most extreme example of this approach. He tested the re-
branding capacity of a major arts institution by founding an extension museum in the off-the-
grid, manufacturing city of Bilbao, Spain. The museum was an enormous success, resuscitating 
the economic prowess of the city, and even the surrounding region. The “Bilbao effect” was born 
(Minutillo 2008). City leaders and arts administrators now had ‘proof’ that it was possible to 
revitalize an entire city with one landmark institution.  
 The linkage between cultural institutions and economic development has changed the 
symbolic and physical map of where museums should locate. In the new decision model, 
museum location is now key to developing an institutional identity. Concurrently, neighborhoods 
are welcoming these institutions with open arms - encouraged by policymakers and private 
developers. These simultaneous efforts have resulted in a geographic spread of New York’s 
museum population. However, this diffusion is only  to certain, ‘acceptable’ areas. We will see in 
the following sections what the characteristics of an ‘acceptable’ neighborhood are. In this 
section, I will convey how the Whitney Museum and the MoMA confronted this new era. Both 
institutions use geography to jumpstart the image of their now aged institutions. They expand 
into new neighborhoods to reinvigorate their reputation as current, relevant, and - for lack of a 
better word - cool.  
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The ‘cultural corridor’
At P.S. 1 no one wears a tie…at MoMA they wear cuff links.
Tom Finkelpearl, former Deputy Director of P.S. 118
 In 1971, while the MoMA was already a citywide landmark, a small, scrappy arts 
organization formed in relative obscurity. The organization, the Institute for Art and Urban 
Resources, was founded by Alanna Heiss, a former music student. Heiss was deeply  embedded 
in the underground arts scene of 1970s New York City, advocating for her struggling-artist 
friends and colleagues. Similar to Whitney  and Rockefeller before her, she was unsatisfied with 
the scant recognition museums and galleries were giving the younger generation. In its early 
form, the Institute was more a social service than collecting institution. Heiss was a proponent of 
the alternative space movement: she reclaimed abandoned properties and repurposed them into 
work-live and exhibition spaces. Heiss attacked the city  with a broad sweep; the Coney Island 
Sculpture Museum, 10 Bleecker Street, the Idea Warehouse in TriBeCa, and the Clocktower 
Gallery in lower Manhattan were all products of her efforts. 
 Ironically, the Institute did not have its own space. That changed in 1976, when Heiss 
took over an abandoned school building that had been shut down by the Department of 
Education in 1963 on the corner of 21st Street and 46th Avenue in Long Island City, Queens. The 
building was, and is, massive; it’s size and distinctive red brick Romanesque revival architecture 
make it a visual and symbolic neighborhood landmark. Heiss sectioned the floor space into 
twenty-four subsidized studios. She renamed her organization Project Studios One, or P.S. 1. The 
61
18 Goldstein 2008, accessed online.
organization’s name is a clever reference to the building’s past  life, but also a sign of the arts 
organization’s future educational role in the community.  
 Locating a massive arts institution in Long Island City  was not an obvious choice.  While 
there were artists living in the community, the neighborhood did not have the density  of SoHo, 
the Lower East Side, or many spots in Brooklyn. There was not an existing presence of arts 
organizations. P.S. 1 was hoped to be the spark of more to come. And come it did. The new 
building and its early  success brought novel attention to the area. By 1980, the era of cultural 
branding had taken hold and Long Island City  was a target. A cover article in New York 
Magazine named it  “The Next Neighborhood” (Keating 1980). The article contested that P.S. 1 
gave Long Island City’s then-sprawling, unorganized artist community “legitimacy” (ibid., 22), 
and that it acted as a “key catalyst” (ibid., 24) to attract additional artist and luxury oriented 
organizations. There were plans to build a three-block $67 million Queens Performing Arts 
Center, which would anchor a projected arts district. City government and private developers 
were commandeering the project; one developer said that area “was like an oil field” (ibid., 20). 
 Twenty years later, this master re-branding plan has been slow in coming. While P.S. 1 
grew to become a significant force in the contemporary art world, it did not spawn an ‘authentic’ 
artist community. Instead, the bohemian energy went to North Williamsburg and DUMBO, 
Brooklyn. However, Long Island City  quietly, but meaningfully  grew a small institutional 
infrastructure. The Fisher Landau Center, the Isamu Noguchi Museum, and Socrates Sculpture 
Park were founded in the orbit  of the converted schoolhouse. These institutions were doing well, 
but more or less under the radar. P.S. 1 itself had a cutting-edge, respected reputation, but was 
struggling internally and living “hand to mouth” (Goldstein 2008, accessed online). Without a 
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high density of the local artists and corresponding lifestyle amenities (targeted restaurants, cafes, 
etc.), this museum cluster did not capture the attention of greater New York City. 
 Across the East River, the Museum of Modern art celebrated it’s seventy-first birthday in 
2000. While the longevity of the institution was something to celebrate, there was some 
blemishes on the once pioneering reputation of the Museum. Although it was oriented towards 
modern and contemporary art, some felt that it was too scholarly, too safe, and falling out of 
touch with the times. As we saw in the previous section, the effects of institutionalism have taken 
their toll; the MoMA was not built to be as flexible and responsive as it might have wanted. A 
breath of fresh air was needed. In 2000, the MoMA became partner institutions with P.S. 1 - now 
named MoMA PS1. The union brought financial security, a new audience and donor base, and a 
world-class reputation to the impoverished Long Island City  organization. In the blink of an eye, 
P.S. 1 rebranded itself into an august New York City museum. Midtown MoMA benefited from 
the partnership merger as well: they received a healthy dose of ‘street cred’, as well as additional 
square feet to exhibit and test out more experimental, less MoMA-certified works. 
 What is perhaps most surprising about the partnership, however, is how important 
geography  was to the decision. According to both institutions’ press releases, one of their major 
goals was to “extend the reach of both institutions”. Glenn Lowry, the director of the midtown 
MoMA, was vocal about how the partnership  would redefine the city’s cultural landscape: “P.S. 
1 appealed to him because of Long Island City’s proximity to the Modern without being in 
Manhattan…Mr. Lowry said, ‘We are creating a cultural corridor...’” (Vogel 1999, accessed 
online). At a professional conference, Lowry pushed the point even further by calling the outer 
boroughs “the centers of New York” (Center for an Urban Future 2006, accessed online). 
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Lowry’s moves represent a careful, delicate dance between development, government, and 
museum interests, and how they have come together during this era. In Chapter Two, I will 
further explore this dance, and how it has affected the locations of dozens of the city’s museums.  
 MoMA PS1 was signified as a major step ahead in the stop-and-start process of 
transforming Long Island City  from a quiet, working-class manufacturing neighborhood to a 
buzzy, creative class arts district. Today, the neighborhood’s economic development corporation 
lists seventeen major arts organizations. A few of them have banded together in joint 
development and outreach efforts, anchored by  MoMA PS1 (the Long Island Cultural Alliance). 
A number of smaller galleries have opened in the past  decade as well. 2011 saw the first annual 
Long Island City  arts festival: no less than 52 organizations are participating in the eight-day 
event. In 2000, the New York Times argued that the neighborhood, after thirty years of false 
starts, has finally “come into its own” (Vandam 2010, accessed online) and a local research 
center argues that the MoMA stamp of approval “stepped up the pace of development” in Long 
Island City  (Center for an Urban Future, accessed online). In one fell swoop, the Museum of 
Modern Art re-branded itself, a struggling outer-borough arts organization, and an on-the-brink 
neighborhood.
The big move…back
 After unsuccessful attempts to expand their 32,000 square foot building on Madison 
Avenue, the Whitney Museum’s board began to entertain relocation discussions in the 
mid-2000s. The notion was hotly debated, and it took years until they finally agreed to relocate. 
Despite this internal tumult, in 2010 the board unanimously decided that it was time to move. 
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The chosen location -- the downtown, trendy, revitalized Meatpacking District - was a vast 
departure from their current home.
 One of the reasons the move was so contentious was because, after almost five decades 
on the Upper East  Side, the museum was highly attached to its neighborhood. This was the case 
even for the board members. Leonard Lauder, a powerful trustee and the institution’s most 
generous patron, was one of the staunchest  holdouts; he could not imagine the Whitney being 
anywhere else. After consenting to the move, he explained his initial reticence: “It  would be 
unfair for someone like me who grew up near the Whitney to believe it  should stay  there” (Vogel 
2010, accessed online). The Whitney would have to say goodbye to its proximity  to donors 
(many who are lifetime residents like Lauder) and to Museum Mile. There was also uncertainty 
about how this would change the museum’s attendance base. Lauder wondered, “I have no doubt 
that they can build the museum, but once the surge is over, will they be able to create a new 
viewership  that can sustain it?” (Vogel 2010, accessed online). Lauder is personally  donating the 
funds to hold onto the original location, just in case. 
 While Lauder doesn’t want the museum to change, the other Whitney  leaders hope that 
this move will do exactly that. Through their new location, the Museum is reorienting their 
image, function, and audience. This is in large part through their new association with the 
Meatpacking District. Until the 1960s, the neighborhood, which runs between 14th Street and 
Gansevoort Street north-south, and from Hudson Street to the river east-west, was literally  a 
meatpacking commercial zone, bustling with slaughterhouses and food preparation businesses. 
As shipping waned on the Manhattan waterfront, the neighborhood suffered and fell into a state 
of decay. In the 1970s, nightlife establishments started to open in the area, catering towards the 
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gay and BDSM communities. The ‘sprucing up’ started in the 1990s. Fashionable boutiques - 
which wanted to get in on the edgy vibe of the neighborhood - popped up. Galleries started to 
creep south from neighboring Chelsea. The turnover of the neighborhood was rapid and intense. 
Today, it is home to some of the city’s most expensive and desirable restaurants, hotels, and 
nightclubs. The neighborhood, however, does not have any museums.  
 To fit into this community, the Whitney needed an internal and external makeover. The 
groundbreaking ceremony was closer to a young, urban loft party than a staid trustee soiree. 
Director Adam Weinberg speculates that the museum could become a nighttime destination, “a 
gathering place for the community and a place where people can do things in the evening other 
than eat and drink...And we’re talking about having very  late hours sometimes during the week 
because people are out much later in that  neighborhood” (Swanson 2011, accessed online). 
Commentators interpret this move to be a strategic rebranding for the institution: the New York 
Times opines that the museum, similar to the MoMA, is “trying hard to show off a younger, 
hipper side” (Murphy 2011, accessed online).
 Local observers argue that the addition of the Whitney to the Meatpacking District will 
act as a “capstone” to two decades of concentrated renewal (WestView News 2012, accessed 
online).  There is already talk of additional amenities, which were once decidedly  not downtown, 
to make the move as well. For example, owners of the hallowed Four Seasons Restaurant, are 
considering an outpost near the museum site (Smith and Karni 2012).
 City  government has played an active role in ensuring this relocation. In Chapter Two, I 
will map out exactly  how these actors have intervened on the museum location decision at the 
population level. Suffice it to say that this has indeed taken hold of the Whitney. In 2009, the 
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New York City  Economic Development Corporation inked a deal with the museum to 
substantially  subsidize their investment in the property. The Whitney would pay only half of the 
site’s appraised value -- $18 million -- and the city would dedicate $55 million to the building 
construction. The agreement is in line with previous public development projects in the 
neighborhood. The Meatpacking District has now “been spruced up and made safe for a major 
cultural brand” (Davidson 2011) and the Whitney Museum is expected to act as that 
“anchor” (Whitney  Director Adam Weinberg in Swanson 2011) for additional development and 
branding. City  intervention had already proven to be successful in the neighborhood through the 
high profile conversion of an abandoned elevated railway into an urban park named the High 
Line. Mayor Bloomberg budgeted $50 million for this quality-of-life project in 2004. The site of 
the new Whitney is located at the terminus of this park. By geographically  linking with the High 
Line and the Meatpacking District, the Whitney  Museum of American Art has fully  shed its 
rebellious, informal start, and is now the crowned formal arts institution of the new New York. 
 The last thirty years have marked a major shift in how museums interact  with their home 
cities. Museums are now active players in development efforts, strategically  redefining 
themselves and their surroundings with the location decision. The Whitney and the MoMA 
moved into neighborhoods unlike the Upper East Side or Midtown. However, both Long Island 
City  and the Meatpacking District were in the process of urban revitalization. They were 
‘acceptable’ neighborhoods for museums because both were well into that transformation. In 
Long Island City, P.S. 1 had helped foster a suitable environment for what would become 
MoMA PS1; in the Meatpacking District, commercial and government forces were jointly driven 
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to re-brand the neighborhood. The MoMA and the Whitney were able to enter into these 
environments, sop  up some of the remaining rough edges of the neighborhood, and further 
catalyze its redevelopment.  Both of these neighborhoods now have major art  museums attached 
to their identities. While these are clearly bringing smaller organizations and businesses to their 
areas, we will have to see if they are able to attract other museums as well. Or, it is possible that 
to further differentiate new museum leaders will cast their eyes even further afield.  
Conclusion
 In this chapter, I argued that the way museum leaders decide on their locations is 
patterned over time. This pattern can be roughly divided into three eras (please see the figure 
below for a summary of key points covered in the chapter). From the Gilded Age to the 1940s, 
museums were personal pet projects; the location decision was an outcome of existing 
embeddedness in networks. In the middle of the century, the museum field became 
institutionalized and homogenized. The ideal museum model emerged, along with an ideal 
location (elite Manhattan). In the 1980s, cultural branding came into play; museums became 
strategic in their location decisions, pushing the envelope of where they could set up shop. This 
also allowed institutions to differentiate in a saturating market. The Whitney Museum of 
American Art and the Museum of Modern Art provided illustrative case studies as to how long-
lived institutions navigated through these periods; in Chapter Two I will argue that they are 
representative of population-level trends. Overall, transformations of the museum location 
decision help us understand the current spatial distribution of museums.
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Table 1.2. Timeline of the three eras of the museum location decision
 However, there are still questions to be answered. While a portion of the diffusion of 
museums can be attributed to organization- and field-level dynamics, it is also clear that these 
museums do not open in empty  space. These institutions interact with the residents, businesses, 
and communities they  decide (or do not decide) to locate in. We can notice, even from the 
current distribution of museums displayed in the Introduction, that there are certain clusters that 
exist, but have not grown to the extent of Museum Mile, such as Crown Heights, Brooklyn and 
Flushing, Queens. Under what circumstances were these areas’ institutions founded? What was 
the composition of these communities at the time of museum foundings? Were they ever 
considered to become the ‘next’ Museum Mile? What stagnated their growth? Along with 
examining the museum population en masse, we need to consider a so-far missing, but extremely 
important piece of the puzzle: New Yorkers.  
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Chapter 2: New Yorkers and their museums
Individually, museums are fine institutions, dedicated to the high values of preservation, 
education and truth; collectively, their growth in numbers points to the imaginative death of this 
country.
          Robert Hewison
 The previous chapter explained how increasing institutional pressures and the growth of 
the museum population altered the museum location decisions over time. I used the institutional 
life courses of the Whitney Museum of American Art  and the Museum of Modern Art to identify 
three eras, each with a different location decision paradigm. In this chapter, I will make the 
argument that the location decisions of the Whitney and the MoMA reflect population-level 
trends, and examine how those trends resulted in the spatial distribution we observe today. I will 
also introduce the changing demographic composition of New York as a mitigating factor to 
explain the diffusion and (at  times) contraction of museum placement. While the organization-
level of founder decisions are key  to understanding how museums have converged in their 
decision making, we need to emplace those decisions in the evolving city of New York to make 
sense of why some neighborhoods benefited from a museum boom and others did not. 
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 The figure below summarizes the location decision model, prevailing demographic trend, 
and subsequent museum distribution of each era.19 The era of personal ties was concurrent with 
the rapid succession and shifting of both the immigrant and elite population. Because 
neighborhoods were not yet solidified and founders tended to make personal location decisions, 
the large-scale geographic distributions of museums created an unsystematic series of potential 
clusters around the city. During the era of homogenization, residential segregation was cemented 
and founder decisions homogenized. Consequently, even though the rate of foundings increased, 
there was an overall contraction in their geographic spread. Founders during this era preferred 
the elite enclave of the Upper East Side. Other clusters developed during the previous era 
stagnated. The final era is characterized by a calculated diffusion of museums. This can be 
explained by the simultaneous rise of gentrification and founders’ increasing desire to 
differentiate their institutions through the location decision. Before elaborating on these eras, I 
will briefly introduce the two datasets utilized throughout the chapter. 
Table 2.1. Characteristics of three eras of the museum location decisions
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19 Both the demographic trends and location decision of each era should be considered fluid guidelines. 
Not every museum followed the location pattern of each era, and New York’s demographic changes are 
extremely complex and fast-paced. I use these rough abstractions to characterize the paradigm of each 
era.  
  As this table indicates, demographic change plays a decisive factor in how the museum 
location decision unfolded over New York’s neighborhoods, even though it is an unconscious 
factor in the minds of museum leaders. By demographic change, I mean the increased proportion 
of minority, and particularly African Americans, in New York neighborhoods. While 
demographics were salient during the era of personal ties, I argue that they were increasingly 
influential as the proportion of African Americans increased and became residentially segregated 
during the era of homogenization and on through the era of cultural branding. I argue that the 
interaction of changing decision paradigms and demographic transformations result in the 
specific large-scale diffusion patterns of each era. In short, the previous chapter made the case 
that museum location decisions are a dynamic product of population-level forces. This chapter 
explains why individual neighborhoods were included or excluded from those paradigmatic 
location decisions.   
 This argument motivates a number of empirical hypotheses, each of which I will explore 
through observed data between 1910 and 2010. This chapter will unfold as follows. First, I will 
demonstrate how the case studies of the Whitney and the MoMA are reflective of broader 
dynamics by chronicling the changing spatial distribution of the museum population through the 
three location decision eras. At key points, I will validate the relationship between the museum 
location and demographic trends by proposing and ultimately rejecting alternative explanations, 
including the primacy of clustering theory and the contention that diffusion is solely tied to 
tourism geography. Of course, these alternate explanations influence the location decisions, but 
at each juncture, we will find, through observed empirics, that historical and current museum 
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diffusion cannot be explained without considering the residential patterns of New Yorkers, and 
particularly African Americans. I will further test the relationship between the location decision 




 Constructing a dataset of New York City’s museums requires an operational definition. A 
museum is, in the broadest terms, an institution whose primary purpose is for the public to view 
an exhibition of some collection.20  These collections can be of artistic, scientific, historical, or 
cultural objects; or plants, and/or animals. 21 This basic definition can be translated into a series 
of operational components, or keywords: museum, arts institution, zoo, botanical garden, 
exhibition, collection, and aquarium. I used these keywords as a search heuristic in a database, in 
this case the New York Times historical archive, 1851-2010. This approach to building databases 
has been tested and utilized (Earl et. al. 2004, Koopmans and Rucht 1999, DeRouen, Bercovitch, 
and Pospieszna 2011).
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20 The International Council of Museums currently defines the museum as: “a nonprofit, permanent 
institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, researches, 
communicates, and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the 
purposes of education, study and enjoyment” (ICOM 2007).
21 It may appear that living museums follow a different location logic than other museum forms. 
However, these institutions are similarly clustered with other museum forms (though more frequently in 
parkland than not). An example of this phenomenon is the collection of institutions, including a botanical 
garden, in Snug Harbor, Staten Island. 
 I read the description of each institution match, and included any matches that adhered to 
the original definition.22 This required dismissing any  “exhibition” matches that were put on by 
commercial galleries, theaters, or performing arts institutions. I also excluded collections and 
exhibition matches that were part of traveling or temporary shows, such as World’s Fairs. I cross-
referenced remaining matches with current and historical directories from ReferenceUSA, 
American Alliance of Museums (previously American Association of Museums), and the 
Alliance for the Arts. I collected founding and closing dates and prior locations from the 
museum’s own records and publications, as well as an independent search through local 
historical newspaper coverage provided by the Columbia University  Libraries (but again 
beginning with the New York Times). I geocoded this dataset using ArcGIS. This resulted in a set 
of 281 founding events; 57 of these were relocations.  
United States Census
 The second source is the United States Census. I extracted demographic data at the tract-
level, beginning in 191023  through the most recent 2010 Census. Both the geographic unit of 
analysis (the census tract boundaries) and the data content has changed over the past century. 
However, the US Census has consistently collected the basic racial composition of each tract.24 
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22 I did not include instances of the dime museum model. These were explicitly referred to as ‘dime 
museums’ and were thus distinguished from their high culture counterparts. Furthermore, the dime 
museum faded out by the early 1900s in New York.  
23 This is the first year data was collected at the tract level. 
24 Unless otherwise cited, all demographic data and figures are based on my analysis of the US Census 
data. 
The era of personal ties
 During the era of personal ties, both the city of New York and its museum population 
were unformed. The relationship between the museum location decision and demographic trends 
was just as shaky. Please recall that in the last chapter, both the Whitney and the MoMA were 
founded modern art institutions in reaction to the establishment, yet in contrasting locations; I 
will argue that this discrepancy was typical until the early 1930s. Museum founders are most 
likely to locate institutions in places to which they have some personal connection; since most 
founders were white elites, we expect and observe that no museums were founded in minority 
neighborhoods during this period. We also predict, and observe, that the shifting locations of elite 
neighborhoods spread out the early distribution of museums. As the era goes on, both of these 
populations begin to take shape, staking their ownership  of certain neighborhoods and forsaking 
others. The initial scattering of institutions becomes increasingly organized.  
New York dipped in gold
In Boston they ask, how much does he know?  In New York, how much is he worth?  In 
Philadelphia, who were his parents?
Mark Twain
 In 1825, New York could hardly  be called a world-class city. There was no police force, 
no fire department, no sewage system. Less than two hundred thousand souls25 - most of which 
were recent immigrants - lived on the island sliver. Over the next fifty years, these figures 
changed at a meteoric rate; by 1870, the population approached one million. The rate of 
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25 One can compare this figure to major cities at the time. London contained almost one million residents 
in 1801. Paris contained just under 800,000 residents in 1831. 
commercial growth was also unprecedented; New York emerged as the shipping and trade hub of 
the country. The manufacturing boom triggered a tidal wave of immigration, at first from Ireland 
and Germany and then increasingly from southern and eastern Europe. Immigrants settled into 
dense downtown tenement districts, close to the factories and ports. The small group of men who 
owned those factories and ports would come to constitute the richest class the country had ever 
witnessed.  
 The Gilded Age (1860s-1890s), as coined by Mark Twain, seemed to be just that - dipped 
in gold. The country’s elite was far wealthier and more celebrated than ever before. Despite 
amassing their fortunes all over the country, an astonishing number of these tycoons chose to live 
in one city: New York (Reitano 2006). In the 1850s, elites lived below Fourteenth Street, 
occupying large town-homes overlooking Washington Square Park and Lafayette Place. A few 
decades later, they  moved northward to Union Square. Gilded Age magnates pushed society even 
further uptown. They built mega-mansions, instead of row-houses, on Fifth Avenue mainly 
between 23rd and 57th Street, with some stretching up into what is now called the Upper East 
Side (New York Times 1926). Please refer to the figure below to trace the succession pattern of 
elite New Yorkers. In addition to constructing elaborate homes along Fifth Avenue, the Gilded 
Age elite channeled their money into the city itself through cultural institutions. Madison Square 
Garden, Carnegie Hall, the Brooklyn Museum, the American Museum of Natural History, the 
New York Public Library, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art were all opened during this 
period. New York was becoming the center of the country - in just a few decades it  had “assumed 
a cultural dominance…that equaled its role in finance and industry” (Burns 1999, 300). 
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Figure 2.1. Elite neighborhoods in Manhattan’s history26
  
 The vision the Gilded Age elites displayed through their creation of these institutions was 
as jaw-dropping as the poverty they willfully ignored. By the late nineteenth century, thousands 
of white ethnic immigrants were pouring into the city. The population of their enclaves in the 
Lower East Side, the Bowery, Five Points, etc., exploded. At the time, the Lower East Side was 
the most densely  populated area in the world (Sanders 1980). Although, it could be said that the 
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26 These locations and time periods were collected from various sources (Pope 1928, New York Times 
1908, Rand 1924).
African American population of New York faced more social and economic challenges than the 
immigrant population. African Americans were once settled in the Five Points neighborhood in 
lower Manhattan, but by  the mid 19th century the population was displaced by European 
immigrant communities (Halle 2003). The extremely low proportion of black New Yorkers - in 
1900, the black population comprised less than two percent of the population (Buns 1999) - is a 
consequence of the deadly  drafts riots of 1863. White New Yorkers assaulted the African 
American population for ‘causing’ the Civil War. After this terrifying episode, African Americans 
decamped to outlying cities, and established the communities of Fort Greene and Flatbush, 
Brooklyn, and Jamaica, Queens. By  1910, enough African American and West Indian immigrants 
had migrated back into Manhattan to form populations in the Tenderloin (midtown center on 
West 40th Street), Hell’s Kitchen, and Harlem (please see the figure below for geographic 
concentrations of foreign born and African American New Yorkers). Although the seeds of 
historically African American and immigrant neighborhoods were planted, nineteenth century 
New Yorkers were on the move. 
78
Figure 2.2. 1910 United States Census
 
 The pre-twentieth century  museum population was similarly  shifting and inchoate. 
However, it is possible to identify the beginnings of museum forms still in existence today 
(please see the map below for the locations and founding dates of existing museums in 1900). 
Learned societies, which opened permanent exhibitions and shared their activities with the 
public, sprang up early on (such as the New-York Historical Society and the Stuyvesant 
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Institute). New York’s first public-private museum collaboration took place during the Gilded 
Age. We will see that this unique partnership, in which the municipal government provides and 
pays for land upon which a private museum can be built and administered, is the basis for the 
city’s powerful Cultural Institutions Group. Both of the institutions that received property  from 
the city were traditional in their orientation: the American Museum of Natural History  and the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Metropolitan had originally  been located on West 14th Street). 
Both of these museums were located on the newly planted Central Park, which at the time was 
far out of the town and surrounded by subsistence farmers.27 The first  encyclopedic museum was 
founded not in Manhattan, but in the neighboring city of Brooklyn. The Brooklyn Museum 
opened on the corner of Henry and Cranberry  Streets in 1887.28  Only a few years after the 
Museum’s opening, the founders abandoned its original location to construct a mammoth Beaux-
arts building at the northeastern edge of Prospect Park in the Crown Heights neighborhood. The 
area was in the midst of becoming a small museum cluster: the Brooklyn Botanical Garden and 
the Prospect Park Zoo were opened in the same park. The Brooklyn Children’s Museum (the 
city’s first  of its kind) was to open just a few blocks away in 1899, spurred on by the success of 
its neighbors. Pratt Institute, with its own public library and exhibition space, was founded by the 
philanthropic oil magnate, Charles Pratt. He located the institution in Clinton Hill where he had 
established roots, and near his former business (which was based in Greenpoint). We can see that 
the transient character of the elite left behind a legacy of institutions that were once located in 
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27 Museum founders were able to place their museums virtually all over Manhattan - before it was fully 
populated - because of the Grid Plan of 1811 (Sennett 1994). 
28 The Brooklyn Museums origins date back to 1823, as it grew out of the Brooklyn Institute for Arts and 
Sciences.
place-based networks. Despite these institutions, we observe, as predicted, that none were 
founded in immigrant or minority neighborhoods of the era.  
The Gilded Age was a period of rapid residential succession and displacement. Elite, immigrant, 
and minority populations located and relocated within generations. Many of these institutions 
were founded near elite areas (Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, Crown Heights in Brooklyn), but still 
outside of the urban core downtown. Since much of Manhattan and the outer boroughs were yet 
to be urbanized, founders could locate institutions based on their personal preferences to an even 
greater extent than the following generation of founders. This era planted the seeds of potential 
museum clusters, which include: Crown Heights, Brooklyn; Battery Park, Manhattan; and 
Central Park, Manhattan (see map below).
The twentieth-century city
 Although it may seem impossible for the city’s population to experience more growth and 
change than it did in the last fifty  years, one of the most defining moments in New York’s history 
was about to take place at the turn of the century. The outer boroughs, originally dozens of 
independent cities, were incorporated in 1898. The city catapulted in size and population (at the 
time of incorporation, New York City’s five boroughs had a combined population of 3.4 million, 
Reitano 2006). Manhattan in particular was bursting at the seams. Much of the island was 
urbanized at  this point; in 1910, Manhattan reached its highest ever population of 2.32 million. 
Brooklyn was swelling as well. At the time of incorporation, it was the third largest city in the 
country. By 1920, it would become the most populous borough. As New York’s population
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Figure 2.3. Museums in 1900 and their founding dates
spread out in the five boroughs, the museum location was now a more constrained decision than 
ever before. The vast expanses of un-urbanized space were vanishing by the minute. 
 During this urbanization, one of the most beautiful failures of New York City  was rising 
from the street, one expensive stone at a time. In 1907, Archer M. Huntington, heir to the Central 
Pacific Railroad fortune, commissioned the construction of several grand beaux-arts style 
buildings bounded within one city block. He believed that this complex would house the 
twentieth century’s great cultural institutions. He named his creation Audubon Terrace, after the 
painter. For his location decision, the city was his oyster. Huntington’s wealth (he founded over a 
dozen museums across the country during his lifetime) ensured that he could build nearly 
anywhere. His ultimate choice may come as a surprise. Huntington perched the Terrace on a 
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block bounded by 155th and 156th Streets and Broadway and Riverside Drive. The surrounding 
area, now known as Washington Heights, was underdeveloped farmland. 
 At first glance, this location decision seems to defy  the era’s tenets of personal ties. 
Huntington was an established heir with a scholarly, worldly bent. Why did he opt for his 
neighbors to be farmers and goats rather than financiers and mansions? But by the second look, it 
seems that Huntington did seek proximity  to financiers and mansions, albeit in his unique way. 
As we know, the city’s elite had been moving further and further north since the 1850s. 
Huntington witnessed the steady migration from Washington Square to Union Square to Fifth 
Avenue and assumed that the elite and their cultural institutions would soon catch up to him at 
Broadway at 155th Street (Gray 1987). 
 The Terrace showed promise at first. Huntington attracted a wide, respectable range of 
institutions through underwriting the property and building construction. They included the 
American Academy  of Arts and Sciences, the Hispanic Society  of America, the Museum of the 
American Indian, the American Geographical Society, and the American Numismatic Society. 
We will see in the next era that Audubon Terrace did not become a bustling cultural or museum 
district - in fact, it could be considered a failure of (literally) monumental proportions. Today, all 
but the Hispanic Society of America have relocated. 
  This era was a time when individual men and women had the money and institutional 
flexibility to make gambles like Audubon Terrace. Following in the large footsteps of their 
Gilded Age predecessors, founders early  in the era had the same quirky, individualistic 
tendencies. Similar to Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney, A. E. Gallatin opened a museum of 
contemporary  European artwork on New York University’s Greenwich Village campus (f. 1927). 
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An institution solely  dedicated to the work of Russian artist and mystic Nicholas Roerich was 
founded in an apartment building on the corner of 103rd Street and Riverside Drive (in the 
Morningside Heights neighborhood of Manhattan) in 1929. The Museum of Safety29  was 
founded just outside Madison Square Park, which was a burgeoning hotel district at the time 
(Patterson 1998). John Pierpont Morgan, Jr. converted his father’s private collection into a public 
library and museum (The Morgan Library  and Museum f. 1924) a few blocks from Grand 
Central Station. These institutions all varied in size, mission, and content. These, like Audubon 
Terrace, Pratt  Institute, the Whitney, and the MoMA were the personal, even fanciful projects of 
the era of personal ties.  
Moving towards the Upper East Side
 The final decade of the era of personal networks was a time of transition. In the 1930s, 
the tide started to turn for the museum location decision. Elite New York was consolidating on 
the Upper East Side, and it began to feel that this would be their permanent home.  As the elite 
were settling in, other New Yorkers were moving up  and out. New York was redefined by the 
extensive, interconnected subway system (the first  line opened to the public in 1904). While the 
city was outfitted with an elevated rail system already, the subway’s efficiency  was 
revolutionary. Now, the working class could move out of the urban core. They quickly 
established residential neighborhoods in northern Manhattan and the outer boroughs (Burns 
1999). Although this was a boon to the population, housing market discrimination was blatant; 
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29 This institution explored the history of construction and manufacturing safety (and danger) in the 
United States. 
these practices funneled blacks, Jews, and other minorities into small pockets of the newly 
expanded city. 
 By the last decade of the era, the Roaring Twenties and the Harlem Renaissance30 had 
given way  to the Great Depression. What was once a hopeful time for minority-white relations 
was diminished by the overcrowding and decline of Harlem, the first majority  African American 
neighborhood in the city (which, incidentally, received no museums during its cultural 
flourishing). The first ‘modern’ race riots - in which African Americans expressed outrage 
against racism - took place in 1935 and 1943 (Reitano 2006). This shifted the tone of race 
relations in the city, profoundly. Residential segregation was cemented; we will see that this was 
only compounded during the mid-twentieth century. 
 Consequently, by the 1930s, the elite population became more or less entrenched on the 
Upper East  Side and grew uneasy  of any form of racial integration. At this point, the museum 
location decision was both personally  motivated and a population-level. By this, I mean that 
locating on the Upper East Side embedded institutions in a proximal network of the richest  New 
Yorkers and a growing museum cluster. A series of museums were founded on the Upper East 
Side during this transformative decade. The Frick Collection was founded in 1935. It was and 
still is located at 1 East 70th Street. Two years later, wealthy collector Jules Bache left his 
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30 Between 1900 and 1920, the African American community blossomed. The community was centered in 
Harlem, formerly a predominantly Jewish and Italian residential community. African Americans gained 
access to the area through Philip Payton, a real estate agent who would become known as the “Father of 
Harlem” (Dobbins 2012). Payton ‘scared’ the original ethnic white residents into vacating by renting 
neighboring, empty units to African Americans. This quickly tipped the scales, and Harlem became the 
first neighborhood that was majority black in New York. Despite exorbitant rents, the community 
flourished. African American art, music, and culture came alive and exploded onto the city. The Harlem 
Renaissance was in full swing during the 1920s, and Harlem became an entertainment and nightlife 
capitol for the entire city.  The Harlem Renaissance seemed to be a turning point for the black community: 
it was a “rare moment of acceptance and admiration...Among whites, it forced a reassessment of black 
stereotypes” (Reitano 2006, 136).
paintings and his home to be converted into a museum, at  815 Fifth Avenue. The Bache Art 
Museum at 63rd Street would only  survive for seven years; the collection was then donated to 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The Museum of the City of New York, originally located at 
88th and East End (Gracie Mansion), moved to its current location at  1120 Fifth Avenue (at 
103rd Street) in 1936.  
 The map below shows us a museum population in flux. During the 1930s, there was still 
a ‘random’ feeling to museum foundings, with events occurring in four of the five boroughs; 
however, it is equally apparent that museums are converging on the Upper East Side. The 
growing attraction of the Upper East  Side masks possible, alternative futures for the museum 
population. If institutional clustering was a deciding factor, then we could have witnessed 
additional museum foundings in Crown Heights, which was once cultivated as a cultural center 
overlooking a park, very similar to Fifth Avenue. A similar case could be made for the cluster of 
museums at Audubon Terrace. We will see, in the next  section, how demographic changes 
stagnated the growth of potential clusters like Crown Heights and Audubon Terrace. 
 Overall, the museum population of the era of personal networks created a toss-up effect; 
there were a series of potential museums clusters dotted across the city. I argued that institutions 
were founded in a variety of areas with differing levels of development (ranging from congested 
midtown to rural Washington Heights farmland). Although the African American population was 
small and the immigrant populations moved during the era, founders did not choose to emplace 
their institutions in African American or immigrant neighborhoods during this era. 
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Figure 2.4. Museum foundings, 1930-1939
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The era of homogenization
I never can pass by the Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art in New York without thinking of it 
not as a gallery of living portraits but as a cemetery of tax-deductible wealth.
Lewis H. Lapham
 The era of homogenization marks the geographic contraction of both New York’s elites 
and their museums. As argued in Chapter 1, this is not a coincidence. During this era, the 
location decision homogenized and the elite concentrated - these trends dovetailed into a virtual 
run towards the Upper East Side (we saw this phenomenon in the case of the Whitney Museum). 
Over the next forty  years, the stretch of Fifth Avenue facing Central Park would become the most 
recognizable museum cluster in the world. The rest of the city was undergoing major 
demographic upheaval. White flight and a second wave of the Great Migration created a deeply 
segregated city. The neighborhoods containing some of the original ‘toss-up’ museum clusters 
underwent major demographic turnovers. I argue that  this era marks an increase in the pertinence 
of racial demography on museum founding locations. If this relationship is correct, we will 
expect a stagnation of once promising clusters when their surrounding demographics changed. I 
will demonstrate that this stagnation occurred even during the introduction and implementation 
of cultural democracy policies, with evidence from differing but related trajectories of three 
clusters located Crown Heights, Audubon Terrace, and Flushing-Meadows.
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The birth of Museum Mile
 Unlike the past  century, Manhattan elites did not seem to be moving anywhere. Instead of 
expanding northward, or outward in any direction, they  put down roots on upper Fifth Avenue. 
Many of the Gilded Age mansions were torn down and replaced by large apartment buildings to 
accommodate for the influx of residents joining the wealthiest blocks of New York City. Park 
Avenue (two avenues east of Fifth) was developing its own sterling reputation. After decades of 
derision, the median-ed avenue was now teeming with luxury apartments31  and becoming a 
‘status’ address. By this period, the Upper East Side had become the established destination for 
the wealthiest, most  influential, and most connected members of New York society. In an 
interview for the New York Times, one wealthy Upper East Sider said: “Personally...I consider 
anything below 57th Street out of town” (Corry 1974). It was also clear that the elite could not 
progress northward as they had before: East Harlem and Harlem were now densely populated 
immigrant and African American communities. The Upper East Side, now bounded between 
Fifth Avenue and Park Avenue and 57th Street and 96th Street, was the permanent home of the 
elite. The days of succession and speculation were over. Between 1900 and 1939, about one-fifth 
of museums were founded on or relocated to the Upper East  Side (with most of these events 
occurring in the 1930s); during the era of homogenization, that  number increased to one-third. 
This made Upper East Side the neighborhood with the highest number of museum founding 
events in all of New York City. 
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31 This newfound interest was caused by the covering of the noisy, polluting elevated rail line.  
Figure 2.5. Upper East Side museums and their founding dates
  
 No fewer than ten additional institutions chose to locate or relocate on or near Fifth 
Avenue between 59th and 110th Streets during this period (and this is in addition to those already 
operating in the area). Even more were opened in the orbit of Museum Mile, particularly along 
the southern edge of Central Park and the East  60s. Some institutions relocated to Museum Mile 
(please see the map below). As we know from Chapter One, the Whitney  moved to its spot on 
Madison Avenue (W2) from the MoMA property  on West  54th Street (W1). The Guggenheim 
followed the same trajectory, settling into its iconic building on Fifth Avenue and 88th Street 
(G2) from 24 East 54th Street (G1). The National Academy of Design (N1, N2) and the Jewish 
Museum also converged on Museum Mile (J1, J2). Finally, the Cooper-Hewitt Museum of 
Design also relocated from Astor Place (C1) to 91st Street (C2). 
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Figure 2.6. Museums that relocated to the Upper East Side, 1940-1980
 The Cooper-Hewitt relocation exemplifies the hopes many museum leaders held for Fifth 
Avenue. The Cooper-Hewitt Museum of Design was originally founded within Cooper Union, 
the progressive tuition-free educational center located on once-elite Astor Place. The Museum 
was built  from the collection of Peter Cooper’s two granddaughters, who had both acquired 
hundreds of pieces through travel. During this era, the museum, like many others (remember the 
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Whitney), faced financial hardship. Cooper Union, also in a bind, kicked the Museum out of 
Astor Place building. For about five years, the fate of the institution was unknown. Then, a 
legitimizing, powerful force entered. The Smithsonian took ownership of the Museum and its 
collection, with aims to establish its first branch museum outside of Washington, DC.32 
 With this bump  in status, the location decision was made infinitely easier. The new 
Cooper-Hewitt took over the former Carnegie mansion on Fifth Avenue and 91st  St. At this 
point, the mansion was owned by the philanthropic Carnegie Foundation, and the move, for both 
parties, was not personal so much as strategic. The new location set the bar for a new standard: 
“the Smithsonian...hopes that its snazzy  Fifth Avenue address will expand the crowds” (Richard 
1969) and that new location marks a “vastly more conspicuous presence on the New York 
cultural scene” (Goldberger 1976, 71). For the Carnegie Foundation, the new tenant would 
ensure that  the historic home was well maintained (it had fallen into some disrepair under its 
current tenants, the Columbia University School of Social Work), and would likely be bought by 
the Smithsonian in the future. 
 Very  few of the relocated or original institutions could be considered a ‘natural fit’ for 
upper Fifth Avenue. None of the heritage museums, which include institutions honoring Jewish, 
Ukrainian, Hispanic, Japanese, and Austrian culture were embedded in their respective 
communities on the Upper East Side.33 Perhaps only  the Goethe-Institut  could claim home turf 
considering its proximity  to Yorkville, a historic Germantown. The art  museums that opened 
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32 The Smithsonian also partnered with the Museum of the American Indian (formerly located in Audubon 
Terrace) in 1990. The museum relocated to the historic Customs House on Bowling Green (near Wall 
Street) in 1994. 
33 It should be noted that Fifth Avenue does hold symbolic value to the city writ large. The Avenue hosts 
major cultural events, such as the well-know St. Patrick’s Day and Puerto Rican Day Parades. These 
major events also began to take place on Fifth Avenue during the 1950s. 
were somewhat near the gallery district on 57th Street, while the actual artists were still living 
and working downtown and increasingly in the outer boroughs. In short, these museum location 
decisions were not about content. As described in the first chapter, this was mandated due to 
other reasons, including increased standardization, professionalization, and consequently 
institutional isomorphism. I will argue in the next section that the dominance of the Upper East 
Side was accelerated through the stagnation of alternate museum clusters, whose surrounding 
neighborhoods experienced dramatic residential transformations. 
The promise fades...
 In this section, I will test  the increasingly close relationship between the museum location 
decision and demographic change by examining the trajectories of three very  different museum 
clusters created during the era of personal ties, as well as one created during the era of 
homogenization. We have already  seen the fabulous fate of one personal ties era cluster: the 
Upper East Side. By demonstrating the contrasting destiny of the others, I will make the link 
between cluster stagnation and African American presence, as well as show that the alternative 
explanation of tourist  dependency does not hold. The argument here is not  that museum founders 
willfully excluded black neighborhoods from receiving local institutions, but that in every 
location decision era, museum founders have been most attracted to areas that do not contain 
African Americans, for varying reasons. Before looking more closely at these cases, I will survey 
the relevant demographic transformations that took place during the mid-twentieth century. 
  The rate of population growth in New York had slowed relative to the mass immigration 
of the late nineteenth century, but there was still remarkable demographic churning between 
1940 and 1980. Although the Upper East Side kept its status as a desirable neighborhood 
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throughout the era, New York on the whole was on the outs. After WWII, white middle class 
families left the city en masse. Anyone who could afford a home loan (heavily  subsidized by the 
government) got out of the urban core. The city  that was left  behind after the white and middle-
class flight was deeply divided. City  policy only encouraged housing discrimination. A block 
was considered “black” based on the presence of only one African American family. Redlining 
was in full force (Massey and Denton 1990). In conjunction with housing policies, 
manufacturing jobs - the bedrock of the working class - were leaving the urban core. These 
developments took their toll; the population of New York City declined for the first time in 
recorded census history in 1960. 
 Post WWII saw another Great Migration of African Americans out of the South. In 1940, 
there were less than 500,000 black New Yorkers. By 1960, there were over one million. Bedford-
Stuyvesant became the most populous black neighborhood across all five boroughs. The 
community  became so large that it spilled over into historically ethnic white areas, such as 
Crown Heights, Bushwick, East Flatbush, and Bronzeville (Burns 1999, 504).  
 Crown Heights was one of the original museum clusters created during the Gilded Age. 
We saw that the encyclopedic Brooklyn Museum, a children’s museum, botanical gardens, and a 
zoo were all founded there during the era of personal networks. During that time, the 
neighborhood was akin to the Upper East Side. Through the 1920s, upper class white New 
Yorkers lived on the shady, wide boulevards overlooking Prospect Park (Krase 1982). Centrally 
located in growing Brooklyn, but with direct access to downtown and midtown Manhattan, it 
seemed that this museum cluster could have developed into Museum Mile’s little sister. 
However, it’s growth ground to a halt during the era of homogenization. Between 1940 and 
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1980, no new museums were opened in the area. This coincided with a dramatic residential 
turnover of the neighborhood before and after WWII. During the 1940s, middle-class Jewish 
families started to move into the area. By 1950, they composed about half of the nearly all-white 
community. African Americans and West Indian immigrants began to join them as well. By the 
1960s, African Americans were a sizable part of the community. Throughout these demographic 
transitions, the original museum cluster stayed put. None of these initial institutions decamped to 
follow the Upper East Side building frenzy. But, additional museums did not choose to open 
their doors in the community either. The geographic clustering towards the Upper East Side 
meant that the usually inevitable process of organizational clustering was not possible.  
 Audubon Terrace, Huntington’s great experiment, is another tale of stagnation. While the 
planned cultural complex showed some promise during the 1910s and 1920s, it  never acquired 
the pull the founder was hoping to generate. The surrounding neighborhood, Washington 
Heights, was still relatively  undeveloped when Huntington laid the cornerstone. During the era 
of personal ties, the community  was primarily composed of a small number of Irish immigrants, 
and then European Jews before WWII. The neighborhood underwent rapid demographic 
transformations during the mid-twentieth century. During the 1950s and 1960s, a growing Greek
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Figure 2.7. Crown Heights African American population in 1910, 1930, 1950, and 1970        
 
 
population settled in the area. By the 1980s and 1990s, Dominican immigrants began flocking to 
Washington Heights, and through 1980s the community was majority  Hispanic/Latino. Again, 
similar to Crown Heights, this museum cluster (which includes the nearby Cloisters and the 
Morris-Jumel Mansion) stagnated. Instead of a major cultural institution, like the Met or the 
MoMA moving into Audubon Terrace, Boricua College inhabited the Beaux-arts buildings in 
1974. The figure below displays the founding and relocation dates of the museums in 
Washington Heights and Inwood, as well as the proportion of nonwhite residents in 1910 (left) 
and 1980 (right); darker gray indicates a greater proportion of nonwhite residents. 
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Figure 2.8. Museums in Washington Heights and Inwood
   
State involvement: cultural democracy in an era of homogenization
 One of the contradictions of the era of homogenization is that it took place during the 
cultural democracy project. As I detailed in Chapter One, cultural democracy policies focused on 
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making institutions more accessible and attractive to the nation’s diverse population. In New 
York, we would expect to see a corresponding interest in creating more populist institutions. 
However, since I argue that the museum location decision is a result of homogenizing 
institutional forces and demographic turnover, any  attempts to democratize the museum 
population through the location decision will not override the attraction of the Upper East Side. 
This resulted in a draw: simultaneously, museums leaders showed a real interest in attracting 
minority audiences but in aggregate located their institutions as far as possible from them.
 The intervention of the state in museum founding originated, not surprisingly, during the 
Gilded Age with the construction of the American Museum of Natural History (NYC DCA 
website). Under this framework, city government allows museums to operate on public property, 
while the museum remains a private institution. This partnership worked well for American 
Museum of Natural History, and was applied to four other early institutions: the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, the Staten Island Institute of Arts and Sciences, the New York Botanical Garden, 
and the Bronx Zoo. This was not a systematic policy, however, and it took eighty years - until 
1962 - for the city  to create an independent Office of Cultural Affairs (these programs used to be 
run out of the parks department). In the 1960s, like many other newly formed cultural agencies 
around the country, the Office got to work with a democratizing imperative. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Office brings this public-private partnership to a specific group of museums. In 
1976, the Cultural Institutions Group (CIG) was formed, uniting these museums and creating the 
highest status designation for a city-funded arts institution. The mission of the CIG during this 
era was decidedly democratizing, even in regards to geography. In their own words: 
The number of CIG members increased dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, as the City 
recognized that its increasingly diverse population required a diverse and dynamic pool 
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of institutions to serve it. Primarily located in the outer boroughs and/or focused on 
traditionally underserved constituencies...34  
The map below illustrates the location of institutions that were granted CIG status during the era 
of homogenization. 
Figure 2.9. Museums added to the Cultural Institutions Group, 1940-1980
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34 NYC Department of Cultural Affairs website.  
 One of the Office of Cultural Affairs’ major projects was reviving the dormant buildings 
used during the 1964 World’s Fair; these institutions were among those who received Cultural 
Institutions Group status during the era. The small cluster of museums in Flushing Meadows-
Corona Park warrant further attention. The cluster is the inadvertent  legacy of one of New York’s 
most powerful men: Robert Moses. Moses, the city’s Parks Commissioner and planning czar 
strived to redefine the city. His love of the automobile created thousands of miles of parkways 
and freeways, cutting through the city  and especially the outer boroughs. In a stroke of vision 
similar to Huntington, Moses imagined the future of the city not to be in Manhattan, but in its 
geographic center - Flushing Meadows, Queens. Flushing Meadows-Corona Park, a green space 
encircled by Moses’ parkways, was the site of the 1939-1940 and 1964-1965 World’s Fairs and 
the original headquarters of the United Nations (Burns 1999). 
 In 1939, the neighborhoods surrounding the park were white, middle class suburban 
communities. During the era of homogenization, Flushing became increasingly  diverse and now 
boasts the second largest Chinese American population in the city. Corona, the neighborhood to 
the park’s immediate west, went through demographic shifts as well. By mid-twentieth century, 
the neighborhood was primarily composed of African Americans and Italian immigrants. The 
African American community, in particular, became known across the country  as home to Louis 
Armstrong, Malcolm X, Ella Fitzgerald, and more (Krebs 1971; Queens Alive, accessed online). 
 The infrastructure created during the world’s fairs left a series of buildings equipped to 
house major cultural institutions. However, many of the fair’s buildings were demolished or 
abandoned after the 1964-1965 Fair. Instead of museum founders appropriating these grand 
structures, as they were doing on Museum Mile, they stayed empty or were torn down. The 
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Queens Art Museum was founded in one of the surviving structures, but not  until 1972; the 
Queens Hall of Science was founded in an adjacent building in 1986. Today, the grand New York 
State Pavilion, one of the last  remaining structures, sits in decay. Flushing Meadows-Corona 
Park is a museum cluster that was single-handedly supported by cultural democracy policies. 
Despite the infrastructure for a museum cluster that could rival the Upper East Side or Audubon 
Terrace during its heyday, many of the promising buildings were abandoned.35 
 The democratization of culture was not only  a top  down endeavor. Museums celebrating 
minority populations were a long time coming. Both of the minority museums that opened 
during this era, El Museo del Barrio and the Studio Museum of Harlem, have much different 
founding stories than most of the institutions we have seen thus far. These museums were 
founded by community-based artists and activists. The Studio Museum was first conceived by a 
Harlem social worker, who then brought on a diverse board of trustees to develop  an institution 
that could “be a ground where the black and white art  worlds really meet” (Glueck 1968, 
accessed online). The institution opened in 1968 on Fifth Avenue...and 125th Street. Although 
this could have been seen as an extension of Museum Mile, the location was not received as such 
a symbol. The New York Times wrote: “the Studio Museum won’t exactly upstage the Met or the 
Gugg...it shares its second-floor space near 125th Street with a sweatshop  where women run up 
garments for the downtown rag trade” (Glueck 1968, accessed online).  
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35 However, there is some hope for museum growth in the area since the founding of the original cluster. 
Since then, three small historic houses have opened to the public nearby: the Louis Armstrong House 
Museum (f. 1986), the Volker Orth Museum (f. 1993), and the Howard Lewis Latimer Historic House (f. 
1988). While this does show promise for future growth, it should also be noted that no museums have 
relocated to or constructed new buildings in the area to date.  
 Just one year later, a group  of artists, educators, and activists decided to found a museum 
promoting Latino arts and culture. El Museo del Barrio was relocated frequently in its early days, 
operating out of small storefronts and closed schoolhouses in East Harlem.  The organization was 
small, but formalized quickly. After just three years, it received nonprofit filing status, and by 
1974, El Museo received its first grant from the city’s Office of Cultural Affairs. In 1977, El 
Museo received its biggest bump in space, recognition, and legitimacy. Like many  other 
institutions, it moved into a large building on Fifth Avenue at 104th Street. Upon moving into 
this building, El Museo also became a member of the desirable Cultural Institutions Group. 
 Overall, these institutions did not  spark their own clusters. The Studio Museum remained 
the only museum in Harlem until 1981. El Museo del Barrio opted to join Museum Mile. The 
introduction of state-sponsored democratic policies and minority-based institutions offered some 
resistance to the overwhelming growth of the Upper East Side, but not enough to reverse the 
trend to homogenize the museum location decision. 
The midtown tourist trap?
 One explanation for the stagnation of these museum clusters is that they are off-the-
beaten path for tourists. Museums rely  on out-of-towners for most of their attendance, and it 
could be argued that locating in the urban core is far preferable than outside of it. If tourism were 
the main driver of institutional placement, then we would expect to see most museums gravitate 
to existing tourist hotspots of midtown and downtown Manhattan. However, this is not the case 
during this era - midtown and downtown did not receive a large share of institutions during this 
era. 
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 Midtown is a particularly interesting case due to the Herculean efforts of the Rockefeller 
family to develop this area as the cultural as well as economic center of Manhattan.  As we know 
from the previous chapter, Abby Rockefeller had already founded the Museum of Modern Art 
squarely  in Midtown. During the mid-century, her son, Nelson Rockefeller, took control of the 
Museum. He also dipped his toes into myriad other cultural and civic developments within the 
area, including the relocation of the United Nations from its original home in Flushing-Meadows 
Park to a plot of land along the East River between 42nd and 48th Streets. He and his associates 
developed Rockefeller Center into a business, entertainment, and tourist attraction. 
 What may be forgotten now is that Nelson and his brothers also tried to develop a 
museum cluster in central midtown - within and around Rockefeller Center. Two now-shuttered 
museums were founded at the site: the Museum of Primitive Art (1957-1976) and the Permanent 
Exhibition of Decorative Arts and Crafts (1934-1945). The Museum of Science and Industry 
ping pong-ed around various midtown locations, including Rockefeller Center, during its 
existence from 1935 to 1949. These museums were not minor institutions. The New York 
Museum of Science and Industry was the only museum of its kind in the city during its tenure; 
while in Rockefeller Center, it was supported by  the prestigious Carnegie and Rockefeller 
Foundations (Kaempffert 1936). Its museum opening featured appearances by Albert  Einstein 
and Amelia Earhart.  
 What is puzzling is that more museums were not founded in midtown during this period, 
because by this point it was the major tourist destination of the city.  Even more puzzling is that 
three of the five museums that  were founded there did not survive. If the tourist-driven theory  is 
correct, not only would museums be rushing to join the hustle and bustle, but they would thrive 
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once established. Midtown was home to the Broadway theater district, the Chrysler Building, the 
Empire State Building, Grand Central Terminal and Pennsylvania Station, Bloomingdales, and 
Macy’s. There was more foot traffic on Midtown’s blocks than the Upper East Side’s. 
 Downtown Manhattan, another tourist favorite (with the attractions of Wall Street, the 
Statue of Liberty, and Ellis Island), experienced the same museum paucity. The New York 
Aquarium sought more space and relocated to Coney Island. Only three museums, the Trinity 
Church Museum, Federal National Hall Memorial, and the New York City Fire Museum (since 
relocated) were founded in the area. The lack of museum development in these high-tourism 
areas suggests that the theory that museums locate based on tourist traffic is insufficient in 
explaining the spatial diffusion of museums during this period. 
State involvement: urban renewal 
 During the era of homogenization, city  government makes its first steps into arts-based 
urban renewal. Towards the end of the era of homogenization, the development of SoHo as an 
artists district will pave the way for many of the policies that dominate the era of cultural 
branding. This was separate from, and in some ways ran counter to the city’s cultural democracy 
policies. 
 Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia demolished a densely inhabited micro-neighborhood in the 
name of culture. The cast  of players is familiar by  now. John D. Rockefeller III, Abby’s son, 
spearheaded the campaign. Moses, then chair of the “Slum Clearance Committee” partnered with 
John D., III to develop a complex of performing arts schools and institutions similar in scope to 
Audubon Terrace. However, the property they were building on was not farmland; it  was a large 
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public housing project densely  inhabited by Latino poor and working class families. The idea 
was radical at the time: create a cultural center to promote and justify displacement and urban 
renewal. At the time, renewal was mainly  through the creation of public works projects - parks, 
bridges, expressways, and ‘tower-in-the-park’ affordable housing. The application of the urban 
renewal mission to an arts institution was a pioneering linkage. 
 Around the same time, the political and economic elite of the city were joining forces 
with starving artists in perhaps the most influential example of urban renewal to date. In her 
seminal book, Zukin (1982) chronicles how a patch of land just south of Greenwich Village 
transformed from an abandoned manufacturing ghost town into a thriving, desirable residential 
neighborhood. SoHo, as it would come to be called, represents the first wave of artist-led urban 
renewal. This took hold in New York City, and elsewhere in the country. Loft living ushered in a 
transformation of New York’s neighborhoods and coincided with a new era of cultural branding. 
 The increase in the number of museums founded at the tail end of this period, after SoHo 
had been fully  colonized by artists and successful galleries, gives us a hint of the relationship 
between museums and gentrification that  is to come. During this era, SoHo was on the verge of 
becoming an alternative cluster to Museum Mile. Several new institutions, including the New 
Museum for Contemporary Art, the Anthology Film Archives, the and Drawing Center founded 
quarters in the area. We will see the fate of this potential cluster in the next era. 
 During the era of homogenization, the homogenized museum location decision interacted 
with elite consolidation on the Upper East Side to create the largest museum cluster in the world. 
Many of the clusters founded during the era of personal ties saw their neighborhoods transform 
around them. On the whole, founders avoided these stagnating clusters in adherence to new, 
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external pressures. This era was a key moment in the diffusion of museums, one in which the 
location of the city’s institutions could have been more equally distributed than we observe 
today. 
The era of cultural branding
There is not a neighborhood in the city anymore that is beyond reach. 
Daniel Doctoroff, former Deputy Mayor of New York City36
 At the beginning of this new era, the city  was in trouble. The 1950s and 1960s middle-
class flight ravaged civic life. The jobs that African Americans had migrated to the city  for were 
leaving just as they arrived. The 1970s saw the creation of an “urban underclass” (Wilson 1987, 
Massey  and Denton 1993) as impoverished black and Puerto Rican New Yorkers were pushed 
into extremely segregated ‘ghettos’. There was a national increase in crime, graffiti, race riots, 
and drug use in urban cores; cities were getting a bad name. In short, New York was no longer 
New York - the entertainment, cultural, and creative capitol of the world. 
 Consequently, the city was desperate to attract people back into its streets, apartments, 
and businesses. The 1980s, as explained in the last chapter, saw the dissemination of urban 
renewal and gentrification. Many  of these campaigns were connected to artists and arts 
institutions. Greenberg (2008) explains how key political and economic actors transformed the 
1970s image and fiscal crisis into an unlikely branding opportunity. We saw the city’s first foray 
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36 Center for an Urban Future 2006.
into this with the redevelopment of SoHo into an artists district. A few years later, culture-based 
development saw another milestone. The publication of the 1983 economic impact report of the 
newly christened ‘arts industry’ by the Cultural Assistance Center (now the Alliance for the Arts) 
and the Port Authority  of New York and New Jersey  redefined the mission of arts institutions. 
They  were now agents of urban change and prosperity. The explicit goal of these economic 
impact reports, which have become standard, are to “change the way people think about the 
arts” (Alliance for the Arts 1993). The 1970s and 1980s also saw the transition of power from 
manufacturing interests to financial and real estate interests. The new way to make money in 
New York was through property owning and selling. This transition, coupled with the bullish 
1980s, resulted in a spread of gentrification practices. The museum was about to become integral 
to this paradigm shift. 
 I argue that even though museum founders sought differentiation in their new location 
decisions, the demography  of neighborhoods (and particularly the proportion of African 
Americans) continues to affect just where that location decision takes place. If this is the case, 
we will expect to see that museums choose to open in new neighborhoods with less museums, 
but are on the trajectory  to becoming or are already fully  gentrified. I argue that  this is the new 
path museums have taken in the millennial city.
The museum boom
 After a short-term recession in the early 1990s, economic growth during the Clinton 
administration increased founding rates exponentially (Lanier, Matsui, and Knight 1991). In the 
‘90s alone, thirty  museums were founded in the city. The influx of museums saw the rise of niche 
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institutions. These small-scale museums include the Toy Museum of New York City (f. 1999 in 
Brooklyn Heights), Museum of the American Piano (f. 1999 in downtown Manhattan), the 
Skyscraper Museum (f. 2000 near Wall Street), and the City  Reliquary (f. 2006 in Williamsburg). 
Such congestion prompted a new museum location decision model. 
 The new model took the museum out of the Upper East Side. Out of 134 founding or 
relocation events during this period, only seven took place on the hallowed stretch of Fifth 
Avenue (please see the map below). The Upper East Side location was no longer a ticket to 
grants, recognition, and high attendance. En masse, this resulted in a dramatic geographic 
diffusion of museums. Manhattan was still king, but the outer boroughs increased significantly as 
well: Long Island City/Astoria and North/South Williamsburg all saw museum activity. And the 
museums that  opened in Manhattan were extending to new areas, particularly those without a 
large museum presence prior. These new spots include East/Central Harlem, Chelsea, and the 
Lower East Side. Although it is clear that there was a geographic diffusion, it is also clear that 
this diffusion was controlled and deliberate. In the next section, I will introduce the additional 
actors who had a hand in this diffusion. 
The virtuous cycle
 After the success of SoHo and Lincoln Center, the late twentieth century  saw the full-
fledged incorporation of the arts into development initiatives. Two mayors, Rudy  Giuliani and 
Michael Bloomberg, took up the cause with full force. Giuliani integrated cultural development 
into his quality of life initiatives. He converted Times Square into a family- and name-brand-
friendly tourist haven by revitalizing the area’s theater district. Bloomberg, a lifelong collector, 
underwrote high profile arts campaigns to attract tourists and additional revenue, most notably 
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The Gates in Central Park. However, Giuliani and Bloomberg are merely the public face of a far 
more systemic transformation. Increasingly, the state (at both the local and federal levels) is an 
active player in the creation of cultural institutions and the support of gentrification. SoHo, as we 
know, was one of the world’s first experiments in state-sponsored urban repurposing. 
Unbeknownst to any of these actors, they  had set into motion an engine of gentrification that 
would be the major driver of urban change during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Figure 2.10. Museum founding events by  neighborhood during the era of homogenization (left) 
and cultural branding (right)
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 Since New York was one of the first  cities to gentrify, it already has a long history of 
succession and renewal. During the first wave of gentrification, which took place throughout the 
1950’s, 60’s, and 70’s, individual working and middle class white homeowners would slowly 
move into a minority neighborhood, fix up their properties, and attract middle class amenities 
(Hackworth 2002, Lees 2003). Many of these pioneers were artists. The state and corporate 
developers facilitated and capitalized on gentrification only after it was initiated by individuals. 
This early form took place in SoHo, Brooklyn Heights, and other neighborhoods close to the 
downtown core. By the 1980s and 1990s, a partnership between state and corporate actors 
reversed the order of this process. This “assertive” (Lees 2003, 2487) involvement is due to a 
number of factors. City  governments were getting less support from the national level, and 
mayors had to rely increasingly on tax revenue to fund their programs. This created an incentive 
for cities to build up their middle and professional classes. The federal government was also 
increasingly  offering incentives and guarantees for both private and public interests to pursue 
major redevelopment projects. Urban corporations, increasingly  shifting toward FIRE (Financial, 
Insurance and Real Estate), capitalized on these new policy developments. Taken together, a new 
city-level public-private partnership emerged - with an aim to redevelop the city for the middle 
and professional classes. 
 In the second wave of gentrification, the state and/or corporation is the pioneer. By the 
1990s, “it is simply accepted as axiomatic that city  government should become more direct 
players in real estate” (Hackworth 2002, 821). Instead of following individuals, they  funneled 
them into specifically targeted areas, such as what occurred in Bedford-Stuyvesant in the 1990s 
(Hall 2000). These waves of gentrification have seen the focus pushed further out from the urban 
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core of downtown Manhattan to the Bronx, Queens, and central Brooklyn. This time, artists are 
not considered desirable newcomers; arts institutions are. This transition to an “entrepreneurial” 
city government (Hall and Hubbard 1996) was key in aligning arts institutions, public interests, 
and corporate developers. A museum placement in a gentrifying neighborhood is a newly 
attainable carrot for developers and city government. This is because of the mutually beneficial 
rebranding described in Chapter 1: museums can differentiate and redefine their image through 
joining a new wave neighborhood, while at the same time that neighborhood can become even 
more established and attractive to the professional class.  
 Neighborhoods we have become familiar with have experienced these successive waves 
of gentrification. The impact of state intervention on Long Island City is evident. From Chapter 
1, we recall that Long Island City experienced a wave of artist-based gentrification in the 1970s 
and 1980s - individual artists priced out of SoHo began to set up  live-work studios in the area. 
This form of artist-led gentrification was taking place in other parts of the city as well, including 
the Lower East Side and Tribeca (Hackworth and Smith 2001). Alanna Heiss gave these 
unorganized artists a landmark at Project Studios One (now MoMA PS1). Corporate developers 
caught a whiff of this succession and were ready to pounce. However, as we learned, Long Island 
City  did not become the ‘next’ neighborhood as some hoped it would be. During the mid-1980s, 
gentrification efforts stalled. It  was only until the state’s involvement in the 1990s and 2000s that 
eventually re-sparked the area’s renewal. During the 1990s, city government became actively 
supportive (through tax abatements, favorable commission appointments, etc.) of Queens West, a 
major mixed-use luxury  development that had been stalled during the 1980s. Once the state 
greased the wheels, Long Island City  started to heat up. By 2002, the MoMA had partnered with 
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PS1, capping the conversion of the neighborhood into an area ‘deserving of’ a major museum. 
With the addition of the MoMA brand, Long Island City is poised for even more development: 
“there is a growing consensus that MoMA’s arrival in the neighborhood has brought vastly 
increased public attention and, some say, stepped up the pace of development” (Center for an 
Urban Future 2006, 14). We saw in the previous chapter that it helped to coalesce an under-the-
radar museum population into a highly visible cultural destination. 
 This has taken place across the city. The Whitney Museum’s move to the Meatpacking 
District is not the tale of a sole museum pioneering into the a still gritty  area, but in fact a 
calculated final move of the Bloomberg administration, real estate developers, and the Whitney 
to locate a major institution amidst an already installed landscape of luxury hotels, residences, 
galleries, and parks. At a conference in 2006, Daniel Doctoroff, then Deputy  Mayor of the 
Bloomberg administration, explained the city’s involvement in the High Line Park, which is 
adjacent to the future Whitney site. Please keep in mind that Doctoroff has made these comments 
years before the Whitney decided to relocate to the area. 
Let  me give you an example of a neighborhood where I think what  you’re creating is a 
truly virtuous cycle, and that’s West Chelsea, where four years ago, when we came into 
office, literally we were one step away from the city tearing down the High Line....We 
decided that  investing in a park in that community was a great investment. Now, how did 
we define investment? We defined it  in terms of creating a stronger community – one in 
which we thought  the High Line itself would be a spur to economic development, which 
would ultimately generate tax revenues, which, in effect, would enable us to invest  in the 
kinds of institutions that simply reinforce this notion of it  as this great, sort of artistic, 
cultural and residential community. So, in fact, that’s exactly what’s happened. We’re 
spending $150 million to create this park. We have, now, about 20 major development 
projects underway along the High Line or in the High Line district, a number of which 
are now calling themselves the “High Line Building” or the “High Line something, 
something.” And, in fact, what  we’re also doing at  the same time is: we’re beginning to 
invest in cultural institutions, like Dia [Chelsea museum and art center located]...So, what 
you’ve got is: a great investment in the park, which leads to investment  in the 
surrounding area, which generates revenues, which enables us to invest in cultural 
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institutions, which just  continues sort of that virtuous circle. And, so, all these things 
really are related.37 
Clearly, the Whitney  has entered a process well underway; one that is coordinated and controlled 
by government interests. This partnership  is in line with other major relocations, including the 
SculptureCenter (as illustrated in the Introduction) and the New Museum.  The map  below shows 
the new locations of these institutions. 
 SoHo was the original neighborhood to experience arts-based gentrification (as described 
in the previous section). SoHo quickly  transformed from a former light-manufacturing ghost 
town, into an isolated artists’ community, into “the world’s greatest shopping mall” (Duetsch 
1994). Museums, like the Museum for African Art and the failed Guggenheim Soho branch, 
invaded this neighborhood after it had been colonized by  artists and their galleries. However, 
since the location has become highly  commercial, the branding cache has faded. Relocations 
have reflected this new reality. The New Museum moved from SoHo to an original construction 
in the once gritty Bowery neighborhood. The New York Times commented that although the new 
location” is only  a few blocks from its current 30,000-square-foot home...in neighborhood terms, 
it is a world away” (Pogrebin 2002, accessed online). The New Museum’s branding efforts 
explicitly take advantage of the area’s reputation: they quote their architects as saying “The 
Bowery was very  gritty when we first visited it...We were a bit  shocked, but we were also 
impressed that  a fine art museum wanted to be there. In the end, the Bowery  and the New 
Museum have a lot in common...” (New Museum website). The case of SoHo demonstrates that 
museum founders during this era are not simply following the geographic seats of new wealth. If 
that were the case, then the cluster in SoHo would have thrived. Museum founders are instead 
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37 Center for an Urban Future 2006. 
opting to insert themselves into neighborhoods balancing between their ‘old’ and ‘new’ faces. 
However, with the introduction of a major museum, it is a sure sign that the Bowery, like SoHo 
before it, will continue to shift to its new face.  
Figure 2.11. Relocations of the Whitney, MoMA, New Museum, and SculptureCenter during the 
era of cultural branding
 
 One of the most interesting cases during this era is the Museum for African Art. This 
museum’s series of rapid relocations in the past thirty years display signs of both the 
homogenizing forces (i.e. normative isomorphism) of the era of homogenization as well as the 
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pioneering, but strategic location decisions of the era of cultural branding. The Museum for 
African Art was founded in 1984 in temporary quarters on the Upper East Side. In 1993, it 
followed the SoHo wave and located on lower Broadway, next door to the New Museum’s 
original location (Sewell 2007). Less than ten years later, the Museum was again on the move. 
Leaders ultimately wanted a “better” location in Manhattan (Roth 2002). In 2000, the trustees 
bought a plot of land on Fifth Avenue and 110th Street, at the northeastern corner of Central 
Park. Before the museum could move into the new location, they  would have to construct the 
building from scratch. Unabashedly, the museum followed the location strategy  of the Museum 
of Modern Art. Three months after the MoMA partnered with PS1, it set up temporary  quarters 
just four blocks from the Long Island City outpost. A representative of the Museum for African 
Art admits that the MoMA’s attachment to the neighborhood played a key role in the decision: 
“MoMA definitely started the trend towards Queens, but now it’s on the radar of the art 
community. When MoMA opened a huge amount of people attended, and that’s 
encouraging” (Roth 2002, accessed online). 
 In another emulating move, the Museum for African Art integrated condominiums into 
their new construction on 110th Street. Like MoMA’s midtown renovation during the same era, 
this is the apex of the joined forces of museum building and economic development. The 
developers in charge of the condominium project were well aware of the transformative potential 
the Museum for African Art could have on its surroundings. The Museum for African Art is 
moving into a location that has just recently begun to gentrify and transition; unlike the 
Meatpacking District and other examples I’ve discussed, the area is still predominantly 
populated by people of color.
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 The Museum’s leaders characterize the existing demography as a benefit. President Elsie 
McCabe Thompson, says: “the building, accessible to Fifth Ave., East Harlem, and Central 
Harlem, does that  [bridges cultures]. I want local children to grow up in this museum. I want 
people who don’t come to museums to come here” (Sheftell 2011). The Museum’s architect 
argues that the institution is not a harbinger of gentrification, but will be designed as a 
community-friendly organization that passively  witnesses the community turn over: 
“Fortunately, this museum is not  a stimulus on development, but a reflection of Harlem’s 
transformation as it evolves racially and economically” (Sheftell 2011). 
 The real estate developers the Museum is partnering with have a contrasting mindset. 
One of the developers on the project, Josh Eisenberg, says that the institution “could do for this 
section of Harlem what the Standard Hotel did for the Meatpacking District” (Sheftell 2011). 
The condominiums on upper floors of the museum building will be the most expensive in all of 
Harlem, at over $1265 per square foot. With a rooftop pool, children’s playroom, and fitness 
center, the developers are clearly competing with luxury developments further south. Eisenberg 
makes this point directly by arguing that  “110th St. is not that far uptown anymore” (Sheftell 
2011). Another developer on the project echoes this sentiment: “We looked at this project as 
extremely special because of its location and museum. It’s still a push to get  people to come up 
here, but we believe there is great value...I think 110th St. is the new 72nd St.” (Sheftell 2011). 
We can contrast this framing with the dismissive reaction to the founding of the Studio Museum 
in Harlem on 125th and Fifth Avenue in 1968. Clearly, times have changed. The Museum of 
African Art could be a sign of an even more pioneering location decision model in the future. 
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Fred Wherry (2011), for example, explains how local community  stakeholders are now actively 
using the arts to rebrand their own neighborhoods in struggling areas of Philadelphia.  
 
 During this era, although museums diffused geographically at an unprecedented rate, they 
moved into a select subset of gentrified neighborhoods. Their diffusion was carefully  controlled 
by a constellation of public and private interests. The new alignment of corporate development, 
museum, and city  government interests in identifying these neighborhoods and locating 
museums in them is the defining mark of the era of cultural branding. Next, I will introduce 
additional analysis to test further the relationship between the museum founding decision and 
neighborhood demography. 
Testing the significance of demography over time
 Thus far, I argued that demographic composition acts as a mediating variable in the 
museum location decision. This was especially the case during the eras of homogenization and 
cultural branding. During the era of homogenization, residential segregation took hold of the city, 
and museums were far more likely to be located in white, wealthy areas than minority ones. This 
is also the case for the era of cultural branding - however, many of these white, wealthy areas 
were recently gentrified as opposed to elite strongholds such as the Upper East Side. For much of 
the twentieth century, demographic turnover - particularly when white neighborhoods became 
minority neighborhoods - stagnated the potential growth of a museum cluster. We saw this 
happen in Washington Heights, Manhattan, Flushing Meadows, Queens, and Crown Heights, 
Brooklyn.  
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 If this association is valid, we would expect that racial composition would be a 
significant variable in the century’s founding rates. In this next section, I will use event history 
analysis to model founding rates to determine if demographic composition is indeed a significant 
mediator of museum placement. Event history modeling is used in the social sciences to 
understand how much time passes until a given unit experiences an event in question, given that 
unit is ‘at risk’ of experiencing the event (Isaac and Griffin 1989). This additional analysis should 
be considered as a supplemental, corroborating component to the historical analysis. 
Unit of analysis
 The data sources for the event history analysis are the same as those used in the first 
section of the chapter: the United States Census (1910-2010) and the original dataset of the New 
York City museum population (limited to events between 1910 and 2010). Event history requires 
a unit of analysis that holds constant geographic boundaries over time. Likely options for a unit 
of analysis include neighborhoods and census tracts. Upon inspection, both of these prove 
detrimental to analysis. Many neighborhoods, such as Fort Greene and Harlem, have been named 
as such during the entire analysis period. However, most neighborhoods have changed names 
(i.e. we can look to the development of “SoHo” as a neighborhood for a clear example) and 
boundaries during the analysis period. Applying today’s neighborhood definitions to the 
population of one hundred years ago is problematic. The census tract is the next logical option. 
Unfortunately, these boundaries have also changed over the twentieth century, particularly 
between 1910 and 1960. Furthermore, although tract boundaries do fall along the street grid, they 
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are arbitrarily  drawn and do not adhere to meaningful divisions between neighborhoods, 
demographics, etc. 
 The most logical and least problematic unit of analysis is the street block. The street 
block is smaller than both the neighborhood and the census tract. It is relevant to lived 
experience (Kusenbach 2008) and does not divide the city anachronistically. All street blocks in 
New York City  were derived from the city  street grid map, available through the Department of 
City Planning. There are 37,639 blocks in the city.  
Dependent variable
 The outcome variable predicted in this model is museum founding in a given block in a 
given year. Simply put, the model predicts the instantaneous probability that a block will 
experience a museum founding in a year given that it has not already  experienced a founding. 
This variable is binary, as a founding either occurs or does not occur, and the model is fitted 
using logistic regression in the discrete time event history  framework (Allison 1982, 1984). The 
appropriate model is of repeated events because the same block can experience multiple 
museums in different years, which occurred nineteen times during the analysis period. Data 
points from the dependent variable are not independent. In fact, I argue that spatial proximity 
between museums (and thus, between blocks) plays a role in attracting additional museums. Due 
to this, I have generated a distribution of museum locations.   
Independent variables
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 As revealed in Chapter One, there are a number of factors influencing museum founding 
and movement locations. In this section, I will describe the independent variables included in the 
event history model that represent these influences.38  
Proportion White, Proportion Black, Proportion Other. These parameters are based on counts of 
each racial group divided by the total residents in each tract. Of course, the meaning and 
categorization of ‘black’ and ‘white’ has evolved and been debated over the eleven census 
periods under analysis. Racial and ethnic categorization has, on the whole, become increasingly 
specific and complex. While there were four racial groups in 1910, today are over fifty-seven. 
For this project, white refers to only  non-Hispanic, single-race white residents. Black refers to 
non-Hispanic, African American or native, single-race residents. Proportion Other totals the 
remaining residents per census tract.  Please refer to Table 2. Census data at the tract level was 
joined with the corresponding street block using ArcGIS. 
Clustering. This variable totals the number of nearby museums existing at each census year, for 
each block. Nearby is defined as any museum within a one-mile radius of the block’s 
centerpoint.  As should be expected, clustering increases over time, both because the number of 
museums overall increases and because museums have tended to cluster in space. Because of 
availability of census data beginning in 1910, there is a left censoring of 31 cases. These are 
museums that were opened before 1910. However, we take these cases as the initial population 
of organizations beginning in 1910, and they are included in the clustering variables.  
120
38 Population density is an additional variable in the analysis. This is a basic measure of the number of 
residents per square mile. 
Results
Table 2.2. Model of Museum Founding, 1910-2010
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -11.0400 0.3846 -28.716 < 2e-16 ***
Year 0.0140 0.0069 2.01 0.044393 *
Population Density 0.0000 0.0000 3.599 0.000319 ***
Proportion Black 1.5740 1.4190 1.109 0.2672
Proportion White -0.0713 0.5004 -0.142 0.8867
Clustering 0.3243 0.0383 8.459 < 2e-16 ***
Proportion Black * Clustering -0.2525 0.1133 -2.228 0.025863 *
Proportion White * Clustering -0.0371 0.0385 -0.963 0.3356
Proportion Black * Year -0.0257 0.0196 -1.311 0.1900
Proportion White * Year 0.0032 0.0089 0.358 0.7202
Clustering * Year -0.0017 0.0003 -6.115 9.65e-10 ***
The above table reports the event history  model. Please note that the parameters are extremely 
small because of the event of museum founding is rare given the number of New York City 
blocks. However, these results demonstrate that there is a significant  pattern to museum 
placement. First, we notice that as time passes (Year), the likelihood of museum founding 
increases. This is concordant with the growth rate of museum foundings previously  discussed. 
Clustering has an even stronger positive effect. As is evidenced through the interaction terms, the 
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influence of clustering is mediated by the racial composition of the given block. The positive 
effect of clustering is more drastically decreased in black areas, compared to white areas. This 
supports the hypothesis that predominantly  Black/African American areas have less local 
museums. We can also see that the effect of clustering also decreases at we move through the 
analysis period. This may  indicate that clustering tends to act as a spark point, but eventually 
areas reach an organizational density that cannot sustain additional museums. We found this to 
be the case during the era of cultural branding.
 The following figures break down the race and clustering parameters. The first figure 
displays the probability of a block experiencing a museum founding, if the block in question has 
varying proportions of Black residents. Each line denotes a different proportion of Black 
residents in the census tract. As proportion black increases, the slope direction reverses; 
increased proportion black corresponds to a lower probability  of experiencing a museum 
founding. The higher intercepts for higher proportion black result  from low proportions of black 
residents before 1940. Other variables were controlled: density  set to mean, and cluster set to 
zero. The second figure displays the same probability, but for different  levels of proportion 
white. It is clear that the overall pattern is reversed for white residents. The positive slope 
direction remains constant and slightly  increases as proportion white increases. Again, other 
parameters were controlled. The final figure illustrates the relationship between clustering and 
time of risk to museum founding.  Each line refers to a different level of clustering (i.e. the 
number of nearby museums). We can interpret this figure to mean that the presence of nearby 
institutions brought in additional museum foundings to the area for much of the analysis period. 
However, towards the end - the era of cultural branding - that trend reverses. It becomes more 
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likely for blocks without neighboring museums to receive an institution. This reflects the 
diffusion to gentrified neighborhoods in downtown Manhattan and the outer boroughs. 
 These results indicate that the distribution of New York’s population has a significant 
effect on the geographic spread of the city’s museums. Areas that are predominantly African 
American are less likely  to receive institutions, areas that are predominantly  white are more 
likely.
Figure 2.12. Likelihood of museum founding given varying levels of proportion black






































Figure 2.13. Likelihood of museum founding given varying levels of proportion white





































Figure 2.14. Likelihood of museum founding given varying levels of clustering
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 In this chapter, I have argued that each era is characterized by a prevailing demographic 
trend. These demographic trends, when coupled with the era’s museum location decision, explain 
the uneven diffusion of New York’s museums over time and space. The first era was 
characterized by personal location decisions. This interacted with oft-shifting demographics to 
create a virtual toss up of museum locations. Since founders did not know where the city’s 
increasingly  diverse constituencies would end up, they made what today seems to be a series of 
idiosyncratic location decisions. By  the 1940s, racial and ethnic groups were clearly divided 
along neighborhood boundaries. As founders homogenized their decisions, they  often chose to 
locate in one of the only neighborhoods that remained steadfastly white and elite: the Upper East 
Side. Today’s era of cultural branding ushered in the rise of gentrification and a new need for 
museum differentiation. Through the combined efforts of city government, corporate developers, 
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and museums founders, institutions diffused to recently gentrified neighborhoods beyond the 
Upper East Side. 
 I concluded the chapter with a statistical analysis of the significant impact of African 
American presence on the likelihood of museum founding. Although this relationship was 
determined to be valid, I do not argue that museum founders willfully  avoided African American 
(or minority) neighborhoods. Instead, during every museum location decision, founders were 
attracted to neighborhoods whose characteristics - elite, gentrifying, etc., - ensured that they did 
not contain high proportions of African Americans. This result  motivates an examination of how 
this spatial diffusion may have an impact on varying use of museums by New Yorkers. I will turn 
to this task in the next chapter.
Chapter three: the consequences of the museum location decision
That which, perhaps, hears more nonsense than anything in the world, is a picture in a museum.
Edmond Goncourt
 The dramatic intra-city relocations we observed in the last chapter is a testament to how 
important surrounding neighborhoods are to museums, even though they are often considered to 
be global institutions. While I have explored what these founding and relocation decisions mean 
to museum leaders, urban developers, and government officials, this project has not yet 
considered how these decisions impact potential museum-goers. The enduring association 
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between the museum location decision and demographic turnover suggests that this question 
warrants further investigation. 
 This chapter is devoted to exploring why individuals attend arts institutions, and if there 
is a connection between the aggregate spatial distribution of museums and audience composition. 
I begin this exploration with a survey  of arts audience research for each era of the museum 
location decision.39 We will learn that museums, not surprisingly, have engaged with their real 
and potential audiences in vastly  different ways over the twentieth century. Despite the 
introduction targeted marketing and outreach, audience composition has remained stratified 
throughout the three eras. One of the most persistent cleavages is African American attendance - 
African Americans are less likely to attend museums than the rest of the population, even when 
controlling for other demographic characteristics.40 
 I will discuss the efforts museum leaders and policymakers have taken, at various points, 
to mitigate unequal attendance, which include lowering costs, addressing varying socialization 
experiences, and altering exhibition content. I argue that since policy interventions addressing 
these alternative theories of participation have not resulted in corresponding changes in audience 
composition, institutional exposure may be a hidden driver of attendance. Institutional exposure 
encapsulates the cognitive, practical, and interactional benefits associated with proximity to 
museums and other forms of arts institutions; the concept suggests that there is a relationship 
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39 Since there is a relatively small number of attendance and participation studies that only focus on 
museums, I include research on all forms of arts institutions. Museums are the most commonly attended 
‘high culture’ arts institution, but the patterns of stratification found in museums tend to reflect other 
patterns in arts institutions and vice versa.
40 Attendance patterns at arts institutions cannot be conflated with cultural engagement overall. 
Attendance at these public institutions can be interpreted as an example of conspicuous consumption, 
along the lines of Veblen (1922). Studies have found that while these public acts of arts engagement are 
highly stratified, rates of engagement in private spaces converge (Tepper and Gao 2007, Conwill 2001).
between local proximity  to arts institutions and increased attendance. I explore the possible 
connection between institutional exposure and attendance by tracing the varied rates of 
institutional exposure over time between the most likely and unlikely museum attendees, white 
and African American New Yorkers respectively. I find that African American exposure levels 
have plateau-ed in the past fifty  years, while museum exposure for white New Yorkers has 
skyrocketed. 
 I conclude the chapter with a test of whether the inequalities found in museum exposure 
are characteristic of other forms of arts institutions, including arts galleries, theaters, and arts 
instruction organizations. I find that they  are, even when accounting for African American 
income and education, which further supports the plausibility of institutional exposure theory. 
Although these results are suggestive, they point to one of the ways non-economic attributes 
perpetuate class inequality. Before presenting the data analysis, I will summarize existing 
research on museum audiences, how they  are stratified, and how museums have addressed this 
stratification. 
The era of personal ties: by us, for us
 During the Gilded Age, founders built inwardly oriented institutions in the locations of 
their choosing. Museums and other major arts institutions were seen as sanctuaries created by 
and in many cases for the elite. These founders reclassified elite’s cultural trappings through the 
deliberate promotion of a small number of arts forms (i.e. ballet, classical music, Old Masters, 
etc., see Khan 2012) in formal arts institutions. In his case study of the Boston Museum of Fine 
Arts, Paul DiMaggio (1987, 2012) demonstrates how blueblood trustees intentionally cultivated 
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a homogenous clientele. As DiMaggio recounts, when the Museum of Fine Arts was first 
founded in 1870, founders prioritized education programs and exhibited a mixture of (what is 
now considered to be) high and lowbrow art; keep in mind that at this time immigrant and 
working class populations were as likely to attend the opera as they were vaudeville (Levine 
2012). During the 1890s, this orientation shifted rapidly  and dramatically. The museum’s leaders 
turned their focus towards connoisseurship and collecting, with the support of a small number of 
Brahmin families. By 1907, the institution that once prioritized education now instructed its 
docents not to explain its art to visitors. The Museum moved from Copley Square to the 
exclusive Fens neighborhood - its neighbors were now exactly the kind of elite Bostonians with 
which they identified and associated (DiMaggio 2012). Attendance at the new building flagged 
over the next decades, despite enormous population growth of the city  at  large. This was fine 
with the trustees, who were “displeased” by  large crowds (DiMaggio 2012, 434). Through these 
efforts, the Museum of Fine Arts became “closed to all save the initiated” (DiMaggio 2012, 434). 
Zolberg (1980) found this to be the case for museums across the country. 
 As we know from previous chapters, New York’s institutions were created with an 
orientation towards founder networks. These personal ties, as we saw in the case of the Museum 
of Modern Art, were often urban elites. Through constricting and defining the content of ‘high 
culture’, museum founders generated an elite-driven arts audience and excluded much of the 
country. 
 Inaccessible or un-relatable content has been considered a barrier to arts institution 
attendance. Scholars have found that minority Americans are more likely to attend arts 
institutions to celebrate their heritage than their Euro-American counterparts (Ostrower 2005). If 
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these findings held during the era of personal ties, then minority  populations would be extremely 
unlikely to attend museums - which were exclusively run and curated by white Americans. Even 
major cultural movements, such as the Harlem Renaissance, were not reflected in museum 
content at the time. Consequently, during the era of personal networks, audiences for museums 
and other high culture institutions were circumscribed narrowly and definitively. 
The era of homogenization: the democratization project begins
 The mid-twentieth century  brings a sea change for museum founders, funders, and 
audiences. The introduction of external funders’ oversight as well as government-sponsored 
democratization policies motivated the need to better understand who was inside these august 
institutions (Peterson 1986). A prevailing research question was: is democratization successful? 
There was an initial wave of optimism (Toffler 1965 in DiMaggio and Useem 1978) regarding 
this question. A 1973 study by the National Research Center for the Arts showed enormous rates 
of attendance: over half of Americans were museum-goers. This finding would indicate that 
democratization had reversed the audience narrowing of the previous era. However, subsequent 
research did not replicate this high rate. 
 DiMaggio and Useem (1978) and DiMaggio, Useem, and Brown (1977), in a review of 
hundreds of unpublished audience surveys of a variety of arts institutions, found that the 
entrenched inequalities set up  during the previous era were still present throughout the 1960s and 
1970s.41 Overall, only about one-fifth of Americans were attending museums. Individuals with 
low-status occupations, less education, and racial minorities were still significantly 
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41 The National Research Center for the Arts result is now thought to be inflated.
underrepresented in all arts audiences (DiMaggio and Useem 1978). New York-specific surveys 
mirrored countrywide statistics, the National Research Center for the Arts found that black New 
Yorkers comprised only 3-4% of high culture audiences, while at the time (in 1970) they 
composed 16% of the city’s total population. Arts institutions attendees were a startlingly 
homogenous group: white, older, highly educated, wealthy, professional, and urban. Essentially, 
the same individuals courted during the era of personal ties. And even this population was 
shrinking. The traditional arts institution audience base - white middle and upper classes - was 
fleeing cities in record numbers; “white flight” dominated much of 1950s and 1960s. The 
American Association of Museums issued a statement in 1972 comparing the inner-city museum 
to a “beached whale” (American Association of Museums 1972, 6) left without an audience base. 
This sentiment clearly  reveals the tension between old guard elitism and new democratization 
outreach. 
 Although established institutions were not immediately successful in the democratization 
project (and there are many indications that democratization was not high on the priority list), 
there were some bright spots for potential minority audiences. The era did see the birth of 
culturally specific museums, some of which were targeted towards underrepresented populations 
(Luby 2011). During the 1960s and 1970s, these museums (recall the foundings of El Museo del 
Barrio and the Studio Museum in Harlem) offered people of color content that  reflected and 
celebrated their heritage, which had been absent from formal arts institutions. However, it  should 
be noted that in order to survive these institutions still had to adhere to a homogenizing set of 
constraints created during the era of homogenization, including the need for validation in the 
white-dominated funding and art worlds. To this day, one of the great ironies of culturally 
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specific museums is that many are - in raw numbers - primarily  attended by non-minority  visitors 
(Farrell and Medveda 2010).
 Culturally  specific institutions were one path towards audience expansion, but traditional 
museums still had work to do. Since museum leaders were interested in diversifying their 
audience, they attempted to understand the barriers to attendance. A common barrier discussed 
was a lack of socialization to and familiarity with art and arts institutions (DiMaggio and Useem 
1978). Pierre Bourdieu developed a theoretical framework to explain how individuals become 
socialized into the arts (and culture, more generally) using data from his native France. Bourdieu 
argues that cultural capital is an individual’s knowledge of and ease with high-status culture 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, 1989). He argues that family background and early educational 
experiences determine one’s cultural preferences through the development of habitus, or a 
seemingly ‘natural’ disposition. Applying and amending cultural capital in the American context 
has motivated a wide range of studies in which arts institution attendance is both the cause and 
consequence of high cultural capital (Lamont and Lareau 1988, Robinson and Garnier 1985, 
DiMaggio and Mohr 1985, Lamont and Fournier 1992). A body of empirical research confirms 
the hunch that  early life experiences play a role in predicting adult arts attendance (i.e. Bergonzi 
and Smith 1996), although the French case did not map cleanly onto the American one. There 
was a growing suspicion that other mechanisms brought people to arts institutions, and that 
cultural boundaries were more porous than ever before (Ostrower 1998). By  the end of the era of 
homogenization, external accountability  and democratization had profoundly changed arts 
institutions, but not their audiences. Although it was clear that audience inequality was 
important, it was not yet clear exactly what caused it.  
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The era of cultural branding: studies in populism
[It is] a really radical change in how people use museums now...I have friends who think this is 
the end of civilization, but a lot more people are going to be in the presence of art.
John Elderfield42 
 The attention paid to audience composition continued through the era of cultural 
branding. This time, the museum audience really had broadened. Data from the 1982 and 1992 
NEA-funded Survey for Public Participation of the Arts shows that museum attendance has 
received a 4.6% bump to 26.7% during the first decade of cultural branding (Robinson 1993). By 
2002, this figure had topped out at 26.5% (Nichols 2003). The growth of the museum audience is 
dramatic enough that the United States has surpassed Europe’s attendance rates for the first time 
(Dobrzyniski 1999). This development inspired Paul DiMaggio to proclaim that art museums are 
“the great  arts institutions success story of the last 20 years” (Dobrzyniski 1999, accessed 
online). 
 These promising numbers elide the question of diversification. The same studies report 
that audiences may be bigger but they are not more diverse - non-Hispanic whites, particularly 
those who are educated and wealthy - are the most  populous arts attendees by far (Nichols 2003). 
Minorities, of all races and ethnicities, constituted only 9% of the museum audience in 2010 
(Farrell and Medvedeva 2010). African Americans show worrying signs of nonattendance: this 
group had the lowest museum visit rate of all race/ethnicities in a recent report (Farrell and 
Medveda 2010); other studies have supported this disparity (Robinson et. al.1986, DiMaggio and 
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42 Tompkins 2012, 63. 
Ostrower 1990, Kaplan and Talbot 1988). Data from the 1993 General Social Survey found that 
on a national level, 42.1% of White Americans attend museums, in comparison with 26.7% of 
Black Americans (Tepper 1998); a more recent national study  supports this result  (Williams and 
Keen 2009). The table below displays nationally representative data for African Americans and 
white Americans at three points in the era of cultural branding. 






 Museums have been more committed than ever to close the attendance gap. Directors are 
striving to develop a modern (read: young, diverse, urban) audience, and they have identified 
new content as the key. During the Gilded Age, we saw that  museum leaders altered their content 
to narrow their audience; today, the same principle is reversed. Popular and even ‘lowbrow’ 
blockbusters (Alexander 1996) are making waves in the museum world. 
 The Brooklyn Museum has been one of the most eager New York institutions in this 
populism effort. Their eye-catching 2004 entrance renovation signaled a newfound welcoming of 
local, diverse visitors. Shortly thereafter, Director Arnold Lehman set the ambitious goal of 
tripling their attendance rates over the next  decade (Pogrebin 2010). The Museum’s strategies to 
broaden their public have focused on generating populist programs, the most visible of which is 
their First Saturdays program (sponsored by  Target). These weekend, nighttime events have been 
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43 Farrell and Medveda (2010) using data from the NEA Survey of Public Participation in the Arts.
enormously  successful; thousands stream into the museum for live music and dancing, complete 
with a cash bar. The institution has also posted record numbers to their mainstream exhibitions, 
including art from the movie “Star Wars” and celebrity  photography by  Annie Lebowitz. The 
Museum will exhibit the winning work of the Bravo network reality series, “Work of Art: The 
Next Great Artist”. 
 These splashy moves have attracted criticism from both inside and outside of the 
Museum. One trustee promptly resigned when the Bravo deal was struck. Maxwell L. Anderson, 
the current director of the Dallas Museum of Art, commented: “You may get people in the door 
for a motorcycle show or a ‘Star Wars’ show, but they don’t return, and there is no residual value 
from their visits” (Pogrebin 2010, accessed online). 
 Looking at  the facts, overall attendance has not increased. Far from it, the Museum 
audience is now on the decline (Pogrebin 2010). Gains in audience diversity and the increase in 
local attendees can be largely attributed to these relatively isolated populist experiments 
(primarily  the First Saturdays events). The Museum does not track the subsequent visits of the 
First Saturdays crowd, but it’s leaders realize this is the ultimate barometer of populist success. 
Director Arthur Lehman says that “if that environment could be replicated...on a Monday, 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, then I could easily retire and say we’ve succeeded’” (Pogrebin 
2010, accessed online). 
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 The Brooklyn Museum represents moves made by museum directors around the world to 
adopt mainstream, inclusive programs.44  However, the mixed reactions to the Brooklyn 
Museum’s policies reveals that there is little consensus amongst leaders over how they  should 
define their real or imagined audiences. Even though museums are stretching their arms to new 
territories, some argue that their “master narrative” is still elite oriented (David 1999). During the 
era of cultural branding, we witnessed an overall bump in attendance at museums, and even 
some signs of democratization through specific, ‘non-museum-like’ programming. However, 
representative surveys demonstrate that while the audiences are getting bigger, at  most 
institutions they are not getting more diverse. After a century  of arts institutions, programs, and 
exhibitions, the core schisms in attendance are still the same as they always were. 
Barriers to arts participation 
A great department store, easily reached, open at all hours, is more like a good museum of art 
than any of the museums we have yet established. 
John Cotton Dana
 Two simple observations emerge from this review of audience studies: (1) audiences are 
consistently stratified, and (2) there is little consensus over exactly why. During the review, I 
touched on two of the most commonly cited explanations for attendance: socialization (or, 
cultural capital) and content. These related barriers have been expounded upon by arts experts 
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44 Supporters of populist programming include Jeffrey Deitch, the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary 
Art’s director (Johnson 2012), and Nicholas Serota, at the helm of the newly relocated Tate Modern 
(Tompkins 2012). Even Thomas Campbell, the newly installed director of the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, is attempting to broaden the museum’s audience by making their entire collection available online. 
He argues that “in maintaining its standards, the Met had too often failed to reach out to less 
knowledgeable visitors.” (Kennedy 2011).
and intervened on by arts educators and policymakers, and in many cases partially account for 
the observed inequality in arts participation. Cultural capital is able to explain audience 
stratification across a wide range of dimensions, but presupposes a rigid class structure and 
knowledge-based status hierarchy not suited to the American case (Ostrower 1990). Content is 
the go-to explanation for most museum leaders and many policymakers. However, we have seen 
that even the most dramatic program initiatives have not created a sustainable cohort of regular 
museum-goers. Consumer cost  is another commonly invoked barrier, although we have seen that 
mainstream cultural entertainment (such as a movie or concert ticket) is often more expensive 
than museum entrance fee. Furthermore, museums are actively addressing the cost barrier. A 
recent study found that two-thirds of New York’s nonprofit arts organizations visits were free of 
charge for the attendees (Alliance for the Arts 2011).
 Most vitally, these theories do not explain the consistent racial inequalities in attendance. 
Across every era, race has been a predictor of arts institution attendance; increasingly, African 
Americans have emerged as the least likely arts attendees (DiMaggio and Ostrower 1990). Based 
on the 1985 NEA Survey of Public Participation of the Arts (SPPA), Schuster (1991) found that 
whites were twice as likely  to attend an art museum or art gallery than African Americans; other 
minority groups were not as drastically different. These findings have been demonstrated to hold 
despite increases in income or education (Puckrein 1991, Edwards 1981). The following quote 
sums up the matter: 
When moderately affluent, moderately well educated, European American Jane Q. 
American wakes up on a Sunday morning and tries to decide what to do with her family, 
there is roughly a fifty-fifty chance that  some kind of museum will be on her list of 
possibilities. When moderately affluent, moderately well educated, African American 
Jane Q. American wakes up on a Sunday morning and tries to decide what  to do with her 
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family, there is considerably less than a fifty-fifty chance that  some kind of museum will 
be on her list of possibilities.45
These confounding results have showed little signs of change. However, race is almost never 
offered as an independent determinant of overall cultural participation. This is because studies 
report that African Americans and other minorities participate frequently in the arts - just not at 
formal arts institutions (Grams 2010, Jackson 2002, Conwill 2001). It  is obviously not a disparity 
in cultural engagement between races, but of cultural institution attendance. 
 I suggest that stratification along racial lines is an indicator of an often-ignored, yet 
significant barrier to attendance: geographic proximity. The location of and differential proximity 
to museums and other arts institutions pops up  frequently  in audience composition debates - for 
both the respondents and arts leaders. Jun, Kyle, and O’Leary (2008) found that access, time, and 
cost were the most significant attendance barriers (also see Tian, Crompton, and Witt 1996).  All 
three of these reasons are directly related to geographic proximity. They also argue that the place 
of residence is determinant, particularly  in the case of the urban/suburban divide. Schuster 
(1991) also found that  the barrier ‘too far to go’ was the second most common response (behind 
‘not enough time’). The most recent SPPA found that proximity to location was a major barrier: 
58.8% of respondents report they  are hindered by  a lack of facilities, 52.2% report that existing 
facilities are inconveniently  located, and 65.7% report that they  have a lack of time to attend 
these facilities (National Endowment for the Arts 2009). 
 New Yorkers find proximity  to be an obstacle as well. In a recent study, the locations of 
arts events are reported to be a “significant obstacle”: more than 60% of residents say  that they 
would attend arts institutions more frequently (or at all) if they were more conveniently  located 
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45 Falk 1990.
(Alliance for the Arts 2005). Despite these findings, location (admittedly, a tricky issue) is not  on 
policymakers’ agendas.   
 This absence is ironic because museum leaders also talk about location as a major 
determinant of attendance. We learned in previous chapters that location is already key to current 
branding efforts. In fact, when asked about the future of the much-debated Brooklyn Museum, 
art aficionados invoked its location as one of its biggest advantages and obstacles.  Philippe de 
Montebello, former director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, said: “I don't know of any 
museum so marginalized by its locality and demographic change [of Brooklyn].” He, like many 
other New York museum leaders, is of two minds regarding location; de Montebello both 
suggests to market locally: “Promotion would stress: ‘You don’t have to go to Manhattan to see 
one of the world’s great collections...”, while also cautioning that “great museums are not just  for 
the people who live within 20 miles...” (Pogrebin 2010). In Chapter 1, I argued that both the 
Whitney and MoMA redefined themselves through location changes, and an explicit  implication 
of their new locations was redefining their local audience base into a fresh, desirable 
demographic. When compared to the Brooklyn Museum, it seems that both institutions that have 
relocated and those that have stayed put are wrestling with issues of how to make sense of their 
locations and their attendees. For researchers and policymakers, the importance of location and 
proximity is undisputed, but no clear link has been made between location and attendance. 
Institutional Exposure
 I propose that there is a link between location decisions and attendance that has not  been 
fully  developed by scholars. Geographic proximity, or institutional exposure, to museums (and 
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other arts institutions) is a hidden determinant of attendance. At this point, institutional exposure 
is an concept that may  motivate future research. I will not directly test the impact of institutional 
exposure on attendance in the scope of this dissertation.46  However, I will present a series of 
quantitative analyses that suggest a plausible correlation between exposure and attendance. 
Before reporting these analyses, I will further develop the idea of institutional exposure. 
 The concept of institutional exposure does not denote physical proximity alone: it 
represents a social mechanism of how individuals learn about, become socialized into, and 
interact with available formal arts organizations. At its most basic level, exposure enables easy 
and spontaneous attendance. The reader may recall James Michener, the Greenwich Village 
resident who passed by the Whitney  Museum during his daily commute. Michener would stop in 
frequently - because it was so convenient; after these repeated visits he found that the Whitney 
shaped his appreciation for American art. Institutional exposure also implies a cognitive benefit. 
If one has museums within one’s local neighborhood, arts and culture implicitly becomes a part 
of daily life. One passes by advertisements to the museum on the way to work or the local park. 
Individuals may be more likely to ‘feel’ that these places are part of the rhythms of daily  life. 
Third, it  is also more likely that other parts of one’s life, including social networks and other 
daily organizations, will be connected to the institution, further facilitating engagement. Across a 
variety of studies, spatial proximity  has been shown to encourage information diffusion, 
interaction, and social influence (Strang and Soule 1998, Stern and Seifert 2000, Liu, King and 
Bearman 2010, Hedstrom 1994). Participation at  a neighborhood institution, and particularly one 
that is invested in the community, can provide an outlet for information exchange and civic 
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46 This is due to a lack of historical or current representative attendance data for New York City museums.  
engagement, similar to a community center (Jackson 2000). Finally, exposure captures the 
interactive nature of institution attendance. Physical presence at museums and other arts 
institutions confers an experience that cannot be replicated elsewhere. Attendance affords skill 
building, gaining ‘ease’ in looking and appreciating art and culture, as well as opportunities for 
specific forms of interaction and interlocutors.
 Although I have focused on museums in the previous chapters, institutional exposure 
applies to a broader range of arts institutions. Unlike a grocery store or daycare center, cultural 
literacy in today’s society requires a wide range of environments. Recent work has demonstrated 
that knowledge and ease across a spectrum of cultural contexts – not only highbrow forms – is 
now required to be socially ‘skilled’ (Fridman and Ollivier 2002, Ollivier 2008).  
 The consequences of institutional exposure help to explain the pervasive, persistent 
character of racial inequality in urban America. It has been demonstrated that the economy alone 
does not drive the reproduction of inequality. Cultural differences, either explicit or implicit, 
have long been considered to not  just reflect, but produce socioeconomic cleavages (Veblen 
1899, Willis 1977, Bourdieu and Passeron 1984). The outward expressions of ‘personal’ taste 
and style emplace individuals into a systematic matrix of race, class, potential, etc. (Bryson 
1996, Goldberg 2011, Lamont and Lareau 1988, Dowd 1992, Ferguson 2004, Marsden et. al. 
1982, Katz-Gerro 2002, DiMaggio and Ostrower 1990). In short, cultural tastes are not ‘natural’; 
they are constructed and protected, both at the individual and group level (Mark 2003). 
 These tastes contribute to the creation of social identities and meaning. On a structural 
level, artistic and cultural tastes (an interactional ease in appreciating and practicing them) can 
influence job market outcomes (Brown 1995) and social mobility more generally (Parkin 1979, 
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Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 1996). For example, Kasinitiz et. al. (2009) found, in a survey of 
diverse, second-generation New Yorkers, that  attending museums and libraries was positively 
associated with educational attainment and political engagement. Individuals with a shared 
‘culture’ tend to associate with each other (Byrne 1971), such cultural inequality also reproduces 
patterns of segregation. I will expand on potential implications in the conclusion of the 
dissertation. Suffice it  to say, understanding how people are exposed to and engage in cultural 
pursuits is central to understanding inequality.
 Thus, institutional exposure hypothesizes that local access to arts institutions will 
increase residents’ attendance to those institutions because (a) it is simply more convenient; (b) 
proximity to arts institutions cognitively suggests that they are a familiar, daily institution; and 
(c) it is more likely that institutions are woven into residents’ existing social fabric. Museum 
location decisions, over time and in aggregate, have generated variations in institutional exposure 
across New York City. These variations will be the focus of the remainder of the chapter. For 
there to be a link between institutional exposure and arts attendance, we would first have to 
observe a correlation between them. In the following sections, I will present findings 
demonstrating a strong relationship. 
Measuring institutional exposure
 I operationalize institutional exposure by totaling the number of local institutions per 
census tract. There are several components of this statement to unpack. I measure the number of 
local institutions because, as argued earlier, one must have access to more than one institution to 
reap  the benefits of exposure. However, I do not make an any absolute arguments concerning the 
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minimum number of institutions required to be living in an ‘exposed’ community; any 
differentiation is relative to the exposure of other New Yorkers at the same point. A census tract’s 
‘total’ includes any institutions within a one mile radius of the tract’s center-point.47 This is an 
example of a radial network buffer, commonly deployed in built environment research (Sallis et. 
al. 2009, Handy et. al. 2002, Leslie et. al. 2007).48  I employ the historical museums dataset 
previously  introduced in Chapter Two; later on, I introduce a cross-sectional dataset of additional 
forms of arts institutions - galleries, theaters, etc., - to determine if and how museum exposure 
compares with arts institutions exposure, more generally.  
A century of museum exposure
 The chart below reports the exposure level of African American and white census tracts 
between 1910 and 2010.49  Museum exposure for white neighborhoods has exponentially 
increased while exposure for African American communities has stagnated and even declined 
during the era of cultural branding. By 2010, predominantly white areas contained more than five 
times the number of local museums than black areas. The historical dynamics of museum 
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47 The one mile radius is a robust measure. The same analysis has been conducted using a half-mile radial 
buffer, and a neighborhood adjacency measure (in which the total number of museums within one’s own 
and adjacent neighborhoods are totaled)’; these analyses were consistent with the presented findings. 
48 This analysis was also conducted with a one-mile network buffer (Oliver et. al. 2007). The network 
buffer traces the one mile path along roads and walkways instead of a continuous circle, which is the 
technique used in the radial buffer. The comparison to the network buffer produced no significant 
differences in findings. 
49 Census tract identified as African American or white changed along with demographic turnover of each 
era. African American tracts were those that contained more than 10% African Americans between 
1910-1940, 50% between 1950-1970, and 75% between 1980-2010. White census tracts contained over 
50% white residents between 1910-1970 and over 75% between 1980-2010. 
exposure have roots in critical shifts of the museum location decision, as well as concurrent 
demographic transformations. 












 Until the 1940s, the museum location decision was motivated by personal ties. This 
idiosyncratic location distribution occurred alongside rapid relocations of New York’s elite, 
immigrant, and black populations. These dual dynamics resulted in unsystematic and changing 
exposure levels for white and African American residents. The 1910 map below illustrates the 
fact that African American communities were relatively  nearby the few museum clusters in 
existence at the time. Census tracts outlined in black were over 10% African American (the entire 
city was less than 5% African American at the time); the fill color is shaded according to the 
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50 Please note that exposure levels for 1930 are not included due to incomplete Census data.
level of exposure. The chart above reflects this proximity; tracts with an African American 
population were more exposed to museums than predominantly white ones.  This was the case 
from 1910 to 1930.  
 The seeming randomness of the previous era gives way to a steady pattern over the 
following decades. The era of homogenization marks a turning point: white areas begin to gain 
exposure, while African American exposure plateaus. In 1950, African Americans reach their 
peak rate of exposure, due to the sudden post-WWII migration of Blacks into northern cities, and 
a simultaneous ‘white flight’. The map below shows that the now-familiar African American 
strongholds of Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Jamaica, etc., are coming into existence -- just as 
the Upper East Side is emerging as the ideal museum location. By 1960, African American 
census tracts’ exposure rate had dropped. White tracts, on the other hand, were on the road to a 
steady increase that will continue through present day.  
 During the era of cultural branding, white neighborhoods received all the exposure gains. 
Majority black census tracts experienced no gains in exposure.51  This is despite the fact that 
African Americans compose around one quarter of the population during this period. The map 
below shows that African American neighborhoods - now quite large - have been pushed away 
from the urban core. Even the African American population in Harlem is concentrated above 
125th Street. After one hundred years of museum growth, white neighborhoods have about ten 
times the exposure they started out with, and African American neighborhoods have almost 
exactly the same rate.  
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51 Other minority neighborhoods have exposure levels that are in between white and black rates. In 2010, 
those census tracts with predominantly Asian or Hispanic residents had an average of two local museums; 
this figure is slightly higher than African American tracts and lower than predominantly white ones.
In short, white New Yorkers have gained the lion’s share of local museums, while most of the 
institutions that have opened over the past century have been inconveniently located to 
stratification. Other arts institutions must be included to determine if there is a similar 
stratification in institutional (not only museum) exposure; if museum exposure is an aberration, 
then institutional exposure is not a likely explanation. I collected cross-sectional data from 2008 
of three additional types of arts institutions in New York City: theaters, galleries, and arts 
instruction organizations.52 This supplementary dataset is from ReferenceUSA, a private 
Figure 3.2. Museum exposure and African American neighborhoods in 1910 (top left), 1950 (top 
right), and 2010 (bottom left)
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52 Live theaters are venues in which original performances are held. These include primarily playhouses 
and performing arts centers (i.e. Lincoln Center). Arts instruction organizations accounts for all 
organizations offering dramatic, vocal, or musical education. Other institutions include outdoor historical 
sites and monuments and arts advocacy organizations that are open to the public. These were relatively 
rare, however, and consequently were not included. 
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clearinghouse for national business information.53  Although this dataset is cross-sectional, 
additional longitudinal data collected (but not presented) shows that the recent museum boom is 
representative of galleries, theaters, and art instruction organizations. These organizational forms 
have also exploded in numbers.54 DiMaggio and Useem (1978) also found that there has been an 
overall increase in the number of arts institutions in the United States since the 1960s.






 These three forms are different from each other, and, perhaps most importantly, different 
from museums.55 All museums in the 2008 dataset are nonprofits, but the other forms include for 
profit businesses. Since there are significant ecological differences between these organizations, I 
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53 The company compiles data from public tax records, and then conducts telephone surveys to verify and 
update information. Reference USA enables data searches based on the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS). This search resulted in 3185 organizations in New York City.14  A 
following internet-based search of the organizations was conducted to eliminate any records that were 
clearly not museums, galleries, arts instruction, or theaters. This resulted in a final dataset of 2549 
institutions. This dataset set was then geocoded with the ArcGIS software.
54 Data collected between 1998 and 2008 show exponential growth of each institution type.  
55 Although it is obvious that these institutions exist in space, it is less clear how these varied institutions 
interact (or do not) with their local neighborhoods. This is particularly important when considering 
audience composition; often, the most numerous visitors are not New Yorkers, but tourists. It has been 
said that tourist-friendly institutions, such as major arts centers, exist in a ‘bubble’ detached from the daily 
life of New York City (for research on tourist bubbles, please see Judd 1999). Despite the ubiquity of 
tourism, arts institutions of all types are locally relevant for myriad reasons. Very few arts institutions are 
‘major’, in the sense that they are regular stops for tourists. While the Metropolitan Museum of Art or 
Lincoln Center get much of the attention, the city is actually composed of hundreds of small, community 
based arts organizations. These are the most numerous by far, and they rely on local employees, 
organizational neighbors, and clients. Jackson and Herranz (2002) found that arts organizations of all 
shapes and sizes are deeply embedded in community dynamics and processes.
do not argue that the location decisions of these disparate institutions have followed the same 
evolution of museums; I only hypothesize that these organizations have a similar ultimate spatial 
distribution in regards to demography. How and why each type of organization has located where 
it has would be the topic of a separate project, although work has been done to this end (Szantos 
2004). 
Figure 3.3. New York City Arts Institutions in 2008
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The twenty-first century city
 Since the following results are based on data collection in 2008, I will take a moment 
here to discuss recent developments in New York’s arts institutions and demography since 2000. 
Over the past decade, galleries, theaters, and art schools - similar to museums - were founded at a 
seemingly unstoppable rate. In 2008 New York, like the rest of the country, was at the peak of the 
housing market bubble. The bull-market wealth circulated through the city and founders felt New 
York could and would continue to sustain thousands of arts organizations. As previously 
discussed, Long Island City has long been primed for an arts explosion, and received a large 
number of non-museum arts institutions in the new millennium. Williamsburg, Brooklyn is a 
full-fledged gallery district that is primed to rival Chelsea and 57th Street in Manhattan. Giuliani 
and Bloomberg’s makeover of the Theater District prompted a spate of new theaters in midtown 
and around the city. After September 11th, downtown (Battery City) was revitalized through a 
number of landmark cultural organizations. 
 The residential population was growing as well. In the 2000 Census, New York topped 
eight million. In 2008, there were almost  8.2 million New Yorkers. While much has been made 
of recent gentrification, New York City is still extremely diverse, yet hyper-segregated 
(Beveridge and Weber 2004). In fact, it is the third most segregated city  in the country  for non-
Hispanic African Americans (Beveridge and Weber 2004). Chin (2005) demonstrates that hyper-
segregation can occur even block-by-block and building-by-building. Although the black 
population is declining56 , the city  contains a handful of large African American communities. 
Harlem is still an international center of black culture, although only 17% of the city’s black 
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56 In 1990, the city was 29.6% black, in 2000 it was 26.9%, and in 2010 it was 25.5%.
population lives in Manhattan. Bedford-Stuyvesant, Bushwick, and Crown Heights are majority 
African American. African American residents live in many neighborhoods of the Bronx, co-
residing with the city’s Hispanic population. East Queens hosts one of the most populous black 
neighborhoods, Jamaica, as well as middle-class black areas of St. Albans, Laurelton, and 
Cambria Heights. Queens is home to such a strong population of middle-class blacks (including 
black immigrants) that they out-earn the white population in Queens (Roberts 2006). 
The compounding character of institutional exposure
 With this frame of reference, I now turn to the measurement of institutional exposure in 
2008.57 It is clear from the previous section that white residents have far more museums located 
conveniently to their homes than black residents. If this is also the case for other forms of arts 
institutions, then institutional exposure will be highly correlated with current attendance rates. 
The figure below reports the ratio of white to black exposure for each type of arts institution. 
 While it seemed possible that other forms of arts institutions could mediate inequalities in 
museum exposure (and thus minimize its potential influence on arts attendance), it is clear that 
museums are representative of a broader pattern. In fact, museums are one of the most equally 
distributed institutions. Instructional institutions are the only  form that is more evenly distributed 
across the city than museums. These organizations are local institutions, often serving only those 
within their immediate area. Their ecological behavior is far different from the clustering we 
previously  witnessed; instruction organizations display the highest tendency to spread out across 
space, with each capturing their own local market (see Small 2010 for an analogue). Galleries 
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57 The 2008 museums dataset is matched with 2010 Census data. 
and theaters operate under a different logic (these organizations can be more readily compared to 
the for-profit firms (Saxenian 1994). Galleries are concentrated in predominantly white, affluent 
areas. They are the most spatially clustered institutions of the four types. This may run counter to 
commonsense thinking regarding pioneering galleries as the precursors to gentrification. It is true 
that they often play this role; however, in aggregate, most galleries are in established gallery 
neighborhoods, surrounded by wealthy, white residents. This is ironic with respect to issues of 
access since galleries are the only institution that regularly offer free viewings of art. 
 Theaters behave similarly, although are not as abundant or mobile (galleries owners can 
relocate with relative ease since they require little building infrastructure in comparison to 
museums or theaters). The table below reports the ratio of exposure for predominantly white 
versus African American census tracts in 2008. This table shows us that there are almost fifteen 
times more local galleries in white versus African American neighborhoods. Theaters have 
almost the same ratio of stratification.  
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 African Americans are less likely to participate in the arts. If institutional exposure holds, 
it would predict that black New Yorkers, regardless of their socioeconomic status, have less 
exposure to arts institutions than other racial groups in the city (but particularly white New 
Yorkers). If there is a clear correlation between inequalities in institutional exposure and 
inequalities in attendance, then it is possible that seemingly race-based differences in attendance 
are masking the mechanism of institutional exposure. 
 In the next section, I introduce income and educational attainment as possible intervening 
variables. The figure below reports an odds-ratio analysis of the data. In the graph below, the x-
axis indicates the varying proportion of African American residents.58  The y-axis displays the 
odds ratios of high versus low institutional exposure. Each line represents a different  income 
level. This figure reports that income59  mediates the relationship  between race and institutional 
exposure, but only to a certain extent. There are extreme exposure disparities for tracts with low 
proportions of African American residents. Low income African Americans (living with 
relatively few other low income African Americans) are extremely likely to be living in a high 
institutional exposure area (over twenty to one odds). Where are communities with large 
numbers of whites, small numbers of low income African Americans, and a thriving local art 
scene? There are a surprisingly large amount of these neighborhoods - they  are communities that 
have been bitten by the arts-based development bug. These include Chelsea, the Lower East 
Side, and Williamsburg, all of which are gallery districts. 
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58 High, medium, low proportion for racial composition, exposure, and income are based on quartiles (low 
< 25th percentile, medium is between 25th and 75th percentiles, and high is above the 75th percentile. 
59 Quantified as median household income per census tract. 
Figure 3.5. Odds ratios of high versus low institutional exposure 
 As we move into tracts with a higher proportion Black, the odds of high exposure begin 
to converge and diminish rapidly. These results tell us that in places with a relatively high 
African American population, income does not  mediate institutional exposure in the way that we 
would expect (i.e. increased income is not  associated with increased exposure). In fact, in the 
areas with the highest Black proportion, there is almost no difference in odds across the three 
income levels.60 It is almost equally unlikely that those census tracts will have high (versus low) 
institutional exposure (it is unlikely because the odds ratios dip below one).  
 These findings bear out in when surveying exposure at  the neighborhood level. African 
American middle to upper middle class neighborhoods do not have high institutional exposure. 
Examples of this include Laurelton, Cambria Heights, and St. Albans; these three adjacent 
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60 The three income levels are: less than $30,000, between $30,000 and $56,410, and over $56,410. 
communities are located in southeast Queens. Combined, they  contain less than five arts 
institutions. These are suburban locales that are each almost entirely  middle class African 
American. While one could argue that there is a lack of arts institutions because these 
communities are far removed from the urban core, we can compare this exposure to similarly 
off-the-beaten path white communities: for example, the white middle class neighborhoods of 
Sheepshead Bay and Bensonhurst in southern Brooklyn have dozens of local arts organizations.   
 The low odds of institutional exposure for high-earning African Americans seems unique, 
but it is possible this finding is accordant with white residents’s experience. The figure below 
displays the odds ratios of high versus low institutional exposure for high-income whites. 
Clearly, the trend is reversed between these two groups. It is unlikely  for areas with a low 
proportion of high-income White residents to have institutional exposure. The odds quickly 
increase as the proportion of high-earning white residents increases. This comparison indicates 
that there is indeed a penalty of residential segregation for Blacks that is not mediated by 
income.
 
Figure 3.6. Odds ratios of high versus low exposure for high income white tracts 
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 Another possible explanation for this disparity  is that institutional exposure is more 
strongly associated with educational attainment rather than income. Education is a strong 
predictor of formal arts engagement (DiMaggio and Useem 1978). I conducted the same odds 
ratios analyses for the proportion college educated, by race.61 The figures below report the odds 
ratios of high versus low institutional exposure for census tracts with the highest proportions of 
African American and white college graduates.62  The results are the same, and even more 
dramatic for white college graduates. In census tracts with a high proportion white and a high 
proportion of white BAs, high institutional exposure is about thirteen times more likely  than low 
exposure. For their African American counterparts, it is less likely to have high exposure than 
low exposure.  
Figure 3.7. Odds ratios of high versus low institutional exposure for census tracts with a high 
proportion of white (left) and African American (right) college graduates
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61 These figures were calculated based on the number of college graduates by racial category divided by 
the number of adults within that racial category. These continuous variables were categories in the same 
method: low (less than the 25th percentile), medium (25th to 75th percentile), and high (above 75th 
percentile).
62 This corresponds to higher than .373 for Black/African American residents and higher than .477 for 
White residents.
 Inequality  in exposure between white and African American New Yorkers holds even 
when accounting for socioeconomic status. Areas with the highest proportion of white college 
graduates increased the rate of institutional exposure, while that rate was almost the polar 
opposite for areas with a high proportion of black college graduates. The same discrepancy  was 
found for high-earning white and black neighborhoods. Areas with a concentration of white, 
educated, wealthy residents are also very likely  to enjoy a concentration of arts institutions. 
Areas with a concentration of black, educated, wealthy  residents do not enjoy the same exposure 
rate. These preliminary  results indicate that a behavioral link between institutional exposure and 
arts institution attendance is worth exploring. 
“The constant penalty”
 The historical origins of institutional exposure are tied to when and how American cities 
became segregated. There is a large body of work identifying the causes and consequences of 
residential segregation (for a review, see Charles 2003). All American cities are cut up  along 
racial lines, most dramatically  for African Americans (Darden 2007, Quillian 1999, Jargowsky 
1997). While prejudice and discriminatory housing practices affect all people of color, Hispanics 
and Asians are far less isolated than their Black counterparts. Conversely, Asians and (to a lesser 
extent) Hispanics do move out of ethnic enclaves and into predominantly white areas (Charles 
2003). 
 Massey  and Denton’s (1993) seminal study of African Americans’ residential segregation 
has a long-term “multidimensional” character that is unique in its effects (Farley and Frey 1994). 
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Massey  and Denton term this the “constant penalty”. These communities lack the basic 
organizations of everyday life, such as banks, grocery stores, and dry cleaners (Small and 
McDermott 2005). Massey and Denton demonstrate that all African Americans, regardless of 
their class, are constrained by  residential discriminatory  practices. This finding is supported by 
Farley  et. al.’s landmark study  (1978) that found whites are the most likely to prefer all-white 
neighborhoods, while African Americans desire to live in integrated neighborhoods. Institutional 
exposure suggests that arts organizations, of all kinds, are embedded in this geographically 
sensitive system. 
 The presented analysis demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between the 
inequalities found in institutional exposure and those found in arts attendance. I argue that 
institutional exposure may  be the hidden driver of what seem to be race-based inequalities in arts 
participation. The era of homogenization heralded in two compounding phenomena: the spatial 
concentration and isolation of New York’s African American population; and the movement of 
museums to white, elite areas. The dramatic inequality in institutional exposure has occurred 
throughout and in spite of democratization policies introduced during the era of homogenization, 
and the current shift towards populist programming. Until arts institutions leaders realize that 
location consideration needs to be part of outreach efforts, institutional exposure will continue to 
be part of the constant penalty. 
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Conclusion
Any organization that stays still is going to die.
Armand Bartos, Jr., former Chair of the SculptureCenter
 In a single sentence, Bartos has characterized one hundred years of history. Over a 
century, we have witnessed the births, struggles, and deaths of hundreds of New York City’s 
museums. We have seen how the collective expectations and individual governance of museums 
have changed over this period. The story of Bartos’ institution, the SculptureCenter, began with a 
charismatic sculptor whose students didn’t  want to leave her Brooklyn studio, and moved into a 
bohemian-friendly carriage house in downtown Manhattan, and then another one in the straight-
laced Upper East Side, and now the SculptureCenter lives on in a multimillion dollar Queens 
exhibition space. The people, art, and ideas that have populated these spaces are too numerous to 
recount - but clearly, Jimbo Blachly would find wellsprings of history if he were to retrace the 
institution’s many steps through the city. Retracing these steps, in essence, has been the task of 
this dissertation. I have uncovered the changing spatial distribution of New York’s museums at 
various points in the city’s history. We have seen  the museum decisionmaking, structure, and 
location has been conditioned on population-level dynamics including population maturity and 
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the introduction of external pressures. It has simultaneously interacted with changing residential 
patterns to generate systematic disparities in local museum access.  
The museum location decision
 The object of study in this dissertation was the museum location decision. I approached 
the analysis of the museum location decision from three points of view: the dynamics shaping 
founder decisions at the organizational level, the large-scale consequences of those decisions at 
the population level, and how the museum location may affect usage at the audience level.  
 In Chapter One, I illustrated three eras of the museum location decision through the 
winding, intersecting institutional paths of the Whitney Museum of American Art and the 
Museum of Modern Art. Both of these institutions were founded in response to existing 
museums’ rejection of contemporary painting. Both were founded just  after the 1929 stock 
market crash, with still-liquid Gilded Age inheritances. These institutions were created towards 
the close of the era of personal ties. During this era, which roughly  spans the Gilded Age to 
WWII, the museum population was still in its “infancy” (Dana 1914). The conventions and 
norms of museum making were still being written. Consequently, the museum location decision 
was a personal one. Museum founders embedded their pet projects in the communities they knew 
and wanted to be a part of. This resulted in a seemingly  random distribution of museums across 
the five boroughs. 
 By the mid-twentieth century, the museum population of New York was growing and the 
museum - as an organizational form - was coming into adolescence. Similar to an insecure 
teenager, new and existing institutions conformed to what they saw to be successful. These were 
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the professionalized, elite institutions that dotted Fifth Avenue in the blueblood Upper East Side 
neighborhood. This created the era of homogenization, in which the number of museums grew 
and yet the range of museum locations shrank. This locational and structural homogenization 
was the result  of increased organizational density (causing competition for legitimacy), the 
introduction of state and corporate funding sources, and rise of the professionalized museum 
administrator. Taken together, this era was witness to the development of the greatest museum 
cluster in the world: Museum Mile.  
 The current era is one of cultural branding. Similar to other organizations that  have taken 
part of the redevelopment and gentrification of American cities, New York museums are now 
using their location decisions not to make the ‘safe’ Museum Mile decision, but to differentiate 
themselves from each other. Museums are now opting to rebrand themselves through locating 
and relocating in new, ‘up-and-coming’ neighborhoods. This spatial diffusion has occurred as a 
result of and in tandem with the geographic saturation of the Upper East Side museum 
population.  
 In Chapter Two, I analyzed how the museum location decision, en masse, interacted with 
residential turnover in New York City. The three eras of the museum location decision transpired 
in very different New York. In the era of personal networks, the city’s population, like its 
museums, were still inchoate and shifting. I argued that during this era, the elites were on the 
move, retrenching further and further north until finally settling on the Upper East Side. Their 
movements, coupled with the idiosyncratic location decisions at the time, left behind a “toss-up” 
of museum clusters, some of which would blossom and some of which would stagnate. The 
following era would determine the life and death of these “toss-ups”. During the era of 
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homogenization, the museum location decision interacted with dramatic residential changes in 
such a way that  African American neighborhoods were extremely unlikely  to receive new 
museums. The exponential growth of Museum Mile coincided with the stagnation of several 
potential museum clusters that were located in areas experiencing demographic transition. This 
all changed during the era of cultural branding. The introduction of economic development 
agents facilitated partnerships between restless museums and gentrified neighborhoods. I argue 
that while this has resulted in an overall spread of the city’s museum population, that spread has 
been carefully controlled to only include areas that are primed for luxury redevelopment. 
 In Chapter Three, I explored how the aggregated museum location decision generated 
systematic racial disparities of institutional exposure. Institutional exposure encompasses the 
cognitive and interactive advantages of geographic proximity to museums, as well as other kinds 
of arts and culture institutions. I argued that there is a possible link between geographic 
proximity to museums and subsequent attendance. I furthered the plausibility of this link in two 
ways. First, I demonstrated that historical patterns of institutional exposure map onto the 
historical and current low rates of African American arts institution attendance. Second, I 
demonstrated that museum exposure is not an aberration from, but in fact reflective of a larger 
pattern of institutional exposure. I supported this claim by  comparing exposure rates for white 
and African American New Yorkers to galleries, arts instruction organizations, and theaters.  
Lessons from the museum location decision 
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 This research makes contributions to a number of scholarly and policy-based debates. In 
this section, I will highlight three lessons that came out of this project. This is not an exhaustive 
list, but points of departure to stimulate further discussion. 
Institutional innovation occurs in geographically saturated populations  
 This dissertation is rooted in the intellectual tradition of new institutionalism. New 
institutionalists identified multilevel factors that  lead populations of organizations to 
homogenize. These factors include higher founding rates, the intervention of the state, increased 
pressures for legitimacy, and the creation of associated professions. As we saw, all of these 
factors came to bear on the New York museum population. However, as its own leading scholars 
have admitted (Strang and Sine 2000, for a notable exception see Leblebici et. al. 1991), new 
institutionalism does not give equal attention to how these homogenized institutions then evolve 
and innovate. In other words, we have a rough series of explanations for how they become the 
same, but how do they then change? The theory  of isomorphism ends when the population is 
institutionalized.
 I offer a theoretical and empirical contribution to this lacuna. I found that maturity of the 
museum population led to geographic saturation which in turn led to innovation. Since museum 
leaders were making similar museum location decisions - on Upper East Side - during the era of 
homogenization, this location came to lose it  capacity to distinguish. Although institutions that 
continue to be founded in or move to the area gained legitimacy  and spillover effects, they lost 
an individual identity. The introduction of a new actor (economic developers) combined with 
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geographic saturation on the Upper East Side prompted the museum population, which had been 
behaving based on isomorphism, to innovate their museum location decision. The location 
decision was now a way to stand out, as opposed to conform. The spatial distribution was 
radically altered during this period (the era of cultural branding).
 The observed evolution of the museum location decision explained when and how New 
York institutions adopted and then abandoned an institutionalized practice. The nature of the 
location decision during this era (in which museum leaders can accomplish the same goals in 
wildly  different, yet similarly  transitioning neighborhoods) is a unique example of how 
organizations can maintain a similar decisionmaking strategy while appearing to diversify. In 
short, this project offers an empirical case explaining how institutions can change while 
remaining the same. 
Museums are a key to the new urban economy
The second-half of the twentieth century marked the transition of urban areas from 
manufacturing to service industries (Sassen 2001). More recently, cities have become luxury- 
and tourism oriented (Judd 1999); tourism is now the world’s third largest industry and tourism 
and entertainment is New York’s second largest (Clark 2004). The museum, along with other 
major art centers, plays a key  role in this new orientation. This change is in line with a broader 
transformation in the role of cities. Instead of being centers of production, cities are increasingly 
centers of consumption; people visit and live in cities to entertain themselves instead of to 
support themselves (Clark et. al. 2002). Cultural amenities are driving the development and 
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attraction of cities more than ever before (Clark et. al. 2002). New York’s second largest industry 
is tourism and entertainment (Clark 2004). 
The positioning of museums in the urban economy is not a New York phenomenon; it is 
occurring all over the world. As discussed briefly in chapter two, museums are becoming 
franchised institutions. Paul Krens’ efforts at the Guggenheim may be the most visible example 
of this effort; most recently, the Guggenheim Foundation announced that it will open a branch 
museum in Abu Dhabi. The Louvre is even getting in on the action; it will open satellite 
museums in Abu Dhabi and northern France later this year. The strategic location decisions of 
museums in this decade and the near future is aligned closely with which neighborhoods, cities, 
and regions will ascend to the world stage.
American cities operate under a two-tiered cultural system
 The consequences of residential segregation, which run the gamut of social outcomes, 
have been well documented (Massey and Denton 1993). African Americans continue to live in a 
spatially  isolated social system that is in the same city  and yet detached from institutions of 
power. Museums - as well as galleries, arts instruction organizations, and theaters - are 
institutions of cultural power. The consequence of this spatial inequality, I argue, is that 
American cities exist in a two-tiered cultural system: one which is legitimized through profitable, 
visible formal institutions, and one which is undercounted and dismissed in informal, 
multipurpose organizations.
 Ethnographic research has demonstrated that  African Americans, and some other 
minorities, engage in cultural pursuits almost exclusively at church, school, or at home (Jackson 
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2002). They do not attend formalized arts-specific institutions to engage in culture. Even middle 
and upper class African Americans in Chicago do not exhibit  their collections at galleries or 
museums, but instead in their apartments (Grams 2010). This trend is occurring even while 
American cultural boundaries are purportedly more porous. Contemporary Americans, unlike 
Bourdieu’s rigid class system in France, can acquire cultural capital later in life. Contemporary 
American cultural capital, as suggested earlier, requires a diverse, omnivorous knowledge base. 
Furthermore, increasingly, it is not only what you know, but how you show what you know: an 
ease of interaction amongst those with cultural capital can be far more rewarding than simply 
knowing a list of artists or composers (Khan 2011). 
 One of the ways to learn how to interact in diverse settings of the culturally  capital-ed is 
by attending formal institutions like museums. However, if the current spatial distribution of arts 
institutions continue, there will be no in-person meeting point to acquire cultural capital in this 
unique setting. Even as whites are becoming increasingly omnivorous, they continue to practice 
the ‘differentiating ritual’ (DiMaggio 2012) of attending segregated arts institutions. The result 
could be cultural apartheid that only  further exacerbates the growing economic inequality in 
American society.
The twenty-first century museum
The museum is becoming something else, and we don’t know what it is yet…
Chris Decon, Director of the Tate Modern63
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63 Tompkins 2012. 
 Like they have at every point in the museum’s institutional existence, some experts are 
hailing the present as the dawn of a new museum model (Anderson 2004). More than ever before 
(people say), museums are shaking off their cobwebs and attempting to ingratiate themselves 
into the daily  lives of the populace. Museums are attempting to create audiences of the future, 
which reflect the diversity, responsiveness, and technological demands of contemporary society. 
 The most visible form of these efforts is the digital collection. Museums have gone viral. 
Google has introduced a new program that allows users to virtually  tour the world’s great 
collections. Even Thomas Campbell, current director of the venerable Met, feels that the future 
of the museum is not in a building: “the museum’s next frontier [will] be less physical than 
philosophical and virtual: a change in the Met’s tone and public face, making it a more open and 
understandable museum, largely by thoroughly rethinking the way it uses technology” (Kennedy 
2011). Another popular strategy is to make the museum space more entertainment-focused. We 
saw this strategy enacted through the Brooklyn Museum’s First Saturday  programs; Target has 
developed a series of partnerships of this nature with museums across the country, including the 
Asian Art Museum in San Francisco and the Chicago Children’s Museum. 
 When the dust settles, these new, exciting initiatives will be recognized as another swing 
on a long-lived pendulum dictating how the museum should fit into American civic life. In the 
future, digital campaigns may be criticized for two obvious reasons: they  elide the systematic 
inequalities in online access, and undervalue the in-person experience of museum attendance. 
Creating an entertainment-like atmosphere in a museum may succeed in getting people in the 
door, but not learning about the contents on the walls. And even after these issues are raised, 
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museum leaders will continue to engage in ‘redefining’ initiatives because the museum is in a 
constant state of redefinition. 
 As long as it has existed in America, the museum has been expected to be many things to 
many different people. It should teach, collect, preserve, inspire, entertain, judge, and more. It 
should be a place of comfort and enjoyment to the poorest and richest individuals in our society. 
It should explain the most abstract and impenetrable cultural concepts, while maintaining their 
hallowed auras. 
 Of course, almost no institution can serve all of these purposes simultaneously. How 
museums - as a population - have swung back and forth on the pendulum between these missions 
has determined where they are located, who attends them, and who funds them. Which way will 
the pendulum swing next? It seems that the museum population is moving towards two opposing 
goals: to develop themselves as landmarks of luxury, redeveloped neighborhoods, and to increase 
and diversify attendance through populist programming and marketing. These goals, I argue, are 
at odds. It’s likely  that these forces will cancel each other out in the end. Museum directors will 
create programs that will attract  a wide range of people, but they will be located in 
neighborhoods that make it  impossible for those people to attend museums with ease or 
regularity. 
 When he was running the Newark Museum in the 1910s and 1920s, John Cotton Dana 
expressed the mixed emotions so many leaders have: 
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Probably no more useless public institution, useless relatively  to its cost, was ever 
devised than that  popular ideal, the classical building of a museum of art, filled 
with rare and costly objects.64
This quote, written by a man who devoted his life’s work to museum administration, 
encapsulates the chasm between the museum’s idealized potential and realized accomplishments. 
The most unique, compelling attribute of the American museum is that everyone can attend it; 
museums are the most fabulous, jaw-dropping places that are explicitly inclusive. But, when we 
look at historical and current attendance rates, this has never really  been the case. If the museum 
continues to live in an increasingly  inaccessible world, it’s potential as a uniting force will be 
squandered. And yet the museum’s promise must not be undervalued. As the United States grows 
increasingly  polarized - economically, politically, and socially  - the institution has the capacity  to 
become more central to American democracy than ever before. 
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64 Quoted in Meyer 1979, 39.
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